posted at the Cohort by Curtis Perry
When most folks think “Packard”, this isn’t exactly what usually comes to mind. This looks more like a ’53 Ford with a bad rhinoplasty. Well, strictly speaking, it’s not a Packard, just a “Clipper”, newly-installed Packard president James Nance’s solution to the continuing debasement of Packard’s luxury car image. Henceforth, the Clipper would be its own division, to do battle with GM’s formidable B-O-P trio and their would-be competitors in the very competitive medium-price segment of the market. Good luck with that, as Ford and Chrysler would soon find out with their Edsel and DeSoto.
Technically, Packard had been building mid-priced cars ever since the Depression forced them to, with the 1935 120. And in 1937, the 115 even had a six cylinder engine. But Packard struggled with the new post war environment once the seller’s boom years were over, and was ailing. And Nance’s last ditch effort was to take Packard upscale again, spinning off the lower tier Clipper line into a separate brand. But as can be seen from the ads, it was still “Packard Clipper”. So it wasn’t really any different, and it was still the same basic car, sitting on the same 122″ wheelbase, using the same body shell.
The basic Clipper used the smaller 288 inch flathead straight eight. But the Clipper DeLuxe shared the big (monstrously so, and 1000 lb heavy) 327 inch version with the senior Packards. Now that would be a fun car to have, a 1953 Clipper DeLuxe two door sedan with that giant hunk of cast iron wrapped around eight cylinders in the front. I saw one of these engines idling once at a car show, and it was impossible to tell it was running except for the fan spinning in front. All of that iron, a giant flywheel, and well-balanced internal parts make these creamy-smooth.
In 1954-55, Packard merged with Studebaker Corporation, hoping it would benefit from Studebaker’s larger dealer network. The Clipper became it’s own make, hoping to compete with DeSoto, The Studebaker-Packard merger was a big mistake and marked the kiss of death moment for Packard. In fact, the final Packards of 1957 were rebadged Studebakers (AKA Packardbakers) and sales tanked. The Packard name was retired the next year (1958). It was around that time that Studebaker-Packard dealerships became the distributor for German Mercedes-Benz automobiles. And the rest is history.
So, is a straight-8 inherently smoother than a V-configured engine? My favorite modern engine is the straight-six…BMW M20 and M30, Volvo white block, Jaguar AJ6 are all engines I have enjoyed owning. Not a fan of V-6s or V8s…
Straight six is the smoothest, having both primary and secondary balance. I remember that from Machine Design class, and that we did the calculations to prove it. Couldn’t do that now to save my life…
V-12 being a pair of straight sixes has similar balance advantages.
What’s not an advantage is the front of that Packard Clipper. Woof!
Straight eights came about because they were easier to cast than V-8’s at the time, and most designs that originated in the thirties were just two more cylinders added to the marque’s already top of the line six. Ford’s V-8 was a major breakthrough in production for its time, and it had a LOT of compromises in it that wouldn’t have been acceptable for higher priced marques. They’re definitely smooth. My Buick 248ci engine was virtually vibration free.
And, a lot of it had to do with style. Once Cadillac and Oldsmobile came out with their high compression V-8’s, the straight 8 was an immediate antique. Even if a manufacturer had managed to match the V-8’s with power and weight in a straight 8, it probably wouldn’t have sold, being considered too old-fashioned and conservative. Packard and Pontiac were the last of the straight 8’s in the US.
and most designs that originated in the thirties were just two more cylinders added to the marque’s already top of the line six.
Examples? While that may have happened in some cases, I’m at a loss to think of any specific examples from the top of my head. I’d be interested to know who did that.
The reverse is the case with the Packard 115 six; it was essentially their eight minus two cylinders.
A lot of the assembled cars, Continental engines came up that way, at this hour of the morning that’s the only one that immediately comes to mind.
(Later in the morning – I think I’m more awake.) I’m going to have to do some serious research regarding turning a straight 6 into a straight 8, but the one bit of information I can clearly remember from my reading (and this is 30-40 years ago), is that any manufacturer who went this route was building a flathead engine. Anyone doing OHV (Buick, etc.) did completely different designs.
Then again, GM was the shark in the goldfish bowl even back then and could afford to design completely different engines for each marque. Doing it on the cheap by adding two cylinders was the way of the independents and the smaller manufacturers who bought their engines from outside firms. I’m pretty certain that Studebaker went this route in the late 20’s for their first straight 8.
Too much reading, too many years ago, and senior memory sucks.
There were at least 65 marques using V8 engines before 1932 Henry’s only real achievement was on the price he charged he brought a V8 into the low priced field.
Yes. Rather than write it all out, I’ll quote just quote Wikipedia:
A straight-8 can be timed for inherent primary and secondary balance, with no unbalanced primary or secondary forces or moments. However, crankshaft torsional vibration, present to some degree in all engines, is sufficient to require the use of a harmonic damper at the accessory end of the crankshaft. Without such damping, fatigue cracking near the rear main bearing journal may occur, leading to engine failure.
Although an inline six-cylinder engine can also be timed for inherent primary and secondary balance, a straight-8 develops more power strokes per revolution and, as a result, will run more smoothly under load than an inline six. Also, due to the even number of power strokes per revolution, the straight-8 does not produce unpleasant odd-order harmonic vibration in the vehicle’s driveline at low engine speeds.
If Wikipedia is right, both inline 6 and 8 cylinder engine can be designed to cancel the primary and secondary forces or moments. As such the 8 will run smoother than the 6.
I never took any engineering or other classes along those lines (economics major) so my understanding of certain technical and mechanical stuff is rudimentary, at best. Thanks for the explanation.
I might add that there’s nothing cooler than popping the hood and seeing that long, shiny valve cover on the Jaguar AJ6/AJ16 engine…made me think of a Spitfire airplane engine…
Cars like this are why I tell friends that I REALLY LIKE CARS, BUT….you can pretty much keep anything built BEFORE 1955. Of course there are a handful of exceptions to that “rule”.
Funny you should mention it. I happen to be reading Bob Turnquist’s Packard history at the moment. I don’t have it in hand but I do recall a couple of salient points (forgive me if my memory serves them ill). the final straight 8 out of the Packard engineering department was introduced in 1940. It initially put out 160 hp in the big cars, had 5 main bearings and two mercury filled harmonic balancers. No wonder it was so smooth!
By the way, I love that opening shot. There is something so clean and dry about desert pix of cars with the bright sun casting black shadows. Makes you wonder how those clouds escape being sucked away into the atmosphere.
I have always liked this generation of Packard, but I think I have to agree with DougD on the (de)merits of the front end. I don’t think I have ever seen one of these as a 2 door sedan.
I might be alone here but I actually like the front end of these… I like the long hood and all that chrome. I certainly wouldn’t kick her outta bed
You aren’t alone. This is my 90-year-old Dad’s favorite Packard face after the classics, and he has a good frame of reference, having grown up with the maturation of automotive styling. They brought back the stateliness that was lost in the first postwar body with it’s mini grille.
Maybe it has something to do with our last names. It’s just a Koch thing LOL
I think after the 1948-50 “pregnant elephant” fiasco, Packard really was toast. These early ’50s models were an attempt to offer something more modern, but they just came off as stodgy and old fashioned looking. It didn’t help that they were still offering cut-rate models known as Clipper. The Senior Packards of 1955-56 really were better, with much more modern styling, modern V8 engines and the full compliment of power and luxury features buyers of premium cars now demanded. But it was too late, and combined with niggling quality issues and the mess of Studebaker pulled them down into oblivion.
A sad end to one of America’s finest marques.
If Packard hadn’t come with the pregnant elephant fiasco and if they had come with a V8 earlier and being with Nash instead of Studebaker if the game would had been different?
http://packardinfo.com/xoops/html/modules/newbb/viewtopic.php?topic_id=15964&forum=4
http://www.hemmings.com/hcc/stories/2005/08/01/hmn_feature25.html
…and being with Nash instead of Studebaker if the game would had been different?
John Conde was working in the Nash HQ on Plymouth Rd when he was tasked with creating flip charts for Mason’s merger presentation to the Packard board. The way the products and facilities were to be sorted out was that all the different division’s models would be based on existing Nash platforms. The Nash Ambassador, Packard Patrician and Hudson Hornet were to be final assembled at E Grand, with the bodies built at the Hudson body plant on Conner. Meanwhile, the Nash Statesman would share it’s body with the Packard Clipper and Hudson Wasp, with body building at the Nash body plant in Milwaukee and final assembly in Kenosha.
My first take is that this proposal would:
first: spell the death of Packard, because who would buy a Packard knowing it’s nothing but a tarted up Nash?
second: it would cost millions to rework E Grand for unibody construction
third: The Statesman and Ambassador are pretty much the same car from the firewall back. Building nearly identical bodies in two different plants would be wasteful in the extreme, by either shipping stampings back and forth or creating two sets of identical dies to make the same parts in two different places at the same time.
No one in their right mind would expect this arrangement to be implemented. If the Packard board was foolish enough to accept it, I bet they would have seen the same thing that happened to Hudson: all the Detroit facilities disposed of and production concentrated in Kenosha within months.
Here is the page from the Conde article. The model alignments are described at the bottom of page 15.
It is because of really well thought out and informed comments like these, that I enjoy reading the comments almost (if not more) than the actual articles here at CC! Thanks for the info.
So what we can deduce is that, basically, Packard was screwed whichever way that they went? The big 3 would have wanted them out of business, so Packard had to be aligned with someone else, who already likely had limited resources. AMC–from my somewhat limited knowledge–was saved by their Jeep brand (what year was this prevalent in–post Pacer or pre-Pacer?).
So what we can deduce is that, basically, Packard was screwed whichever way that they went?
Yup. Nash would have shut E Grand down and there were zero synergies with Studebaker, which led to E Grand shutting down.
As noted in another post, Nance had two strategic objectives: develop a stand alone mid-market brand (he wanted to move Packard back up market, but did not want to walk away from the volume their mid-market priced cars gave them) and bring body building in house (bodybuilding was outsourced to Briggs in 41 and Briggs was not doing them any favors in either quality or price)
Only deal that would have benefited Packard was to beat Mason to the punch and grab Hudson in 53, Hudson was an established mid-market brand, achieving strategic objective #1, and Hudson owned a body plant, achieving strategic objective #2.
Consolidate assembly at E Grand with the Hudson brand on the short wheelbase Packard platform, taking the place of Clipper, move the Packard body tooling to the Hudson body plant, gain several thousand Hudson dealers and the legacy Hudson service parts business.
It would help, but the company still would have died as it was still too small.
Was there a way for any merged company of independents – regardless of the companies that did actually merge – to avoid the eventual concentration of production in one primary location?
Packard merged with Studebaker, and by late 1956, it faced the same fate – the Detroit facilities were closed, and Packards were warmed-over Studebakers produced in South Bend.
The earlier merger proposals envisioned the creation of a “mini-GM” – one company offering several brands spread over a few bodies. The problem is that, even if there had been a four-way merger, the resulting entity would have had a hard time implementing this product plan. The volume simply wasn’t there.
Even Chrysler Corporation had a tough time keeping up with GM by the late 1950s. In response, it moved to share more components among the divisions. The 1957 models took the first step of sharing major components across all divisions, and all Chrysler Corporation wagons used a common body shell starting that year.
Ford tried to match GM with the Edsel and Mercurys with unique bodies, and that effort was dead and buried by 1961. The Edsel was gone and Mercury again became a tarted-up Ford. Even the stunning 1961 Lincoln Continental shared a cowl and windshield with the Ford Thunderbird, and was produced in the same plant.
I doubt that an American Motors consisting of Hudson, Nash, Packard and Studebaker would have been more successful in the long run if it had tried to imitate GM.
Was there a way for any merged company of independents – regardless of the companies that did actually merge – to avoid the eventual concentration of production in one primary location?
Doubt it. Everyone was running far below capacity. Studebaker was building about 150,000 cars in 53, falling well below 100K in 54. Studebaker’s break even was about 220,000. Nash was running 120K in 53, 90K in 54, with a capacity of 250,000. Hudson had cracked 100K in 48 but was down to 66K in 53. George Christopher had been promising the Packard board his plans would put sales at 200,000. Packard cracked 100K in 51, but only managed 63K in 52 and 90K in 53.
One other scenario I have looked at was Nash + Studebaker. Nash had a reasonably up to date platform, but no V8. Studebaker had a modern V8, but an obsolete platform. That would work out as consolidating final assembly on the Nash platform in Kenosha, consolidate engine building in South Bend using the Studebaker foundry and engine plant, while all the facilities outside of the block where the foundry and engine plant were located were sold. Then tear town the Kenosha foundry, remove the engine production equipment. Then use the freed up footprint to build a body plant next to the assembly plant, using equipment removed from the Studebaker body plant, so they are shipping stampings and trim from Milwaukee, instead of assembled bodies, which would cut down on the 40 trucks that were shuttling between Milwaukee and Kenosha daily.
Regarding the “grand alliance” that Pat Foster casts doubt on, the October 2015 issue of Hemmings has a reprint of an interview with Romney that ran in SIA in 81. In the interview, Romney confirmed that the “grand alliance” did in fact exist, in Mason’s mind. Romney said the plan died with Mason as he immediately took the company in a different direction, which follows what Nance said about Romney welching on the deal.
Can’t say I blame George Romney for backing out of a merger with Studebaker-Packard. That company was so sick by 1954 that it probably would have dragged down American Motors with it.
There also would have been a constant struggle for power between James Nance and Romney.
Nance had been dealt a bad hand, but Romney, in my view, was simply the better automobile executive. He had a clearer picture of what he was up against in the competition with the Big Three, and took the appropriate steps (consolidation of production in Kenosha, focus on the Rambler) that helped the company survive for a few more decades.
Can’t say I blame George Romney for backing out of a merger with Studebaker-Packard. That company was so sick by 1954 that it probably would have dragged down American Motors with it.
As it was, AMC nearly went bankrupt in the spring of 56. They had spent $10M getting their own V8 into production, and millions more getting the new 56 Rambler in production.
Romney met with the same insurance company people who had just turned Packard’s loan request down. While Romney admitted to a coworker that he was blowing smoke in the meeting, and he did not get as much as he wanted, he convinced the money people he had a viable plan to turn the company around, and got enough to keep the lights on.
Nance had been dealt a bad hand, but Romney, in my view, was simply the better automobile executive.
Nance and Romney both had a bad situation to deal with. While Nance had been peddling appliances, Romney, whose background was as a bureaucrat, had been learning the business from Mason.
Nance’s lack of experience showed in the negotiations with Studebaker, when he apparently believed the investment banker’s projections of the millions of dollars in synergies that could be realized with Studebaker. imho, those synergies were delusional because Packard and Studebaker were too far apart in the market. Packard making luxury cars and Studebaker making cheap cars meant the proposed platform sharing was a pipe dream.
Nash and Hudson were both in the mid market, so could have had some platform sharing of their top line models with the cheapest Packards. Studebaker’s strength was in cheap cars: the Champion and Commander, so could share with the low end of the Nash or Hudson lines. Packard and Studebaker? Nope, no way.
From my reading Nance wanted to separate the Clipper from the Packard as soon as he got there but it wasn’t until the 1956 model year that it was finally accomplished, with separate dealer signs and such. When the 56’s started arriving at dealers without being labeled as Packards some dealers rebelled and complained and the Packard name was put back on. All too late, of course.
I have never like this vintage very much. Believe it or not I prefer the late 40’s design more. When I finally saw one in the flesh I was pretty disappointed. But the 55’s (and 56’s) more than made up for it.
Nance developed two strategic objectives soon after joining Packard:
-develop a stand alone midmarket brand
-bring body building in house.
Packard never had the capital to buy or build a body plant. He did start separating the midmarket from high end models, as the other Steve says, by renaming the bottom end 200 as the Clipper, then starting to distance Clipper from Packard.
This is the trunk lid of a 53 Clipper. Packard badge as large as the Clipper badge and wearing the Packard crest.
In 54, the Clipper received unique taillights and rear quarter panels.
This is the trunk lid of a 55 Clipper. Large Clipper nameplate and ship’s wheel crest, with Packard in small script off to the side.
While the Clipper carried the Packard shaped grill through 56, there was consideration of eliminating that visual link to Packard as well.
Yes, that is correct. Clipper registered as a separate marque in 1956. Didn’t last the year.
Upon arrival as company president in May 1952, James Nance, being primarily a marketing man, realized the poor differentiation of the medium-priced 200 Series from the upper-medium 300 and the luxury segment Patrician 400 continued draining what little was left of their luxury car reputation. Hence, the Clipper name was revived to lend a modicum of distinct identity to their volume medium-priced models. It was too little too late, though the Clipper did account for 76.9% of their 1953 production. Other than minor re-arrangement of trim, a new grille insert, wrap-around rear window, it was still the same old 200 from the prior two years.
Minor correction: all 1951-54 288, 327 and 359 ci straight eights share essentially the same block. The 288 was a de-stroked 327: 3-3/4 versus 4-1/4.
True. I was probably thinking of Buick’s straight eights, which IIRC did come in large and small block version.
The 1931 version of Buick’s straight eight came in three sizes: 220, 272, and 344 CID. In 1934 a new block was designed for the 272 which became 278. In 1936 a new block was designed @320 CID replacing the two larger engines. For 1937 a 248 CID version of the new block replaced the smaller engine (which had been upgraded to 235 CID). The 320 CID engine weight was nearly 800 lbs, while the 248 was 672 lbs. It makes sense that the blocks may have been different sizes, but basically the same design. The 320 CID version was rated @165 HP in 1941.
Minor correction: all 1951-54 288, 327 and 359 ci straight eights share essentially the same block. The 288 was a de-stroked 327: 3-3/4 versus 4-1/4.
Sticks in my mind that the 288 and 327 only had 5 main bearings, while the 359 had 9.
Yes, 1951-54 five main bearing 288 and 327 engines plus the 1951-53 327 nine main bearing engine sharing the 3-1/2 X 4-1/4. For 1954 the latter bored to 3-9/16, the stroke to 4-1/2 for 359 ci. Compressions increased over these years as well trying vainly to keep up with the V8 competition.
Packard has George Christopher to thank for it’s slide into the midmarket. Yes, the 120 probably saved the company in the mid 30s, but Christopher is quoted as saying he saw Packard’s competitor as Buick, not Cadillac, so that it who he aimed at, until he was fired.
There has been a long running mystery about what happened to the Packard senior line tooling during the war, because the only tooling they had in 46 was for the midmarket Clipper. One urban legend says FDR pressured Packard into giving the senior tooling to Stalin (pretty well debunked) Another theory was that the senior tooling was not adequately protected while in storage during the war and the dies rusted beyond repair. My theory is that Christopher saw an opportunity to close the book on the senior line that he was not interested in, and sold the tooling for scrap.
The bathtub styling of 48-50 was not really that far out of step as Nash, Hudson and Lincoln all followed that trend at the same time.
As for the Reinhart body, yes that grill makes me cringe, when I see it in pictures. Somehow, it, and the heavy handed trim detailing, doesn’t seem so bad when you see one in the metal, like this 54 I saw at the Gilmore a while back.
Let us not forget George Christopher’s partner in this ‘crime’ up to 1942: Max Gilman. As primary ramrod of the medium-priced 120 Eights and lower-medium 110 Sixes, abetted by Christopher’s manufacturing expertise, this duo had no use for the Senior lines in their vision for the company’s future. Alvin Macauley and board acquiesced to the duos very forceful direction to remake the old-line luxury car maker into a middle market contender. Gilman was elevated to company president in 1939.
This they succeeded doing in spades, starving Senior lines of distinctively-differentiated cars, becoming less and less the Packard luxury car perceived by the public as something aspirational as of old. After Gilman’s hasty departure under scandalous circumstances, Christopher in his place was the one-man-show that cemented the solidly medium-priced Packard into place for its remaining postwar decade. Luxury models remained available through the end, albeit a very small percentage of annual sales.
A luxury car reputation is a fragile thing, easily broken, difficult to rebuild and restore to prominence.
As Cadillac has discovered over the past 30 years…
…the duos very forceful direction to remake the old-line luxury car maker into a middle market contender.
And a mighty plunge it was. In 35, a Studebaker President was larger and more expensive than a 120. The 120 and 115/110 later grew larger, but were never far from Studebaker President/Commander prices.
What do you do with a car that’s too special to scrap but not special enough to fix?
This… Apparently this is what you do
I’ll take that Alfa is no one wants it!
You pop another top and watch it rot.
I appraised a beautiful 53 Packard Clipper Four door sedan this summer which had been a two owner car originally bought in Vancouver, BC. The engine purred and as stated in the article you could hardly tell the straight eight was idling.
Seeing the two door sedan in such a condition is a bit unsettling. I always imagined these cars were well optioned and almost always four door sedans.
I rather like this era of Packard. I’ve said before that today it actually seems more modern than the ’55 – ’56 jukebox Packard. No offense as I know the ’55 – ’56 is well liked, and I like them as well. But, the clean simple and tall design of the ’53 has a lot of the proportions and sensibility of a modern car.
As it appeared leaving the factory, not like the pictured heap, the ’53 Packard Clipper seems a lot more Oldsmobile to me than Ford.
This is a ’54, not ’53. Mechanically identical but the rear quarters have taillights like the ’55s. There’s also an extra bit of stainless under the casting that wraps around the front fender from the parking lamp.
And the formal separation of the Clipper from the Packard line didn’t happen till ’56. In ’53 & 4 they were still Packard Clippers. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packard_Clipper
My Paternal grandmother,Nonnie Schrader had a 53 Buick special for her last car
Dad used to talk about ”the last straight eight” he carried on about what a good
engine it was. In 54 all buicks had the nailhead I Think that the fireball had a reputation
for being a gas hog and old school but I bet lot of buick people hated to
see it go! You couldn’t be old style in 1954!