I’ve written numerous articles about bad old GM’s Deadly Sins, including such transgressions as making the most basic safety items optional, such as disc brakes on the new FWD 1967 Eldorado (and Toronado), their standard drum brakes being grossly deficient as well as making improvements to the 1960 Corvair’s deficient standard rear suspension optional. Thanks to increased regulatory standards and the public’s demands for safety, these kind of deficiencies are now (mostly) in the remote past. But this morning I read in the New York Times that Boeing charges extra for two very simple and basic monitoring displays/alerts that would have made it very obvious to the pilots just what was triggering the MCAS software to push their Boeing Max 737s into deadly dives. And not surprisingly, the two planes that went down both lacked them.
This whole affair has been deeply shocking, but to find out that Boeing treats a wide range of safety items as optional extras with which to pad the bottom line has left me deeply dismayed. What is it that makes management and our oversight (FAA) willing to treat safety so cavalierly?
As an aviation buff, I’ve been following the issues with the MCAS system. In a nutshell, it is an automatic system that puts the plane in a nose down attitude when it receives input from the angle of attack sensor that the plane is too far nose up, an intrinsic tendency caused by the larger more efficient engines used on the Max. These sensors are mounted on the outside of the plane, and work quite basically in sensing the angle of the air stream in relation to the fuselage.
It’s well known there was a problem with the sensor on the Lion Air 737 that went down. But there’s two of them, one on each side of the plane. Yet inexplicably, the MCAS system only uses input from one of them. Ever since reading about it initially, I have wondered why, as these sensors are prone to damage or malfunction. That huge flaw in the software is what Boeing is now going to fix as quickly as possible, to make MCAS use input from both sensors. Seems mighty obvious.
But there were two optional devices that would have made this issue evident to the pilots. One is an angle of attack indicator, which gives a readout of both sensors. The other is a disagree light, which activates when the sensors are at odds with each other, as was undoubtedly the case in both these crashes.
These are a simple display and indicator light. And having the light come on would have instantly made it clear that there was an issue with one of the sensors, which would make it obvious to the pilot just why the MCAS system was misbehaving.
There’s no absolute assurance it would have kept these two crashes from occurring, but it’s been documented in the case of the Lion air cockpit recorder that one of the pilots was desperately searching through the airplane’s documentation to understand what was going on.
“They’re critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install,” said Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham. “Boeing charges for them because it can. But they’re vital for safety.”
Redundancy is a key issue in aviation safety. After the Air France Flight 447 crash in 2009, which was caused by another critical sensor, the air speed sensor pitot tubes icing over, an additional third pitot tube from a different manufacturer was added to the Airbus planes in question.
And it’s not just these two displays either.
Boeing charges extra, for example, for a backup fire extinguisher in the cargo hold. Past incidents have shown that a single extinguishing system may not be enough to put out flames that spread rapidly through the plane. Regulators in Japan require airlines there to install backup fire extinguishing systems, but the F.A.A. does not.
“There are so many things that should not be optional, and many airlines want the cheapest airplane you can get,” said Mark H. Goodrich, an aviation lawyer and former engineering test pilot. “And Boeing is able to say, ‘Hey, it was available.’”
But what Boeing doesn’t say, he added, is that it has become “a great profit center” for the manufacturer.
What’s really odd about all of this is that Boeing and the airlines go to great lengths to keep these options (and their prices) out of public view, presumably because the flying public (rightfully) would be concerned about any airline not having the full available complement.
Airlines frequently redact details of the features they opt to pay for — or exclude — from their filings with financial regulators. Boeing declined to disclose the full menu of safety features it offers as options on the 737 Max, or how much they cost.
But one unredacted filing from 2003 for a previous version of the 737 shows that Gol Airlines, a Brazilian carrier, paid $6,700 extra for oxygen masks for its crew, and $11,900 for an advanced weather radar system control panel. Gol did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Oxygen masks for the crew are an optional extra? And advanced weather radar? Hard to believe.
So what did the three US airlines do when it came to optioning their 737 Max fleets? American Airlines bought both the display and the disagree light. Southwest bought the disagree light, and had a angle of attack display of a different type mounted over the pilots’ head, which they are now moving down on the main display screen. And United…passed on both. A United spokesman said the airline does not include the features because its pilots use other data to fly the plane. No further details on that available.
Meanwhile, Boeing is hard at work in modifying the MCAS software to incorporate data from bot sensors. But that’s still no reason to not display the data and have a warning if there’s a discrepancy.
Incorporating the disagree light and the angle of attack indicators on all planes would be a welcome move, safety experts said, and would alert pilots — as well as maintenance staff who service a plane after a problematic flight — to issues with the sensors.
The alert, especially, would bring attention to a sensor malfunction, and warn pilots they should prepare to shut down the MCAS if it activated erroneously, said Peter Lemme, an avionics and satellite-communications consultant and former Boeing flight controls engineer.
“In the heat of the moment, it certainly would help,” he said.
I’m afraid this whole episode has deeply shaken my faith in Boeing and the FAA, which has allowed Boeing to largely self-certify their new planes. That reminds me way too much of how the EPA allows automakers to self-certify the emissions of their cars. And we’ve seen the results of that.
Update: I just read (at 9 AM PDT) that Boeing is going to make the disagree light standard from now on, but is still going to charge extra for the sensor display.
Related reading:
1960-1963 Corvair: GM’s Deadliest Sin?
1967 Eldorado vs. Renault R-10: An Unfair Comparison Thanks To a GM Deadly Sin
How GM Nickled and Dimed Americans (and Itself) To Death With Undersized Tires
Really? When most other car makers were just as much to blame? Shame for trying to link the old GM to this tragedy.
Are you prepared to use any tragedy to drag up your version of GM’s Deadly Sins?
Are you seriously saying that because other manufacturers cared as little about human lives as GM, GM should really not be blamed? That is a pretty damn absurd statement.
I don’t think he meant that GM shouldn’t be blamed, but that the others should also be blamed.
I agree
But it does seem that there is a lot of GM bashing on this sight sometimes.
Every company is trying to sell you the least amount for the most money. Just enough to keep yours satisfied to come back for more.
I’m a lifelong GM skeptic. My position is that as the market leader (52% in my childhood) GM should have always led by example, whether it was safety or quality. The rest of the market would have had to keep up.
They chose not to. Shame on them.
GM ITSELF linked 124 deaths and 274 injuries to the ignition key lock failure. 17 survivors were victims with physical injuries that resulted in quadriplegia, paraplegia, double amputation, permanent brain damage, or pervasive burns. Those lives have been ruined.
Who knows how many actually died and were injured by GMs very similar tactics to save a few pennies on a part or inability to make an ignition lock that works properly?
Deadly sin indeed.
Nobody cares if you’re going to leave CC, stop showboating and quit already
This isn’t an airline, there’s no need to announce your departure.
Well played. ;o)
Hopefully weather doesn’t force a cancellation…
Oh come on — the very first thing I thought of when I read about this was “jeez, it’s just like the missing sway bar on the Corvair.” Full disclosure, I own a Corvair. A ’64 with both the sway bar and the camber compensating transverse spring in the rear.
How true regarding the Corvair. Interesting that your CC name is “Mad Hungarian” which was also the nickname of comedian Ernie Kovacs, who was killed when his Corvair Lakewood crashed in Los Angeles in the early ‘60’s.
That’s all nice and dandy, but let’s talk about the elephant in the room: There is an obvious design flaw, causing the tendency to lift the nose up / stall / etc.
It is like having the car with bad wheel geometry and tendency to veer off the road, and only additional control systems like ESP can keep it on the track. I wouldn’t trust such car, regardless of the additional control systems, alarms and indicators, would you?
You are correct Sir! This matter is not getting its due attention in the reporting.
And with all respect to those who lost their lives in these tragedies, this is a real PR disaster for Boeing.
Perhaps it is about time we jettison the “government is the problem” mindset.
Government is not the problem. Greed is the problem.
It’s not nearly that straightforward, and the comparison to automobiles really only goes so far.
With an aircraft, any significant changes to engines or equipment can alter its center of gravity and dynamic characteristics in ways that are significantly more dramatic than a passenger car. In a car, adding a different engine that’s lighter or heavier, shifting the weight distribution forward or back a few percentage points, may produce some noticeable changes in handling, but it’s pretty incremental and it’s unlikely to make the car unstable. That’s not true with an airframe because there are a lot more dynamic factors in play. On aircraft, if a piece of equipment is removed or replaced by something lighter, it’s not uncommon for it to have to be replaced with ballast, or require other design changes.
The 737 MAX series is challenging in that respect because it’s a mostly carryover airframe with newer, more efficient engines; that is, as I understand it, a big part of the sales pitch, since the 737 series is very popular and has a lot of users. Adding new engines to an existing airframe is a huge challenge even if the new engines are better in every respect — there are CG issues; center of pressure issues; changes in airflow into, out of, and around the engines, etc.
One notorious example of how troublesome this can be was the Royal Navy version of the F-4 Phantom II, the F-4K. For the F-4K, the British decided to replace the F-4’s J79 turbojets with Rolls-Royce Spey turbofans. On paper, this sounded like a major improvement: The Spey was substantially more powerful than the J79 and turbofans are more fuel-efficient. However, its mass-airflow requirements were very different, it was physically larger, and with more thrust it ran hotter. Redesigning the engine bays and intakes to accommodate the Spey made a mess of the Phantom’s aerodynamics, so the Spey-engined F-4K and -4M actually ended up with a lower maximum speed (but better acceleration and climb rate) and poorer high-altitude performance despite having 15 percent more thrust than USAF and USN Phantoms.
The ideal solution dynamically is to redesign the airframe and wings around the engines, but that’s rarely feasible. Computer-managed or assisted flight controls are very powerful and are capable of managing airframes that would otherwise barely fly (like the F-117), and a lot of modern aircraft are mostly fly-by-wire anyway.
The issues here are essentially merchandising, as Paul says.
A related problem that some pilots have been broaching is that Boeing’s flight manuals and pilot training materials don’t really talk about the MCAS or managing these types of malfunctions. That too may ultimately be about marketing, since Boeing has taken pains to sell the 737 MAX line as being a painless follow-on to the familiar 737, just with greater fuel efficiency and some improved minor features.
From my reading, these more powerful engines were mounted more forward than previous ones, and the tail was changed. Airframe may have been the same, but as I understand it a change in these items would be enough to pretty much consider the whole plane as a new model. Certainly handling characteristics were different and it appears pilots were either not aware of this or were flying to previous iteration ‘muscle memory’ (for want of a better term that incorporates autopilot).
The nose was stretched, so I assume the tail had to be revised accordingly to balance the increased keel area, but Boeing made a point of not changing the wing, and the center fuselage I think is about the same (except on the 737 MAX 7, where there were plugs to make room for extra seating rows just ahead and behind the wings). So, it was not exactly the same airframe, but Boeing tried to limit the scope of the changes.
The tendency to treat it like the older 737 even when its handling characteristics were different were, at least according to some pilots, a function of the flight manuals and training materials downplaying or ignoring the differences. I believe there was at least one pilot complaint to the FAA’s anonymous message system calling complaining that the materials the company provided were really inadequate in this respect.
The nose was stretched for a number of reasons, so I assume the tail had to be modified to balance the change in keel effect. Also, the 737 MAX 7 eventually got fuselage plugs to accommodate some extra seating rows ahead of and behind the wings. So, it was not a completely carryover airframe, although I think the wings and wing box were unchanged and a lot of the fuselage was the same as before.
The FAA got at least one pilot complaint that the flight manual and training materials really did not adequately address the differences from the earlier 737, which is the point I was making; see https://www.dallasnews.com/business/airlines/2019/03/12/boeing-737-max-8-pilots-complained-feds-months-suspected-safety-flaw
How much of the original 737-100 remains?
This thing seems like Abe Lincoln’s ax.
About this much LOL
Cute little thang ain’t it?
Stretching the 737 is nothing new. The previous generation 737-900 is almost as long (with similar seating capacity) as the 757, thus eliminating the need for the 757 in Boeing’s line-up.
Also, maybe I have this wrong, but wasn’t the new 737-MAX supposed to get carbon fiber wings like the 747-8? That would certainly change things a bit in that they are considerably lighter.
I’m sure the COG thing was worked out with these. I’m inclined to think most of this is a lack of training in conjunction with the aforementioned “Deadly Sin”. Aren’t pilots supposed to be checked out on a new type? Although this is a 737 more or less, it’s a whole different kind of flying all together.
MarcKyle64’s picture above shows the difference quite nicely between a 1967 model year Boeing 737 and a 2019 MY 737. And that doesn’t even consider the differences between flying one with old fashioned cables (737-100 & 200) to more modern controls (and engines) in a 300 or 400 series, to the Next Gen 500, 600, 700, 800, and 900. This New Max series is like a Resto-Mod if you will to the old 737. Other than appearance, it’s a whole new plane!
I read the same about the shift in center of gravity like you Don. I also read about the inadequate training for the Max 8s and that the training was basically self administered on tablets. No doubt this is something that needs to be addressed as it obviously had a major impact on the handling of the aircraft.
I also wonder how long Boeing will keep revising the 737 air frame. I know it is historically a good plane and well liked, but when is it time to move to a new design? How much of this continual use of an old air frame is profit driven? It reminds me too of Canada’s CF-18 (F-18) replacement debacle. One of the planes we looked at was the Boeing’s Super Hornet, another old air frame Boeing has brought up to date. In this case, it’s not even it’s own design.
I mentioned it in my article: adding these larger more efficient engines created a tendency for the Max to nose down (correction: actually nose up) under certain conditions. The MCAS program exists solely to compensate for that inherent tendency. Thus the analogy a previous commenter made about an car with unstable handling characteristics needing ESP is quite relevant. MCAS is a BandAid for an inherent instability of this airplane.
That may not be a first, or a fatal flaw inherently, but Boeing treated MCAS as transparent, meaning airlines did not have to re-certify their 737 pilots to fly the Max. That was a key selling proposition. And the result is that pilots are encountering a sudden powerful nose down situation due to faulty sensor input that they literally cannot overcome by physical force alone. The only solution is to shut MACS down. But since no additional training was required, they were not prepared to do so.
That’s the whole gist of the issue.
An automotive equivalent would be to put a driver into an early ABS braking system car without having been told that the system will make the pedal pulse and chatter, meaning it was doing its job. Instead the driver freaks out and releases the brakes. And cause a crash. Or something like that.
I had understood that the plane’s tendency is to go nose-up too easily, which could lead to a stall. Thus the MACS software compensates in the background to keep the nose down. In a malfunction the software gets aggressive and pushes the nose down hard. As you say, shutting off MACS is the solution. As you also note, Pilots won’t know this without the appropriate indicators.
“An automotive equivalent would be to put a driver into an early ABS braking system car without having been told that the system will make the pedal pulse and chatter, meaning it was doing its job. Instead the driver freaks out and releases the brakes. And cause a crash. Or something like that.”
Something like that did actually happen. When Chevrolet introduced the 1991 Caprice, of course many police agencies bought them in droves. Many officers did not receive any training on the ABS on the 1991 Caprice and this resulted in a number of crashes. Once they were trained on how to properly brake with ABS, the problem went away.
With this aircraft it seems that more adequate training would surely better prepare the pilots for the situation when MCAS needs to be shut down. This is similar to how the police officers needed training on how to brake properly with ABS in emergency situations. It seems to me the significant alterations made for this variation of the 737 should have required more extensive training, but surely this would have effected appeal of purchasing the aircraft, and likely hampered sales somewhat. I hope part of the “fix” for this aircraft is to have the pilots recertified.
My bad…yes, nose up. From my article:
In a nutshell, it (MCAS) is an automatic system that puts the plane in a nose down attitude when it receives input from the angle of attack sensor that the plane is too far nose up, an intrinsic tendency caused by the larger more efficient engines used on the Max.
One would think that the designer of the MCAS system would have tested aircraft altitude AGL (above ground level) before forcing “Nose Down”.
Getting an abrupt and strong nose down control move two miles above the ground might be disconcerting to the pilots, but there would be plenty of time to remedy the situation. Having MCAS do its thing so close to the ground when both pilots are usually very busy, leaves no time for well considered reactions.
Getting an abrupt and strong nose down control move two miles above the ground might be disconcerting to the pilots, but there would be plenty of time to remedy the situation
Maybe. maybe not. I’m not an expert in this field, but airplanes at high altitude have very little margin for either stalls or exceeding their designed max airspeed velocity. You nose down at 550mph with the throttles still on, and very quickly you’re breaking the sound barrier.
Commercial trucks are often equipped with a Bendix anti-collision system which applies brakes if it senses something ahead, it also beeps when it considers that the following distance is too close. Naturally it has difficulty on curves, including with road signs. But not always, so the reaction is often a surprise.
Recently the unit on a truck I was operating decided that an overpass, at night, was dangerous and locked up the brakes at 65 mph with no warning. And then changed its mind and let go before I hit the abutment.
There were no instructional placards in the cab, no orientation, just “there’s your cab”. A red warning flashed on the dashboard during the incident but then disappeared so I don’t know what it said. It was late so I was alone there, if a car had been beside me they would have been crushed.
At one point I was involved with training people to operate remote control locomotives. There were similar issues which resulted in fatalities and damage,and a similar disregard for completing the full instruction as submitted to FRA. At point I failed a student because he was unable to control the locomotive and had collided with another one. They brought in a manager to certify him.
The impetus remains the same: How can we obviate skills which cost us a premium?
The deaths are not taken seriously, just part of doing business.
We need to consider a corporate death penalty since these are all premeditated deaths.
Yep. And you need to be trained and re-trained on a simulator so those reactions are all but automatic.
If I remember correctly they fitted a yaw damper to the 747 because the prototype was hard to control. At least they didn’t make it optional.
Thank you for the information and comparison to an early ABS equipped vehicle. It helped explain the situation to me.
In one of the articles I read, the problem was described as resulting in part from the age and design of the original 737. It was designed so long ago, in relation to small and regional airport terminal access, that the cabin needed to be closer to the ground so that roll-up aluminum steps could be used for passengers to mount and dismount. This worked fine with the skinnier and lower-bypass-turbofan engines (“fat cigars”) in use at the time. Over time, newer engines have used a higher and higher bypass ratio in order to improve efficiency, with an accompanying large increase in engine diameter, and Boeing simply ran out of room to place them on the old pylons (even as designed and built now, the engines on the 737 are closer to the ground than in other Boeing planes. I recall a recent picture of my cousin who is a flight attendant, sitting in the front of a 737 engine; she could quite easily walk right up and sit down). Boeing’s solution, in addition to lengthening the nose wheel assembly, was to move the engines forward and up, to where they are now nearly attached directly to the wing. This contributes significantly to the nose up attitude at high angles of attack-engine thrust has been moved forward in relation to the center of gravity of the airplane. Basic physics.
Why would Boeing do this? Because it is cheaper and easier to modify an existing airframe, both from a design and manufacturing perspective, but also from that of certification. And it is easier to sell more of an “existing” airplane to airlines, as you can market it as not needing extensive and expensive, new training for pilots and mechanics.
Whether Boeing stretched an existing airframe too far from its original design, the extent to which Boeing was negligent in not explaining the consequences of these design changes to pilots and airlines, or requiring that pilots be trained in the change in how the airplane flies and is electronically managed, and whether the FAA was too lax and cozy in its regulatory relationship with Boeing, will be sorted out in the investigative and democratic (small d) process. But an important piece of understanding comes from the decision by Boeing to keep stretching out a popular, existing airframe in the rush to beat Airbus and maximize profits. I see many parallels in the auto industry, so I see this as a relevant topic for CC.
This piece in the LA Times covered that part of the story:
https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-fi-boeing-max-design-20190315-story.html
I know that the 737-200’s that flew for Pacific Western Airlines and CPAir had a built in air stair system that folded out from the port side passenger door for use at smaller airports in Western Canada. The planes didn’t need any ground equipment at all.
I also remember the retracting stairs, very convenient for deplaning right out onto the tarmac at ONT (Ontario Airport) before it was remodeled with skyways. This was an option which added weight. I loved those -200s, as their acceleration made takeoff runs more fun than usual.
Re “captive” FAA inspectors, Conflict-of-Interest is widespread in both business and gov’t, and reflects of a general decline in ethics. Why be “good” if one believes there’s no eternal reward for it?
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-did-the-faa-allow-the-boeing-737-max-to-fly?utm_medium=social&utm_social-type=owned&mbid=social_facebook&utm_source=facebook&utm_brand=tny&fbclid=IwAR3rhPoLPr2o54AQBOJFCIFKl7w4f1oX5KiNglAuYH6l5A8FgugIynUce8M
Thank you for the article – a real eye-opener !
Serendipity.
Boeing, one of the great US companies? Looks like Airbus is squeezing them. SHAME on you Boeing. Installing safety features on as options!
Ironic that Airbus only recently copped a massive decline in orders for their A380.
The A380 burns ten gallons a mile at cruise. That’s a huge amount of fuel. I’ve read reports that 3 787s are more efficient in seat-mile costs than two A380s. Scheduling is obviously easier with more planes. No one wants to wait a few hours for their connecting flight anymore.
But this debacle has me wondering what deficiencies there are with the 787. Does anyone else remember the battery fires the 787 had? Seriously? Battery fires?
Yep, it’s a bit apples for oranges. The A380 was just too large. Nothing wrong with its airworthiness and apparently everything wrong with the efficiencies as you’ve mentioned, as well as issues including resale prices. Essentially not worth the cost of maintaining such an enormous plane for such little advantage.
What its relative demise may do is free up capacity for the 737 competitor at Airbus in the wake of this incident
I agree. Embraer and Bombardier may see orders increase as well.
About four or five years ago, I watched a long special on Al Jazeera news regarding cost-cutting and safety problems with Boeing. It had employees talking with anonymity and that kind of stuff. The tone of it was like “It’s only a matter of time before disaster.” It immediately came to mind when the crash first made the news.
I’m actively seeking out Airbus flights.
I’m presently abroad and I’ve amended my itinerary so I can avoid Boeing aircraft.
“If it’s Boeing, I’m not going?”
Well, you might be going – just not where you might’ve expected…
Ok if your okay with self certified aircraft, your family can sue Boeing if you die due to their negligence.
That’s the route now, not safety procedures.
That’s not easy, given Boeing’s marketshare.
One more thing that I think will cause Boeing trouble is the fact that the Max planes have the very noticeable wing design with the upswept tips (sorry, I don’t know the right technical language for planes). As a flyer, you can notice them a mile away, and now people will see them and get nervous. My wife immediately started harping that I needed to watch out for the “death planes” with the “crazy wings.” Perceptual damage like that is almost impossible to repair, and people simply won’t want to fly on those visually distinctive planes.
All 737s ever since the -200 have had winglets. They’ve been around for decades. You’re not going to find a 737 that doesn’t have them. They’re not new to the Max.
But maybe you were being tongue in cheek?
Somewhat tongue in cheek, but also in-line with other non-experts who don’t know much about planes. For people like us, planes will get grouped together by recognizable design features like the wing tips. I’ve seen news reporters “inform” viewers about the Max by saying that it has the distinctive upswept wings. People won’t differentiate between generations, they’ll latch onto that visual detail and make assumptions. Just like all Corvairs were seen as dangerous, even though later ones were much improved.
Also, I could be wrong, but don’t the Max’s wings have a more pronounced upsweep than earlier models?
The max8 planes have distinctive dual winglets which extend both upwards and downwards on an angle like the skegs in the tail of a ‘59 Pontiac.
BEO is right:
The purpose of winglets? To lengthen the wing, in aerodynamic terms, so that it tapers to a point rather than being chopped off. This reduces drag. The winglets are turned up to keep the plane from becoming wider, which would be a problem at the loading gates.
The present political climate in the USA is pro-business and anti-regulation in the extreme.
I don’t see any new regulations on Boeing happening for a long time, if ever. Torts are subscribed as a remedy to safety issues in this realm, not legislation.
“What is it that makes management and our oversight (FAA) willing to treat safety so cavalierly?”
Canucknucklehead is right and to explain it further, in an effort to “cut government waste” Boeing is allowed to self-certify. Not only that, they lied to the FAA about the criticality of the system calling Hazardous rather than Critical, and they did that by lying about how much MCAS could correct the pitch by 500% as to not trigger more oversight.
So Boeing lied about what the system could do so that it wouldn’t get scrutiny by regulators, self certified the system as less dangerous than it was, purposefully avoided training existing pilots on the system so that they could sell the planes as not needing the expense of retraining, and then sold the safety features that could have saved the lives of everyone at extra cost. Somehow I see that as a little worse than charging extra for seatbelts.
Here’s a source that details more of the self-certification process: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
If safety is a priority, no company, especially one as large and powerful as Boeing, should be able to certify its own products.
However, it is the will of voters in the USA that a company like Boeing be allowed to do so.
Expect more such incidents.
Agreed, it should always be ‘Third Party’ inspection. In Alberta, an engineer cannot stamp his own drawings. They have to be sent out to be approved.
Erm, as an Alberta-licensed engineer, this came as a bit of a surprise. In actual fact, by law, a licensed engineer MUST authenticate (seal) his/her own work. To do otherwise would be unprofessional practice. And I believe this to be the rule in all jurisdictions in Canada, if not the US as well.
It’s that way in the US as well. Putting one’s stamp on any drawing is putting ones livelihood and reputation on the line. A professional engineer can stamp the work of others, but they are then assuming responsibility for any issues as the stamp means they have reviewed and agree with the work.
I’ve had a professional engineer’s license since 2001, so I’ve lived this for a while.
The article is complete with the usual comment from Boeing that “we can’t comment because the matter is under investigation”, doubtless later to be followed by the “we can’t comment because the matter is being litigated”.
All power to the Seattle Times for putting this out in a place where Boeing must be a very significant employer.
Looking at the Seattle Times article and Paul’s “Do Not Touch” photo gave me pause. The weather-vane like AOA sensors probably do not react well to any manual bump or force, no matter how gentle, other than simple airflow pressures.
Any yet, in the lead photo in the Seattle Times article, I see two external ports situated directly above what looks to be the starboard AOA sensor with their two heavy cable trailing down just in front – and very close to – the suspect sensor that activates the MCAS.
I have no idea what these two ports and their cables are for, but if they are used for any reason in between flights, it’s not hard to think that the attachment and detachment of these cables in close proximity to the “Do Not Touch” sensor in the hectic turnaround time of most passenger aircraft could be problematic.
Any auto-control flight system that fights manual input from human pilots and does not disengage completely is, IMHO, a bad design. As a person who spent his whole career designing, developing, and testing software, if there is one thing I do not trust, it is software.
Update… the two upper ports are the starboard pitot tubes.
I wonder if these tubes have flagged covers or heaters put on them when the plane is overnighting on the ground or if they are visually inspected during pre-flight. In both cases someone on a mechanical lift is physically near the AOA sensor on a regular basis.
It’s not just the PRESENT political climate. For the past two decades, or perhaps more, the US government has increasingly taken the attitude of corporations as “partners” in the regulatory process. This mindset has only been amplified over the years, regardless of what political party is in control of the presidency, congress, or congressional committees. The results of this way of doing things are predictable.
Most regulatory agencies are staffed with former executives of the industries they’re regulating, and then when these folks are done with their government service, they head right back to the industry itself, or more lucratively, lobbying on behalf of them. There seems to be much less sense of duty for the public interest as compared to decades ago… and such a sense of duty has certainly not been stressed by Congress.
This holds true not only for aviation and automobiles, but for food safety, pharmaceuticals, you name it. Right now, the cards are stacked heavily against the public interest. If there’s any good that can come out of these Boeing disasters, maybe the public will begin demanding that this way of doing things must change… but sadly I’m not hopeful.
Thanks, Paul, for this informative take on this topic.
I think of how easily the present administration sidestepped the provisions put into the CFPB’s leadership succession *specifically to frustrate attempts at regulatory capture* and installed a Wall Street shill at the head of it.
And yet, over the past two decades, in the U.S. commercial aviation fatalities have decreased by 95 percent, when measured by fatalities per 100 million passengers.
Commercial air travel is remarkably safe.
Should we remain vigilant? Certainly. But the contention that people are endangered when they set foot in a commercial aircraft because of U.S. regulatory policy is not supported by the facts.
I agree: the political climate regarding regulation and oversight goes back several decades.
I’m always a bit baffled by the contradictory information I get about the experience of government regulation. On the one hand, there is no shortage of news stories like this where oversight is clearly too lax and inadequate. On the other hand, from what I’ve heard from acquaintances who have actually experienced government audits, it’s far from a buddy-buddy affair. I was told that the regulators (this was the medical device industry, so the FDA) told them flat out that their approach to the audit is essentially “we know you are committing violations and we will find them and you will be fined (or worse) before we are done.” I was also told that the experience with foreign regulators (European, I think) was far more collegial and less stressful. And these audits were happening constantly. Maybe it’s different in other industries.
I am not sure what “the present political climate” has to do with any of this. The FAA did not get even an interim administrator appointed by the current administration until January of 2018. This plane’s entire development and certification occurred under an FAA run under the previous administration.
I am kind of amazed that even now we humans tend to be surprised and amazed by regulatory failures. Those would seem to me more the norm than the exception.
Government and regulations (protections, really) are only as good as the people who administer them.
Let’s once again put people in charge who believe in good governance.
I’ve mentioned here before that the former head of Toyota Aus. was once questioned about the basic level of equipment fitted to his models and the cost of simple options like ABS, and that his answer was that “mate, if we could charge more for the air in the tyres, we would.” Like GM of old, who can challenge us?
I’m not clear why this story would be a shock to someone of your singular intelligence, PN. A disappointment, ofcourse, Boeing’s stuff being the Camry of the skies, but any time the controls on capitalism unbound are relaxed or even less enforced, there’s a cost. The very system is designed that way, to the extent that there’s reward for those who find a way around constraints. Commonly, the results are just more profit for the individual operator, and not awful at large. But on the big risks, they always are. Self-certifying in everything from building codes up to planes has always been an given-industry con-job and a delight to governments who want to move expenses off their books.
(I say all this as the usual white middle-class beneficiary of capitalism, btw).
As long as it’s not Americans being killed there’s no way any new regulations will be added on Boeing.
Cynical? It’s the truth.
I get your cynicism, but I think that’s stretching it.
“No one is more motivated to have a safe aircraft than the manufacturer, because if one crashes, it could be the end of that manufacturer, it could cost billions of dollars — just like it’s costing Boeing,”
– Jeff Guzetti, author of a 2011 DoT Inspector General’s report generally critical of FAA oversight.
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/21/congress-faa-boeing-oversight-1287902
Not to put too fine a point on it, but even Americans being killed — en masse, on a regular basis — does not translate into regulatory or legislative action if the right people are making money off it.
Bingo. It would, at a minimum, need to be the RIGHT Americans, not just a bunch of yokels from flyover country, or maybe even commuters from NYC. Now, politicians and/or their families, media moguls, celebrities, or major industry players might… MIGHT spark interest in federal “regulators,” but I doubt it.
As several have mentioned, America belongs to the lawyers. Who know that a few innocents will need to die in order for there to be a multi-million or -billion dollar settlement, which in turn keeps the business going.
It’s always been this way. Knute Rockne dies in a Fokker f-10 in 1931 and people go nuts and the result is the DC-2 and 3 and Boeing’s 247 and the later formation of the CAB, forerunner of the FAA
Excerpt from Wikipedia:
Driven by the public feeling for Rockne, the crash story played out at length in nearly all the nation’s newspapers, and public demand for an inquiry into the crash’s causes and circumstances ensued.
The national outcry over the disaster that killed Rockne and seven others triggered sweeping changes to airliner design, manufacturing, operation, inspection, maintenance, regulation and crash investigation, igniting a safety revolution that ultimately transformed airline travel worldwide from the most dangerous forms of travel to one of the safest.
So…logic indicates that when a Kardashian gets killed in a Boeing, then things will begin to happen. Not until then though.
More than Knute Rockne, the disaster that comes to mind is the Titanic. Most of those who perished were traveling in steerage. If it had been just those who died, no one would have much cared.
But the few, very wealthy Americans who went down with the Titanic after it hit an iceberg were the ones that got regulators attention.
> Knute Rockne dies in a Fokker f-10 in 1931 and people go nuts and the result is the DC-2 and 3 and Boeing’s 247 and the later formation of the CAB, forerunner of the FAA
See also: Mansfield bars
So…logic indicates that when a Kardashian gets killed in a Boeing, then things will begin to happen. Not until then though.
I’m willing for them to make that sacrifice.
The opioid crisis is the poster boy of that.
And guns are obviously another.
At least with airplanes, once the issue is known, the consumer can vote with their dollars and effect change (or perhaps not, but at least eliminate the issue for themselves). If everyone just decided no way am I ever flying on a 737MAX, airlines and Boeing would be falling all over themselves to offer every conceivable safety backup and advertising as such – “WE at Airline ABC offer all the warning lights imaginable and redundant safety systems that are offered, does your Airline X even offer Oxygen masks to your pilot?, there’s a reason your seat is $20 less over there”
With opioids an informed patient can avoid them and/or be aware of and/or attuned to the risks (now at least). If everyone decided to not take opioids in favor of other options (that admittedly may not work as well) and to publicly shun the doctors that overprescribe them as well as refusing to do business with Purdue Pharma to start with things might change.
With guns, you just can’t avoid some zealot at your church or ballgame or shopping trip or birthday party or whatever that’s intent on doing harm. Even when congressmen (Scalise) and women (Gifford) and schools full of kids (I think there’s a limit to comment length) and even modern era presidents (Reagan) get shot nothing changes, even though the general public overwhelmingly supports at least common sense changes to the status quo.
No this is not to begin a political rant but to illustrate the problem with the dollars involved.
And no, I am not convinced that Airbus would come out squeaky clean in a comparison either, there’s likely an analagous scenario there as well that just hasn’t caught up with anyone yet. The Europeans are not by default any more altruistic than the Americans.
And now I read that several foreign airlines want to pull out of their contracts to purchase more 737 Max’s. So, the consequences for Boeing are beginning. What will be the consequences for the FAA? Will we, as a nation, swing back toward a belief in the necessity of robust and independent regulation of the civil aviation market? Given the complexity of the problem (design history/technological change/human-artificial intelligence interface/regulatory climate/market forces all coming together in ways that are understandable, tragic, and possibly criminal), I am impressed that the problem is being understood and addressed so quickly. Which also suggests how easily it could have been prevented. It is not like the De Havilland Comet, for which a special water tank pressurization system had to be constructed in order for the nature and cause of the metal fatigue that downed several of them to be understood. Flying remains the safest form of travel; engineers continue to make it even more so. It is the human systems that we have to continue to monitor, regulatory as well as economic, so that the pressures to bring a program in on time and under budget do not result in decisions to cut corners and people falling out of the sky. I can read the Mulroney on a car and determine if it has all of the newest safety features; I can do an Internet search (and talk to my pharmacist! They know a lot more than the doctors do about drug main- and side-effects) to inform myself whether I think a drug is safe or not; I cannot do that on a commercial airplane.
+1 on the opioid crisis.
A gun control debate is probably a political pandora’s box better not opened on CC, I would think.
A gun control debate is probably a political pandora’s box better not opened on CC, I would think.
Agreed, as it’s purely political.
Deaths from heroin overdoses could essentially end tomorrow by making methadone or suboxone free to anyone already addicted who wants it.
Alright, I won’t disagree with leaving that Pandora’s box better remaining closed, my point was more to the notion of the “right people” needing to be affected being the necessary motivator for change as mentioned above. There have been political leaders personally affected by the opioid crisis too, so those in charge HAVE been the ones affected and things still haven’t even seemed to begin to change to an appreciable degree, this may end up the same (i.e. no real change, there is too much money at stake overall).
“Even when congressmen (Scalise) and women (Gifford) and schools full of kids (I think there’s a limit to comment length) and even modern era presidents (Reagan) get shot nothing changes, even though the general public overwhelmingly supports at least common sense changes to the status quo.”
I’ll weigh in. To say things like these usually means a person doesn’t understand firearm laws, or simply wants them banned. In the last century the laws have changed dramatically, and usually from an incident.
For example JFK being shot ended mail order firearms delivered to private citizens and required serial numbers on all long guns. Reagan being shot created the Brady Bill. What was legal in 1918 was pretty much anything, full auto, short barreled shotguns, sales to minors, etc. All prohibited now.
Firearm ownership in America is a right not a privilege. It’s a right enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and the only such right that Americans are comfortable with regularly limiting. I don’t see how it connects to Boeing’s situation. Or the opioid situation.
Speaking of which, to say that handing out free opioids to those addicted who want them would end overdose deaths is pure speculation. One can find plenty of research saying that it will end deaths. And plenty saying the exact opposite. But it’s all speculation.
We all end up connecting our favorite pet projects to whatever the latest crisis is, connecting dots that aren’t there. So we end up talking gun policy and drug policy when the subject is neither and had no connections. Even national prejudices came out, only if Americans die do American companies care. Really?
Boeing offering as standard the safety equipment would have saved lives. For a host of legal and economic reasons they didn’t. They didn’t have to, and now they will pay the price
Speaking of which, to say that handing out free opioids to those addicted who want them would end overdose deaths is pure speculation. One can find plenty of research saying that it will end deaths. And plenty saying the exact opposite. But it’s all speculation.
I don’t know what you’re reading, but it’s obviously not medical-scientifically based. It’s literally impossible to overdose on Methadone; it’s very slow acting and it lasts for 24-36 hours. You don’t shoot it up. it’s administered by clinics orally every morning. It’s been proven as a safe alternative to heroin, and it’s use as a safe alternative is rapidly expanding to jails, prisons, treatment centers, rehab, etc..
What kills people from OD most typically is this: they go to a rehab that requires complete abstinence. The lose their tolerance. They come out, and they almost inevitably relapse. An then given that they have no tolerance, they easily OD.
All of the same applies to Suboxone, except even more so. It includes a second drug, Naloxone, that inhibits the opioid receptors so that it makes shooting up heroin useless.
My younger son is an addict. It’s been a five year long nightmare. repeated ODs and hospitalizations, jails, crimes, other unspeakable things. I’ve found him several times laying on the floor and I assumed he was dead. Since he went on methadone, his life is 95% better. It’s been a huge change for him and all of our family.
During these past five years, I’ve read a whole lot about addiction. And learned a lot from it and professionals and other sources. To say what you’re saying, that it’s “all speculation” is highly incorrect and frankly, a bit pathetic.
Like every issue facing humans, there are solutions based on evidence, medicine, science and facts.Medical-based treatment with methadone and Suboxone are the gold standard, at this time, based on the facts. Even bringing in “speculation” into the discussion is a huge mistake. The only speculation that these medical-based treatments are not effective is by those that have an agenda, religious or perhaps by the rehab-industrial complex which rakes in billions by trying to treat addicts with total abstinence, when what they’re really doing is killing addicts by sending them out into the streets with no tolerance, setting them up for OD. And of course prisons do this too.
I don’t waste my time with “speculations” on such life-and-death matters with a family member. I inform myself as to the science/facts/evidence, and act accordingly.
It would be great if there were a better solution than these medical-based ones currently available, but until they come along, it’s the best there is.
Firearm ownership in America is a right not a privilege. It’s a right enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
It’s a “right” only because of a very controversial 5-4 decision (Heller, 2008). if the composition of the supreme court had been slightly different then, you and I might well not be saying that. It was a very politicized decision.
In the past, SCOTUS ruled otherwise. twice.
As I read the controversial lines that are so fought over, it doesn’t read like a right to me. But I accept the political realities, and so it is, until perhaps someday another court interprets those words otherwise.
One thing is very clear: the wording of that amendment is very much not clear in making the case that all citizens have the right to carry firearms. So it will be the subject of debate among citizens and SCOTUS for a long time to come.
And this is not speculation. The fact that SCOTUS ruled 5-4 proves that the language in the 2nd amendment is obscure, vague, and subject to political interpretation.
I don’t want to get involved in too much political discussion, but I do wish to offer some support of Paul on the methadone and suboxone. This is administer for free where I live and we have several clinics locally that are regularly used by addicts. It is also given in our local jails and rehab clinic. It does work, if one doesn’t relapse and start using other drugs. Without getting into too many personal details, I know from experience those with the support system to keep them on methadone can make massive improvements in their lives. But those that are on their own, and don’t have any supports in place often do fall off the wagon or worse.
This opioid crisis effects many and we have had numerous deaths in the past year of young people who have used opioids, in particular fentanyl. Paul, I offer empathy to the situation you are going through with your son. It is not something I’d wish on anyone.
You don’t take any prisoners do you Paul?
Impossible to overdose on methadone? This is from the CDC:
“Methadone accounted for approximately 1% of all opioids prescribed for pain but accounted for approximately 23% of all prescription opioid deaths in 2014”
And
“The rate of methadone overdose deaths increased 600%, from 0.3 persons per 100,000 in 1999 (784) to 1.8 in 2006 (5,406), was stable in 2007 (5,518), and then declined 39% to 1.1 (3,400) in 2014.”
That’s a lot of people dead from something that they can’t overdose from.
I don’t subscribe to the addiction is from moral failure theory, long so popular. Not do I subscribe to the abstinence only ideology. Seems to be that we are learning addiction is wired into some brains. Effective treatments will have to account for this. Using a dangerous drug that kills people to treat addiction, surely we can do better.
A lot of Supreme Court decisions are 5/4, including the one that legalized gay marriage a few years back. Is that also a “very politicised decision”? Can the court someday “interpret those words otherwise”? The Obamacare decision was also 5/4, so by your logic it seems to politicised and ripe for reinterpretation as well.
Of course whether I agree or disagree with either of those 5/4 decisions isn’t the point. Who knows. But your logic is what’s good for the goose is good for the gander.
And speculation is just that. Your methadone statements aren’t facts supported by the CDC, so what are they? Your view of the Heller decision is fine, but your logic allows for decisions beloved by the political left to be overturned because they were merely based on certain people with certain politics being on the court.
And ow, you called my thinking pathetic. I thought only my students did that.
Methadone accounted for approximately 1% of all opioids prescribed for pain but accounted for approximately 23% of all prescription opioid deaths in 2014”
I stand corrected. Anything can be abused. My point is that methadone, as administered in the only way it’s legally supposed to be administered, will not cause overdose.
My comment was directed at your statement “handing out free opioids to those addicted who want them would end overdose deaths is pure speculation.”
it’s factually incorrect, because that’s not how methadone is “handed out”. Your statement was clearly worded to imply that these opioids are just “handed out”. They are not. Hence there cannot be an overdose from methadone administered by a methadone clinic.
Black market drugs can and will be abused. The whole point is that many addicts would much prefer to have their addiction treated in this way than have to worry about where their next fix is coming from, and do whatever it takes to be able to buy it.
I’m not going to argue this point further, because it’s silly. Medical-based treatments (methadone, subuxone) are expanding rapidly, and are increasingly being accepted by courts, the penal system, etc. as a better alternative.
Using a dangerous drug that kills people to treat addiction, surely we can do better.
If you (or anyone else) can come up with something better, you’ll be a rich saint. You’re coloring your feelings about medical-based treatment because of wishful thinking.
The reality is that there is nothing better. So the smart and obvious thing is to use the tools that are available, and hopefully use them as safely and effectively as possible.
30,000+ Americans per year are killed in car crashes. Are you suggesting we stop driving because surely “we can do better”? Many problems are not easily fixed, you know.
Methadone is like driving a modern car compared to an old jalopy with no safety equipment. You can still get killed in a modern car if you abuse it badly enough, but it’s a whole lot safer than a 1960 VW.
So what exactly is your point? if you think methadone clinic treatment is as (or anywhere nearly as) dangerous as black market heroin use, which is what you seemed to be saying, than you are simply not properly informed.
As to SCOTUS 5-4 decisions, I don’t know what your point is. They are what they are; It’s politics, obviously. So what else is there to say about them? If some of the existing ones are overturned, then there will likely be a political backlash. That’s how politics works.
Which is a self-tempering mechanism. SCOTUS knows that if it changes things too much too fast, it will just create a backlash. Better to let sleeping dogs lie. Do you see any Democrats running on a platform of major gun control, or calling for an overturn of Heller? I think not.
My point? You said that the Heller decision was politicised and implied that it will be overturned when a more left wing court is in place. You implied that you think the right of the keeping and bearing arms is open to reinterpretation and a political court got it wrong.
Now you say that the courts know that to change things too much will result in a backlash. Better to let sleeping dogs lie. No Democrat is running on overturning Heller.
Well which is it? You are contradicting yourself here. You seem to want Heller overturned, then admit that to do so is not in the best interests of the court when I point out that 5/4 decisions include key left wing social victories that by your logic are vulnerable.
Few court decisions are overturned because it’s bad for the court and the country. Constantly revisiting major decisions is unwise. So Heller will stand. R v.Wade will stand. Obergefell will stand. They settled certain things, people often don’t like it, but there it is, settled, and we live it.
The CDC claims heroin kills about 15,000 Americans a year. Methadone about 3,300. Not nearly as deadly as illegal heroin. But the methadone is prescribed and the deaths are supposed to be under the care of experts. That they are so high is dismaying. Is it as safe as claimed? Seems not.
This is in specific response to Mr. McClure’s comments. Methadone is a synthetic opioid which can be very effective and very safe in the treatment and long-term maintenance of a person with an opioid addiction. It does indeed have a very long half-life in the system, which is what makes it normally so safe to administer and use-it lasts a long, and reliable time, so the addict and his treating professional can count on its working and not be at risk of its causing an accidental overdose. Methadone is a controlled substance, requiring a prescription and careful monitoring by a medical professional who is trained in the treatment of addiction. Where it can be unsafe, and lead to overdose and death, happens when it is employed, illegally (without a prescription), as a substance of abuse, by an addict who is not in treatment, and seeking relief from the side effects of withdrawal by using (injecting) a dose of methadone for which he/she is not physically tolerant. Methadone is not simply handed out to addicts who want to get high, or even to addicts who want to stop getting high. I am glad to see that you are looking to reputable sources for your statistics, but please do some further reading before you start quoting and interpreting them.
Naloxone (Narcan) is, by contrast, a rapid acting opioid agonist (meaning, that it counteracts the effects of opioids on the brain) that is extremely useful in the acute treatment of an opioid overdose. It does not make people high and does not, in contrast with methadone used in an illegal and unsupervised fashion, present a risk of overdose. The physicians with whom I work teach the first year medical residents that if you do not know why the person in the ER is unconscious, you probably can’t hurt him by giving him Narcan, while you keep working to figure out why he won’t wake up. If it works, he wakes right up; if it doesn’t, the biggest risk he faces is that when he does wake up he will experience more discomfort, as Narcan blocks the analgesic effects of various pain killers.
There are indeed political and economic perspectives in making such powerful drugs readily available to addicts, even under supervision-hospitals, for example, and we the public get stuck, under our present health care system, with the medical cost and staffing burden of caring for addicts who have survived an overdose they might not have without the availability of Narcan. But that is a political and social discussion that we need to have. There is no question that these drugs are medically safe and effective as prescribed; indeed, life-saving.
Paul, I knew there was something like this happening in your family, from allusions you have made elsewhere, and from the pattern of your posts. There have clearly been times when you have had to deal with life as it comes at you, and not been as available to the CC community. I am so sorry to hear that you and your family are living this nightmare. Please take a little comfort in the knowledge that our understanding of addiction and its successful treatment is growing. If there is any silver lining to be found in the current opioid epidemic, it is that is is happening to the “right” families, and as a result addicts are more likely to be seen as needing treatment (rather than incarceration for being weak and bad, or just the “wrong” people), and more public resources are being devoted to research and treatment. This does not immediately help your son, but maybe it can let you know that you are not alone. This is not your fault. From AA: “Man takes a drink, drink takes a drink, drink takes a man.”
One more thing, and this is actually related to the original topic: In attempting to understand the current epidemic of opioid addiction, researchers are pointing their fingers at the prescription drug industry, which seems clearly to have oversold the benefits of newer, more powerful, opioid-based prescription drugs, such as Oxycontin, and way, way under-admitted their potential for abuse. (Really, did NO ONE in the lab consider the possibility that people could crush this stuff and snort it?) While heavily marketing them to the medical industry, and by-passing the entire doctor-patient relationship system of responsibility by directly marketing to the public. There were profits to be made here, too, and people are dying. I am not anti-profit; I am only opposed to industry that loses sight of its original purpose (in this case, to alleviate human suffering) and becomes solely focused on profit. Money is, also, a very powerful drug, with significant addictive potential.
I certainly agree there’s a bottom-line incentive for companies in any industry to do the right thing. My point, which I I’ll admit is entirely political, is that the incentive not to is inherently greater.
Some things related to safety were omitted from JDM cars that were required in foreign markets side intrusion bars being an obvious one, my NZ assembly 93 Subaru Legacy had a sticker on the rear window advertising that safety feature, ex JDM imports didnt have them, and Subaru wasnt the only maker to leave stuff out, Has Boeing taken a leaf out of that playbook GM isnt the only one to maximize profit from its products.
Some rental car companies in the US were able to purchase Chevy Impalas for example without side airbags to save a couple hundred dollars even though the general consumer could not purchase the same car without that “standard feature”. This was not always disclosed when the vehicle was sold later.
Back in 2007, I had a Buick Lacrosse as a long term rental while my Aveo was getting a new engine. It had no ABS.
Thirty comments in and I’m not seeing much questioning about the purchasers skipping safety options.
While I’m far from saying Boeing is blameless, there is credit to be shared. So why did Lion Air not purchase these? Same for the other carriers? It’s not like a $6700 option is any real percentage of the purchase price.
This is an issue that all blame cannot be assigned to one source despite the inclinations I’ve read in prior comments.
No doubt my thoughts will be in the minority.
(scene at a dealer in spring 1961) I’m not ordering those pricey seat belts. That ’61 Corvair is safe enough.
Jason, I see your point. The issue is that Boeing attempted to patch a serious problem with an optional and questionable fix (indicator lights and a disconnect switch plus pilot training) that should have been mandatory. The safest fix is THREE sensors and integrated computer software to interpret the readings from them and disregard anomalies.
One could argue that the really safest fix would have been to either solve the underlying aeronautical issue that the electronics were there to disguise and/or train pilots on how the Max version of the plane flies differently from the older versions. Improvements to the electrical nanny-system would seem to me to be a third-level failure.
Fixing the underlying aeronautical issue would have meant a completely new airplane. The MCAS system is a Band Aid. A completely new airplane would have thrown Boeing a huge competitive disadvantage, at least for the shorter term.
But aeronautical Band Aids are not new. There’s a long history of them. Some fighter planes were impossible to fly manually without BandAids.
The problem is that Boeing wanted to sell the Max without requiring a new pilot certification for it; that was the key economic benefit for airplanes. It’s expensive to recertify all the pilots for just a new version.
That’s why the pilots didn’t know what to do when their planes suddenly nosed down because of bad sensor data. A more robust MCAS system along with alerts/displays showing the cause of the discrepancy would almost certainly have avoided these crashes. As would complete pilot recertification.
Given the route both Boeing and the airline wanted to take (no new pilot certification) than making sure the MCAS system was as robust as possible and alerted the pilots to bad data seems like a very easy and minor way to minimize the potential shortcomings of taking that route.
I don’t disagree about anything lobbed at Boeing. Good business would have provided a fix across the board.
However, this is a two-way street. Why did the carriers not obtain the fix?
From what I understand the carriers were not clearly (enough) informed of A) exactly how, when and why MCAS works and B) what these options would potentially prevent.
Came here to say exactly this, Jason. Not to let Boeing off the hook, but ultimately they were just responding to the demands of the market. There is plenty of blame to go around here: Consumers shopping for absolute lowest fare, and airlines trying to cut every possible corner to compete for them, and ultimately the regulators that let this whole farce go on.
It’s quite a stretch to blame consumers. Consumers will always go for the cheapest price for the product they need – part of the product they need when purchasing an airplane ticket is “not dying en route”.
Customers would pretty quickly stop buying tickets for airlines that would kill you if that was a visible part of the deal.
The assumption is that you do not risk your life. If the FAA cannot guarantee a minimum of safety, they are of no use.
Came here to say exactly this, Jason. Not to let Boeing off the hook, but ultimately they were just responding to the demands of the market.
How do you know that? Do you really think it was that, rather than Boeing looking for a competitive advantage as well as creating new profit centers?
Keep in mind that the additional cost to Boeing for these two displays was close to zero.
If the cost is close to zero (and therefore the potential effect on price of the plane could be the same) then what competitive advantage would Boeing gain?
But what is “close to zero” of the cost of an airplane for the system (extra summy light, extra instrument) along with installation? $50? seems low. $100? Still low. Call it $200? Irrelevant on a sale of this size, HOWEVER spread across the 5000 or so existing orders that’s $1,000,000. Still not a big amount in relation to the company itself but as someone who used to get paid in my former life a portion of my pay that directly correlated with costs that I could cut out of a product that’s a good chunk of change to some individual somewhere. And without someone higher up or differently informed forcing the expenditure it’s easy to see how it happens.
I get your point, but with respect, Jason, no. This isn’t a bit of questionable packaging on a kid’s meal when the purchaser should’ve known, it’s many thousands of humanoids above the earth daily in defiance of gravity. An actual miracle of modern tech, made ordinary only by the diligence of brilliant techies, and, dare I say it, the regulatory squeezes of them that squeezeth.
Sure, the buyers could choose, but given the tech existed and was (apparently) a dime in the dollar, why scrimp on the package? Knock it off the profitable whole, surely, and be good people.
Yet the buyer still scrimped on the package. Why? And who is the one owning the jet that is transporting these people above the earth? How does the purchaser bear no responsibility?
My reference to purchasers wasn’t us, but them, the airlines. And them transporting us up there have large departments (or contractors) charged with the very dull responsibility of calculating risk versus reward, and decisions were made which the deciders endorsed. Quite possibly on the basis of their own short term financial gain as upper management. They’re my purchasers, and that’s how they bear responsibility.
What “calculation” was made? I doubt that Boeing gave purchasers any data that predicted the risk, and the purchasers probably didn’t have any independent assessment.
Another reason why I today my travel arrangements include my Lincoln Town Car; not Delta or American Or Jet Blue.
Which means you’ve chosen the most dangerous form of transport possible.
Would the airlines not be equally culpable? They knew additional safety options were available and deliberately chose not to purchase them. No one forced their hand.
Also, why would Boeing continue to shoehorn modern technology into a 1950/60s design? Would it not be better for their bottom line to design a new air frame from scratch that can easily accommodate these new devices or outright negate the need for them?
It must cost them considerably to engineer around this ancient airframe? It’s kind of like GM making stability control, airbags, electric motors, etc. fit inside the X-frame and body of 1959 Chevy Bel Air.
Perhaps the reason they did this was because they are incentivised to do so by the current regulations–The Boeing 737 is grandfathered in and exempt from certain standards. If not for this regulation, they would undoubtedly be building a new air frame.
I am obviously a proponent of safety regulation, but I think too few of us recognize that each regulation comes with costs as well as unintended consequences and subsequently are too quick to blame the manufacturer rather than point out our system has endemic flaws.
I mean, It can’t be good from a profit standpoint to kill hundreds of your customers and lose thousands more. Surely the folks at Boeing realize this.
It can take a decade or more from the first concept to FAA certification. The bean counter CEO at Boeing would prefer to maximize profits now. Boeing used to have a former engineer at the helm until they acquired McDonnell-Douglas. They chose to maximize profits instead of undertaking the cost of developing a new airliner. They are now paying for that choice.
Good post, Paul. The 737 IS a rampside classic. No one flies the -100 anymore though.
The comparison is like the difference between the 1965 vs 2019 Mustang. Larger, more powerful, more fuel efficient and (mostly) safer.
Yesterday’s WSJ contained a piece that approached the issue from a different perspective. It seems that in upgrading to the Max series the plane has some handling characteristics that are significantly different from the prior version, one of which is the tendency to “nose up” under certain circumstances. Instead of working out the aeronautics and/or training pilots on the new plane’s flight characteristics, Boeing addressed things with an electronic system that works in the background to make the new plane feel like the old plane when it is under manual control.
The problem is that in emergency situations the pilot has little or no experience with the plane’s actual flight characteristics. And the NYT is right to point out that additional instrumentation that would warn a pilot when there is a problem in the electronic system is missing as well.
The car analogy would be offering a Corvair with electronic stability controls that make it drive like a Chevelle. But when confronted with an emergency, the driver 1) has no experience with the car’s actual handling dynamics and 2) has no way of knowing whether he is dealing with the car or the electronic systems (and whether those systems are working properly).
Indeed a complex issue, and we will find out more.
I am totally unsurpised at the existence of optional charges for what we would consider essential features. Airplanes, like many other items are sold on low bid and the strategy is to get in with the low bid then grow your package (and your profit margin) with extras, essential or not. Like Jason I would also question the purchasing teams on their selections, aircraft purchasing should be dance where both partners know and anticipate the moves.
What scares me more is the training aspect. It’s early days but I think I saw it reported that the Air Ethiopia co-pilot had only 200 hours of flight time, and the captain had not done simulator time on the Max series of 737. To pick up on JPC’s car analogy that’s more like being experienced in driving a Chevelle, but getting a new car that looks like a Chevelle but is actually a Corvair.
I’ve always been a nervous flier (control issues, heights, and claustraphobia – a fun combo in the air!) but I’ve been comforted by the fact that my Uncle was an Air Canada pilot for 30 years without a serious incident. However after the Air France crash he flies as little as possible because those guys didn’t know how to fly, they know how to operate a computer system and crashed when actual flying was required.
This also reminds me of a near-disaster with an AC 767, where a new airplane ran out of fuel and was saved only because the pilot was an experienced glider pilot.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gimli_Glider
The pilot was hailed as a hero, but was also demoted because running out of fuel was his responsibility.
You’re like me, but claustrophobia is my biggie. Aisle seats only, exit row or at the very end by the galley, where there is more ambient space.
Long delays on the ground are my worst nightmare! As long as the thing is moving, whether being towed by a tug, rolling down a taxiway, or in the air, I’m fine. Stopped on the ground for an extended period? Down the hatch with the Xanax!
The smaller the plane, the worse. Single row full sizers like the A320 or the 737 are bad enough, I remember one time in Vancouver we couldn’t leave the gate because of some unidentified liquid in the cargo hold. It was a tiny plane (CRJ maybe, it was Jazz Air). Hell on earth for me. I actually asked the flight attendant if I could wait on the bridge. Surprisingly, she said yes, but a minute later, they announced that we were deboarding and switching to another plane.
Heh, yes CRJ is not my favourite but Dash8 is my most hated. Too many rough flights between Montreal and Bagotville.
737 has usually been my favourite plane, big enough inside, small enough that it looks like something that could fly. Long production so problems have been found and worked out. (!!!)
Don’t forget the older 737s had a few accidents caused by rudder control valve reversing operation due to thermal shock..
Dash 8s. My Dash * story is on a return visit to Canada in ’94 the Korean travel agent messed up and put me on the milk run from Vancouver to Saskatoon. Well, at least I got to to see what Cranbrook and Kelowna airports looked like! Calgary I already
was familiar with!
You have to admit, the STOL capability of those things is impressive.
In the air in no time.
Nobody went back to driving school when they traded their Chevelle for a Corvair either though… 🙂
The training aspect is precisely part of the problem, the product was sold as being so similar to the previous version that essentially no re-training was necessary. If the plane had been recertified as a new plane, training would have been required (at great cost) and sales would be reduced as a result.
From what I understand there are only about nine 737-MAX simulators in existence currently (2 at Boeing) so every pilot getting a full experience on one would cost a lot and take a lot of time. Obviously needed in hindsight to those of us here (or at the least the extra instrumentation if nothing else.).
But back to the Corvair, it’s not like the friendly salesman at the Chevy dealer took the time explain the potentially different characteristics of the Corvair either, more likely the keys were tossed to you and you were asked which color you wanted to order when you returned from driving around the block. I suppose you could compare this post and all of the news about this issue to Ralph Nader’s book…
It seems that in upgrading to the Max series the plane has some handling characteristics that are significantly different from the prior version, one of which is the tendency to “nose up” under certain circumstances
I specifically mentioned that in my article here. And that’s been known all along. The new larger engines of the Max creates that tendency. MCAS is a Band Aid to compensate for that.
And since Boeing wanted to be able to sell the Max to existing operators of the 737 without recertification of all their pilots for this variant, pilots essentially were in the dark about MCAS, and how it could malfunction and what it took to respond. The pilots were physically wrestling with a yoke that was pushing forward (down), when the solution was to just turn MCAS off. But they weren’t trained, because the whole appeal was that any 737 pilot could step in and fly a Max too.
Not so.
But the least Boeing could have done was to make MCAS redundant by using input from two sensors, and give the pilots a warning that the sensor data was bad. That alone would have made a huge difference.
The car analogy would be offering a Corvair with electronic stability controls that make it drive like a Chevelle. But when confronted with an emergency, the driver 1) has no experience with the car’s actual handling dynamics and 2) has no way of knowing whether he is dealing with the car or the electronic systems (and whether those systems are working properly).<
To a lesser extreme ESC does exactly this with modern SUVs and taller crossovers as well as high peformance cars. It makes them behave like just about any other car where drivers don’t need to make adjustments to their habits like they used to need to do for vehicles with tippy high centers of gravity and tail happy oversteer conditions.
This is what non functioning ESC looks like in a modern crossover
I saw this phenomenon in home construction. What the buyer did not see, or wouldn’t have been able to impress his guests with, he had no interest in, when it came to upgrades related to safety, or better materials. I saw buyers spend the extra thousand on fancy door hardware over upgrading to copper water lines over the polybutylene that was popular in the late 1980’s and 1990’s. (now banned.) Today, there are entire neighborhoods full of homes with that dreaded time bomb.
The political rantings that have been allowed recently are ruining this site.
And I know you know this Paul, but even today safety items like blind spot detection, accident avoidance, lane detection, and inflatable seatbelts are not standard equipment. Nor do people expect them to be. In the recent past it was backup cameras and stability control. But I get it, you gotta pimp your deadly sin series at every opportunity.
Not sure what happened here, but I’ll be taking a break. Maybe I’ll check back later. Or maybe not. It’s too bad, this site was one of the few left that didn’t drag politics and hate into everything. Thanks to all the contributors that made this site so fun and interesting for so long.
Your 100 % correct Paul, but it seems that the pilots and crew are stuck in the middle here. When I took lessons, my instructor who was a commercial pilot, stressed that I should “Always fly the plane” in any situation. Hard to do without proper instrumenation and equipment.
Indeed… the acronym ANC comes to mind. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.
The whole video game aspect to flying these days gives me pause.
Furthering the list of things a pilot should always remember is this that I spotted online…
https://www.pea.com/blog/posts/6-pilot-rules-that-everyone-should-live-by/
A good read, even though it simplifies things quite a bit.
This is such an upsetting issue on so many levels. Obviously, the tragic loss of life is at the top of the list. I am shaken to the core by the revelations about Boeing, which I’ve long admired as a world class company with excellent engineering and managerial talent. As the plane’s maker, they are clearly the most culpable for the disastrous situation.
But I’d also argue that there are plenty of root causes that contributed to the mess. The biggest of those seems to be the software/hardware interface, and the notion that new software can simply be layered onto older mechanical systems. It’s a very common mindset that extends well beyond Boeing. The WSJ has a great article today covering this (The Risks of Marrying ‘Smart’ Technology With ‘Dumb’ Machines), and it impacts so many sectors, from utility grids to home HVAC systems to cars and planes. As a quote from the article states: “It’s not that the software doesn’t work, it’s that it doesn’t work in all conditions,” and therein lies the challenge. Software is not a cure-all, and is subject to faults and weaknesses just like anything else. Now add the potential for malicious hacking that could deliver catastrophic results on a grand scale. The answer during the aftermath will be: “oops we missed that.” Perhaps no big deal for a mobile device, but catastrophic for things that need to ensure human safety. That’s one reason I’m so skeptical of fully autonomous cars.
So yes, Boeing did not properly vet and think through all the ramifications of the new systems and how to ensure they operated consistently and transparently. Based on what I’ve read, Boeing failed to see how safety features that previously might not have been super critical were suddenly vital. So while the company is being blasted for making safety “optional,” I’m not convinced they were doing it in some greedy quest for profits at the expense of safety. That would be (and has turned out to be) terrible business for them.
However, like most companies, Boeing is driven by profit motive, and the factors are complicated there too. First off, I think the airlines themselves are an issue. Talk about cutting corners and scrimping on service to deliver at the altar of profitability–as a frequent flyer I am all too familiar with how rotten the air travel experience is today. So these airlines, as Boeing’s customers, undoubtedly demanded new aircraft that packed on more seats and cost less to operate, and they surely wanted lower acquisition costs (hence making certain features deemed non-essential optional to satisfy cheap customers). Plus I’m sure the airlines wanted to integrate the new planes seamlessly into the fleets, without needing to consume pilot time with “training.” So to satisfy these customers and meet their expectations, Boeing attempted to “update” a traditional workhorse plane, even though a better solution would really have been a new aircraft design with “hardware” and “software” more thoroughly integrated from the start.
But as “mature” companies, both Boeing and the airlines would have been pilloried by Wall Street for the development costs of new and better planes. “How are you going to recoup that R&D spend?!?!” and “Why did profit margins go down?!?!?” Ironically, there’s a split in today’s capital markets that exacerbates the situation: “new” companies with “new” business models get an “innovator’s premium” that is not necessarily tied to current earnings. These companies can often lose money with impunity and still access capital, based on “Vision.” Tesla, with a valuation rivaling that of General Motors, is a perfect example of the phenomenon. The two companies are held to different standards and different expectations. While Boeing doesn’t face a disruptor like Tesla, they aren’t given a market premium for innovation either. I’m sure the company has the talent to design amazing, sophisticated all-new aircraft that would avoid the issue of jerry-rigging new software on old mechanicals. But the markets, both customer and capital, wouldn’t buy it.
So it’s just a hot mess all around.
The economist’s “Law Of Unintended Consequences” has wide application. No one person or group of people, no matter how brilliant and experienced, can possibly foresee every consequence of a design decision, and will undoubtedly muff things that will later be discovered and fixed. And this applies to both design and to regulatory failures.
In a similar situation, my daughter works for a mental health facility that just moved into a brand spanking new building this week. And after years of planning, design and construction of a facility intended to be top-notch, the staff is finding basic problems like bathroom doors that cannot be unlocked from the outside and sinks with running water accessible to people suffering from a condition in which they are perpetually thirsty and will kill themselves from excessive water consumption if they are given free access to a water source.
RL Plaut above does not trust software. I do not trust new. New is very often just another word for “we don’t know what’s wrong with it yet.”
But dammit JP, with all respect – and for lots of personal reasons, in her job I really do mean “all” and also “huge respect” – to your daughter, none of these folk are 20,000 ft up. The entire practicability of people flying about clad in nothing but aluminium tubes and loud engines is based upon planning for unintended consequences, and this consequence was made a bloody option to detect! So, yeah, the rule you mention has wide application until a small amount of thought is applied and the rule is displaced, and we can be damn sure folk smarter than us (or at least, me) did the maths about the risks involved.
GN, the great contributor of no surname – or full name, when I think about it – like my comment to Jason-Does-He Really-Need A-Surname-Here, I say this with utmost respect: no.
This was, is, available tech, and stupidly cheap in terms of the whole. So it simply should’ve been installed. We’re talking the margins on a roughly $100 million purchase here.
The entire flying idea is one whose risks are only mitigated by an excess of caution, so if it’s true that buyers could buy a 737 with flight staff oxygen optional, then the hell with it, it’s not a hot mess but a hot disgrace. (Not, ofcourse, directed at you personally, GN).
I’m George 🙂
“Hot disgrace” is most appropriate, both for Boeing and any airline that would allow its employees and customers on flights not equipped with safety features like the oxygen for the flight staff.
As a frequent air traveler, learning the sordid details about these absurd nickel-and-dime decisions on multi-million dollar airplanes is frightening. I used to comfort myself about the abundance of training and safeguards contributing to the relatively low fatality rate on planes relative to miles traveled (thus air travel = safer than car travel statistically speaking). Now, apparently, it seems we may be going up into the air on a wing and a prayer, pun intended.
Airlines, aircraft manufacturers and regulators should all be embarrassed and ashamed.
Lots of “coulda, woulda”, but the bottom line is that Boeing cut corners. The MCAS system should obviously have been redundant, using input from bot sensors. And the display/warning light that alerts a pilot to differences in the sensor output should obviously have been standard.
Yes, it’s easy to say that in hindsight, but I still can’t believe these two issues were both approved. Making the display/warning light optional, when it cost Boeing essentially zero to include them, is incredibly cynical.
Sad but true. And as we learn more, their actions and business practices seem more and more reprehensible. I also feel sorry for the rank and file workers at Boeing who had nothing to do with these bad decisions, but whose livelihoods will be terribly impacted.
Spot on JP. I think its quite easy to put on our 20/20 glasses then look backwards and criticize other’s once we have some pertinent facts laid before us on a silver platter.
I think if Boeing was presented with this exact situation by a fortuneteller they would no doubt make corrections to prevent this.
But this is beside the point, its the problem really that they didn’t add a 6-thousand dollar device or that it was necessary to begin with and how did we get there?
And I haven’t seen any hate or vitriol on this site which is one of the reasons I enjoy visiting so much.
The lack of hate and vitriol is what keeps me coming back to CC. TTAC, not so much. I like the civility here.
Perhaps a salient or even fundamental issue here is the naming of the aircraft. From MarcKyle64’s diagrammatic comparison above, when is a 737 no longer a 737? If re-engine-ing this time, different winglets another time, different flight control systems before that, maybe different wheels and brakes on another occasion, when does a declaration that a completely different aircraft has taken shape. Geez they could double decker the thing and call it a 737-2000.
To me, a new aircraft has emerged that no longer bears any resemblance to its predecessor. A new aircraft designation would have driven a more thorough design review process, with greater oversight by internal or external regulatory engineers, to ensure complete safety and integrity. I am not naïve enough to believe that the program managers would have allowed that new designation, in the name of speed to market in a competitive environment.
So this is what we are left with. An aircraft that requires all sorts of doo-dads and more redundant backups to ensure the main systems that are prone to failure or disagreement with one another, to enable the thing to operate. Pilots are expected to know or consult fifteen page checklists when an emergency occurs and work through them in a calm manner. These are unrealistic expectations.
Things may get worse before they get better as other OEM’s develop their capability to design and manufacture airliners, Comac among the most prominent of these.
“Geez they could double decker the thing and call it a 737-2000”
Don’t give Boeing any new ideas about the 737.
The modifications made by Boeing to keep the 737 competitive are like Volkswagen’s effort to make the Beetle competitive in the 1970s by introducing the Super Beetle. They changed the front suspension and enlarged the trunk, curved the windshield, made A/C an option, added fuel injection, modified the dash for safety, changed the electrical system from a 6 volt to 12, added disc brakes and so on. By the end, none of the parts from the original fit the new one. But it was still a Beetle.
Unfortunately this situation is not new. If you want to read about a real business/government scandal and lives lost unnecessarily, there is no better example than McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, and the faulty cargo door on the DC 10. Another clear case of failure at all levels, including regulatory agencies, that resulted in major loss of life in the 1970’s. The two books reviewed here in the NYT back in the day are excellent reading and all too relevant to what’s happening today.
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/10/10/archives/the-cheap-door-that-cost-346-lives.html
The underlying mindset of this affair seems to be “cheap”.
Southwest saves a lot of money by using 73s exclusively as it reduces training expense.
Boeing has spent it’s profits buying back stock, so now it has a mountain of debt, the pension fund is short $20B, tangible net assets is deeply negative, and equity is near zero. (the recently retired CEO, Jim McNerney, who oversaw the Max series development, was, like Bob Nardelli and Jeff Immelt, a Jack Welch protege, so sought profit via financial manipulation)
Southwest doesn’t want a new aircraft, because that would increase training expense.
Boeing doesn’t have the $30B to develop a new aircraft.
So, Boeing did a patch job on the 73, because it was cheaper. They discovered some sketchy handling characteristics, so they applied an electronic bandaid that was more aggressive than the stick shaker and stick pusher anti-stall systems that have been SOP for years. They didn’t make this flight control system double, or triple (what used to be the standard) redundant, because it was cheaper. They sold it as flying just like older 73s, so pilots didn’t need a lot of training, which is cheaper.
The FAA has been underfunded for years, and outsourced the certification to the aircraft manufacturers, because it’s cheaper.
Foreign airworthiness regulators take the FAA’s word, rather than do their own certification testing, because it’s cheaper.
I used to have a subscription to Mechanix Illustrated, and the high point of each issue was Tom McCahill’s road tests. In one of his tests, Tom said words to the effect “we have the best engineering and metallurgy in the world. we could easily make the best cars in the world, but we’re always trying to make things cheaper instead.”
But how many people could purchase brand-new Packards in the 1920s or Mercedes-Benzes in the 1970s? Not everyone can afford the best.
Your reply comes off as a bit callous. The simple fact is that the issues that Steve correctly identified and the ones I brought up in the article would have cost little or nothing more.
These airplanes all have “glass” displays. Adding the optional display for attitude and the light to warn of a discrepancy between the two sensors requires no actual physical equipment. It’s purely in the software, and already there.
It’s like selling a car with the ESP already in it, but charging more for it to be activated.
I personally know of one case (neighbor of friend on Vancouver island) installed cruise control in his Yaris simply by buying the dash switch panel
from a J-Yard, popping the blank-off plate, and plugging it in. All of the hardware under the hood was already there.
It’s like selling a car with the ESP already in it, but charging more for it to be activated.
In Boeing’s case, charging a *lot* more. A piece on the news in the last couple days reported that Boeing’s charge to install the warning light was $80,000.
I was addressing Steve bringing up Tom McCahill’s statement asking why automobile manufacturers weren’t making “the best cars in the world.”
Manufacturers have done that – and the resulting vehicles were priced far beyond the ability of most customers to buy them brand-new.
A Packard Single Eight was better than a Ford Model T, and a Mercedes Benz S-Class was better than a contemporary Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme.
People weren’t buying the Model T or Cutlass because they were too dumb to know any better, and Ford and GM didn’t make those cars instead of a Packard Single Eight or Mercedes S-Class solely because they were run by tightwads concerned with the bottom line.
Making various safety features standard on an existing or upgraded product is much different – from both a cost and complexity standpoint – than directing engineering, purchasing and metallurgy/manufacturing to produce the “best.”
(And then there is the issue of what makes a product “the best” – speed capabilities? passenger comfort? safety? fuel range? Virtually every product represents various trade-offs and compromises among each attribute. Deciding which attributes should receive priority involves a complicated interplay between manufacturers, customers and government regulators.)
A Packard Single Eight was better than a Ford Model T, and a Mercedes Benz S-Class was better than a contemporary Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme.
I’m not talking about that sort of difference. I’m talking about, literally, nickles and dimes. If an automaker can cut the cost of a car by a dime, they will, because, when you sell 2,3,4 million cars a year, it adds up.
Remember how cars in the 60s and 70s rusted through in 5 years? I do. They don’t rust out like that anymore, because people refused to put up with it anymore. The automakers had to suck it up and use better steel, better coatings and use plastic inner fenders.
Ever notice how bright bodyside trim in the 50s was stainless steel, but by the late 70s it was chrome plated plastic that would weather away in a couple years?
My 78 Zephyr had corners cut to an unbelievable level. Self adjusting drum brakes had been routine on US cars since the 50s. Not on the Zephyr. I had to pay for periodic brake adjustments. Automakers had developed reliable window regulators in the 30s. Not on the Zephyr. Ford devised a staggeringly cheap mechanism that required regular lubrication, at my expense, to operate. The Zephyr required periodic chassis lube, but I first had to pay to have grease fittings installed.
Ever notice how cars moved in the 50s through the 70s, the wallowing and bobbing. If a car stopped suddenly, the body would make about 3 bobbing movements before the shocks would damp out the motion. How much more would a decent set of shocks cost?
The V6 in my Taurus-X, and a lot of other Fords, has the water pump in the valley, driven by the timing chain. Makes for a clean, compact, installation for Ford, and probably cuts cost. But when the pump leaks, the coolant runs down the timing chain housing and mixes with the engine oil. *If* the owner catches it in time, the cost to replace the pump runs $1500-$2000 because you have to disassemble half the engine to get at the pump, but that installation was beneficial for Ford.
That is the sort of “making everything cheaper” sort of thing that McCahill was complaining about, and the attitude at the big three hasn’t changed in the 50 years since he said it.
Every car maker works to remove “nickels and dimes” from the total cost of a new vehicle at every stage of the process – design, engineering and manufacturing. Some are just better at it (meaning, better able to hide it from the customer) than others.
Or they have a better cost structure, which gives them more ability to hold off on the cost-cutting.
I’ve noticed subtle cost-cutting in various Hondas I’ve owned (and I’ve owned nine since 1987, with the most recent being my 2017 Civic EX-T sedan). It’s the same with Toyotas and even the vaunted German marques. Remember what happened to Mercedes-Benz’s vaunted quality and reliability in the 1990s as it struggled to meet the competition posed by Lexus?
This phenomenon is not unique to GM, Ford and Chrysler.
The wallowing behavior of cars in the 1960s was because Detroit pursued the “boulevard ride,” or, as Chevrolet once dubbed it, the “Jet Smooth” ride. That wasn’t driven by cost concerns. Chrysler Corporation cars had noticeably superior handling to the GM, Ford and AMC competition from 1957 through about 1966. The corporation then began softening the suspension tuning of its products to bring the cars in line with the competition, not because of cost concerns. (Whether this was a wise move is another question.)
Note that GM began a concerted effort to improve the handling of its cars beginning in the late 1960s, and without charging extra for it.
As for the rust problems – cars of the early 1960s actually rusted less than their late 1950s counterparts, particularly the Fords and Chryslers. Things did get worse in the 1970s. On that you are correct.
Then again, remember that labor costs began increasing dramatically in the 1970s, in the wake of the bitter, long strike against GM in late 1970, and prices for raw materials were increasing, too. We coined the term “sticker shock” in the mid-1970s. Add the cost of pollution control devices and the need to completely redesign the vehicle fleet in response to CAFE regulations, and it’s apparent that Detroit’s cost pressures weren’t a figment of the bean counters’ imagination.
The Fairmont is an interesting case, because it was a clean-sheet design, and some of what you encountered (the window mechanism) was more about reducing WEIGHT than cutting cost. Ford and the other American auto manufacturers were under tremendous pressure to improve fuel economy – driven by government mandates – and one way to do this was by reducing the weight of various components. But, as Gene Bordinat of Ford noted, the companies weren’t very good at it. Reducing weight had not been a priority prior to the first fuel crunch.
As for the car’s maintenance schedule – the brochure for the 1978 Fairmont touts a 60 percent reduction in scheduled maintenance costs for a six-cylinder Fairmont compared to a 1973 Maverick with the same engine.
I couldn’t find whether the drum brakes on the Fairmont were self-adjusting…although on-line parts catalogs do list “self-adjusting mechanism” parts for 1978 Fairmont brakes.
When Ford includes a specific figure (“60 percent reduction”) such as that in a customer publication, it had better be backed up by hard facts. That is not looked upon as mere “puffery,” as the courts have called various claims in advertisements.
(“This car in your driveway will make your neighbors envious;” “This is the styling that will set the standard for years to come;” “This year’s interiors are more beautiful than ever;” etc.)
As for the water pump location in the Taurus engines – my understanding is that this was driven largely by packaging concerns. The same engines used in rear-wheel-drive vehicles (such as the Mustang) do not have this problem.
Are you in the flying industry Steve? I ask because you refer to the 737 as a “Seven-Three”… a term I’ve only heard a former neighbor use when referring to her recurrent training in US Air’s planes at the time, a “Seven-Three” and a “Seven-Five” (757). She was a flight attendant for US Air and would throw these terms around a lot when we’d discuss planes. She knew I was an aviation geek.
Just curious. ;o)
Are you in the flying industry Steve? I ask because you refer to the 737 as a “Seven-Three”
Not directly employed. I have had a significant position in Boeing stock, off and on, since the early 90s. I sold BA about a year and a half ago, due to their extremely sketchy financial position, which is entirely self-imposed, the Jack Welch touch in action.
All the corner cutting McNerney oversaw on the 73 reeks of the kind of thinking another Welch protege, Bob Nardelli, brought to Home Depot: fire all the full time people with construction trades experience and replace them with part timers that didn’t know anything, because they were cheaper. Wall St loved it. That was before Nardelli ran Chrysler into the ground, but in that case he was taking orders from Cerberus. Meanwhile Immelt carried on the job Welch started of running GE into the ground.
Bean counters will be the death of us all
I dumped my Boeing stock right after the buyback. The balance sheet of the company was no sufficient for me to keep my investment in the company.
This is what accounts for the market dive in December. It’s just a permutation of the old “pump and dump” phenomenon. I made a lot of money on it. Passengers died for it.
Buybacks are illegal in most jurisdictions. This situation shows how dangerous such actions can be. Law of unintended consequences.
Len, how can you routinely call out the failed American system suggesting the 1% betrays the 99%, when you owned stock in one of the biggest defence spending lobbyists.
Boeing wants more public spending on military (and wars), as it’s great for business. Bad for the American people. As budget cuts in healthcare and social security are anticipated, as the already grotesque military budget grows.
It contradicts what you espouse.
Paul, just a short one to tell you that I, for one, really appreciate it when you explain in a layman-friendly way things that are beyond my scope. As for politics, as long as nobody’s hurt and the comments are kept respectful, what’s to worry about? CC has a lot of readers, I presume. Nobody can expect that a common interest about human experience will lead all of us to think the same way. And we are lucky for that, in my belief.
Mercedes-Benz official, commenting on plans to adopt anti-lock brakes as standard equipment by the mid-’70s:
“How can we sell some cars that are safer than others, even by option?”
-Motor Trend, October 1971
Yeah, how ’bout that? Surely not a match for Daimler’s current-day attitude on the subject.
Excellent article, one small correction, it’s MCAS:
Thanks! It’s amazing how one can get stuck on the wrong thing like that and repeat it over and over…a bit like pilots trying to respond to the MCAS system failing by fighting it physically, instead of just turning it off. Humans are inherently predisposed to keep repeating something that’s become familiar instead of stopping to think.
…a bit like pilots trying to respond to the MCAS system failing by fighting it physically, instead of just turning it off.
The “off” switch is non-obvious, for a pilot who has not been trained on the system, and the pilots were not trained, because Boeing said it wasn’t necessary, because the airlines didn’t want to spend the money on training.
The “off” switch for the MCAS is to turn off the stabilizer trim. In the case of a normal trim run-away, the pilot is trained for it, sometimes can hear the trim system operating, and the effect is continuous.
An MCAS malfunction behaves differently in that it is intermittent. The pilot pulls back on the yoke, and the system disengages, for a few seconds. Then the system reengages with a more aggressive move. The pilot fights it until it disengages again. This is why the Lion Air crew had a little bit of time to work through checklists to try to figure out what the plane was doing, before they lost enough altitude and the MCAS made such an aggressive move they couldn’t counteract it in time.
And a good article from the Seattle Times:
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
Dave
How cozy was the FAA with Boeing at the time? Currently we have a former aviation industry lobbyist as FAA acting administrator, and the Secretary of Transportation is Mitch McConnell’s wife. Not exactly tough, independent oversight.
Paul, Great job on this article! Although I first saw your story in my local newspaper, the CC Commentariat came through in spades with much insightful and overwhelmingly balanced opinion. Kudos to ATEUPWITHMOTOR for the technical details explaining why the Max is not just any old 737.
Every time I visit CC, I leave entertained or better informed. Thanks to all for keeping this great forum going!
Plenty of comments here, but I’ll add yet another.
To the posters complaining about the political nature of this thread, I don’t understand the complaint. Readers of this site know that articles are posted from time to time that are on controversial topics, intended to spark discussion. Sometimes not even on automotive matters, such as this one. These articles are easy to identify and avoid ahead of time for those not interested, and don’t take away from the bread and butter non-controversial car articles. The key for me, which keeps me as a reader/contributor, is that even in disagreement, posters stay agreeable.
“Software is not a cure-all, and is subject to faults and weaknesses just like anything else…..That’s one reason I’m so skeptical of fully autonomous cars…”
100% agree. !!! Don’t know why some [usually non car folks] assume “any day now all new cars will be driverless”.
Some have mentioned the Corvair as being the automotive equivalent of the Boeing 737 Max but, to me, a better analogy might be the Jeep Wrangler. As originally designed, the military Jeep was never intended for (sustained) paved road use, and certainly not at today’s highway speeds.
Yet, the Wrangler’s same basic suspension has been Band-Aided (and, now, electronically) for going on three-quarters of a century to keep abreast of a changing market demographic. They’re still the most dangerous vehicle to drive on a highway and there are still plenty of accidents due to the archaic design, even with the electronic safety aids.
But they still sell in droves, meaning a complete overall of the design is quite unlikely. In fact, it’s that very same adherence to the same old ‘rugged’ WW2 design that makes them so attractive to buyers.
When the Wrangler took over for the CJ the suspension was redesigned, even if it remained of the same basic type. It has more resemblance to the 1984 XJ Cherokee suspension than that of WW2 military jeeps. And since then there have been more revisions, including the change from leaf springs to coils in the TJ (1996) and another clean-sheet redesign for the JK in 2007.
Now I know we haven’t heard the end of this (yes, it’s a link): Ralph Nader, longtime FAA critic, lost great niece in Boeing 737 Max 8 crash.
My hunch is that as the investigation continues, issues other than airlines actually specifying the equipment will come forward, including the role of the regulators (both FAA and local to the operators), crew awareness and training, system set up (redundancy, failure mode indication other than conflict warnings), override ability and data processing of the information.
Also, I think the prices of $6,700 extra for oxygen masks for its crew, and $11,900 for an advanced weather radar system control panel may need a bit of context and/or reality check. I’m pretty sure I used to pay more than $11900 for a repair on cockpit control panels of various sorts over the years, and supply of oxygen masks is a separate issue to the obligation to carry and maintain them.
But, still, we need to know if Boeing with FAA oversight has been able to cut corners
You must not have read my article properly, because I never said or implied that. It seems quite obvious to me that the MCAS system malfunctioned due to bad sensor input. The optional display/light might well have made the difference, but we’ll never know. The real issue is the MCAS system.
But any way you look at it, making these displays optional is highly questionable.
How could Boeing have left internal redundancy and flight deck readouts and telltales off the roster of standard equipment? Simple: there was no legal requirement, and the profit motive is to charge extra money for anything beyond what’s legally required. They’re not in business to make planes, they’re in business to make money and maximise shareholder returns.
There are parallels all over the autosphere, and have been for years, for the same reason. GM ignition switches? Yes, also Ford gas tanks and Jeep gas tanks and a whole slew of other examples. The Carollton Bus Disaster bus was built 9 days before the effective date of new safety standards that certainly would have eliminated or greatly reduced the hideous carnage resulting from the crash. Ford and Superior Coach knew the regulations were set to come into effect; they’d participated in the regulatory negotiations and had tooled up and begun production of compliant vehicles and parts.
Legally, their obligation was to comply with whatever which safety standards were in effect on any given day, and that’s it. Morally, ethically…? That’s a different question. I bet there was a great deal of wishing for time machines so that they could go back to March 22, 1977 and build that bus to the new regulatory requirements, if for no other reason than that it would’ve been vastly less costly than the legal fallout.
Given that Boeing profits immensely from defence sales, and the perpetual wars the United States appears to be involved in, my faith in Boeing as a leading member of the military industrial complex was shaken long before these two tragedies. Boeing’s apparent increasing influence in how your government spends your money, has been alarming for a long time. As the already massive US military budget continues to grow, outspending the next seven countries combined. When much of the population in the wealthiest country in world history lives in poverty, and the country’s infrastructure crumbles. I wouldn’t look to Boeing for morality on any terms, when I’d suggest they appear to be working against the best interests of the American people. Such a waste.
I agree with you. But even without that, ethics and morality are antithetical to the mission and purpose of a corporation: maximum profit right now.
Thank you Daniel. I genuinely hate to enter politics into the fray, but it is impossible to evaluate Boeing as a corporation without shining a light on this darker side of their business model. They lobby the government heavily, and profit immensely from wars (and conflict).
That they might put a price on safety should surprise no one.
Paul
I have great respect for you, and your writing on the topic of automobiles, houses, Oregon life, etc. But you are not now nor are you likely to become qualified to comment in the complicated, specialized area of air safety and accident investigation. Please do not jump into this discussion as yet another underinformed wanna be. Too too many people have taken to the internet to drive forward their opinions, even actual experts like Greg Feith, once a Safety board member, and Sully Sullenberger, both of whom should know better. Both Boeing and the FAA May well have much to answer for. The NTSB will let us know when they complete their actual, factual investigation in 12 to 18 months. Waiting is hard. But speculation and half informed opinions are just damaging bullshit. (Retired B767 Captain)
The gist of my article is that Boeing made optional certain equipment that both experts and common sense says that should have been standard equipment. This is not speculation; these are hard facts.
Let me ask you: do you think these two items should be standard equipment or optional?
I’ll say something else: I’ve long ago learned to trust my judgement on matters where I feel I can trust it, meaning where there are enough facts and common sense to lead to a judgment. This is one of them. Would you like to make a wager that it’s not the MCAS system’s lack of redundancy, of it not having inputs from both sensors, that caused these crashes?
So are you suggesting that Boeing is going to just sit on its hands for 12-18 months until the NTSB report comes out, and shut down its most profitable product line? And then fix what they said went wrong? No way. They’re going to rush this MCAS software fix out in weeks or a few months at most, and beg the FAA for an expedited approval.
Boeing as much as has already admitted it, by saying they are rushing a software fix to do just that. And have announced today that the disparity alert is now standard equipment.
I don’t really appreciate your comment, which is essentially telling me to shut up. I long ago learned not to trust “the experts”. This was brought home to me during the Vietnam War, and I’ve been questioning the “experts” ever since. Therefore you being a retired captain means nothing to me unless you can prove yourself to be someone other than an “expert” who tells “non-experts” to shut up.
I can’t tell you how many times the “experts” have gotten it wrong in my lifetime, and I’m sick and tired of any one of them telling me to be quiet.
So, your gut reaction trumps those who will spend the next year analyzing this accident, addressing mechanical systems, training, regulatory issues, etc, etc? It is quite possible that making an AOA DISAGREE light standard will be a bandaid fix, but no certainty it would have prevented this accident. It seems likely that Boeing’s original assertion- that a quick reach for the stab trimmcutoff switches would have rendered these two aircraft controllable. Several US airlines have experienced what seem to be very similar events, with quite different conclusions. This reaction to uncommanded pitch movement is common on much of the Boeing line and would be a seasoned pilot’s first move. The 1st Officer of the Ethiopian flight had 200 total hours flying airplanes! That poor Captain had to do both of their jobs and be a baby sitter at the same time, plus deal with an emergency. There is a valid reason the FAA requires 1500 hours experience before occupying that seat. I wouldn’t have let that guy fly my single engine Grumman.
In all, my point is this: Unraveling these accidents is far more complex than you credit, or grasp. Inexpert opinions at this early stage are mere static- noise, devoid of useful content.
It is quite possible that making an AOA DISAGREE light standard will be a bandaid fix, but no certainty it would have prevented this accident.
Well, it’s a very obvious and easy quick reaction by Boeing. And I agree that there’s no certainty one would have prevented this accident. I never said so either. But it’s all too obvious to me that it might have made a difference, and given that it essentially costs Boeing nothing to provide, it certainly should be standard as well as the display to show the actual readings of the two angle of attack sensors.
It seems likely that Boeing’s original assertion- that a quick reach for the stab trimmcutoff switches would have rendered these two aircraft controllable.
Obviously so. But were all 737 pilots officers required to be trained on that? No. That’s the whole gist of the problem.
That poor Captain had to do both of their jobs and be a baby sitter at the same time, plus deal with an emergency.
So now it’s the crew’s fault. I get it. And did Boeing require crews to be specifically trained in the MCAS system, and its possible foibles, given that it only responds to one sensor?
Thank you for your…static-noise.
That is just another form of corporate double talk.
The plane is safe to fly. We don’t know the cause of the crash. We will need to investigate first in order to come to a conclusion which may take a year. But the plane is safe to fly in the meantime. Blah, blah, blah.
No thank you. I have been long past corporate double talk decades ago. Clearly there are connections between the two fatal crashes. Enough so that I wouldn’t set foot on the plane. Enough so that I want to know, today, what are the possible issues. No, not a year later and just trust an airline. In fact I just booked flights for my wife and son to Asia and what was the first thing I checked? Who uses the MAX in Asia. Fortunately Asiana doesn’t so they got the booking.
As far as I am concerned if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and walks like a duck then there is a good possibility it is a duck till proven otherwise.
I recall a flight I had to make in June 1974 after visiting grandparents in Orlando. Board the plane off the tarmac and I immediately recognize a DC-10. The first thing out of my mouth is this is the death plane circa March 74. That created quite a scene and a lot of nervous people. I was put on another flight and another plane type. At the time the Turkish crash was still being investigated and we all know now what the issue was.
Well, Chris, now that it’s essentially 100% confirmed what caused these crashes (Boeing’s pathetic MCAS software) are you still going to tell me to shut up and wait for the final reports?
Facts or specularions. That’s the question.
1. Cockpit O2 masks are mandated by FAR. Are you talking about 02 walkaround bottles?
2. Adding “options” drives certification costs to magnitudes most of the readers here are not familar with.
2a. Airlines are notoriously “frugal” the OEM spends millions to certify and option and then no one buys it?
I’m not going to say a lot here because it is a conflict of interest, but let’s just say that Boeing has some interesting practices in how they run their company.
I haven’t read all the comments, but it seems like everyone has an opinion, and I’m not sure of the reliability of the information upon which these opinions are based. Excuse my distrust of the the NYT or the LAT, but I generally reject anything from them unless I have a confirming second source. Like the GM deadly sins mentioned in the text, the poor Corvair was vilified by Nader only to be largely exonerated later by the NTSB. I own a Corvair and find it to be a very good auto for the time period it was built.
With respect to the AOA indicator, there is a back-up to the AOA indicator it’s called an airspeed indicator. In my experience, I’m an old Naval Aviator, with the emphasis on old, and I do not know very much about modern air transport, but in the Navy we used the AOA indicator in the landing configuration. The AOA was used because it was independent of the weight of the plane, whereas the stall airspeed was dependent on the weight of the plane. One of the things you did when dirtying up was to check the airspeed against the AOA indicator. In my aviation experience I don’t ever remember having or hearing of a problem with an AOA indicator, in other words they seemed like pretty reliable systems. Maybe the newer systems are less reliable.
As for the back-up systems or the lack of, I’m not sure that makes the plane unsafe, I guess I would wait until more information becomes available.
4speed- airspeed is really not an applicable backup to AOA. As you’ll recall, in an accelerated condition (ie “pulling G”) a specific AOA can be attained at a wide range of airspeeds. An aircraft in a steep turn will stall at the same AOA as level, but a higher airspeed.
Correct the stall airspeed is weight dependent, so if you are pulling 2 g’s the aircraft would effectively be twice its weight. Likewise in a steep turn to hold level flight you would have to be at greater than one g, which would effect the stall speed and AOA. But if you are in level one g flight in landing configuration you should be able to check the AOA against the airspeed indicator and get a pretty good indication if it was working correctly, which was my point.
Commenting on the core headline subject, I understand that the mismatch warning indicator “light” and the AOA indicator are simply additions to a standard glass screen display. As such, they would be software modules that are added or enabled for the HMI, requiring no additional hardware. The extra cost could be mostly in the additional documentation and training materials.
“…They’re not in business to make planes, they’re in business to make money and maximise shareholder returns…” (Daniel Stern)
“…but let’s just say that Boeing has some interesting practices in how they run their company….” (Ryan)
I’m inclined to agree. Boeing used to be an “engineering” company run by Engineering, built superb products and supported their products. Now the company is run by the Finance/Accounting dept, with all the predictable outcomes and problems.
It seems that Boeing has been pushing the design limits of the 737 to keep it current and to the point of getting it to match the 757 capacity (at 200+ passengers). There’s only so much mileage you can get out of an old airframe.
To be fair, Boeing has been nothing short of amazing in keeping the 1960s vintage 737 airframe with significant upgrades competitive with the newer Airbus A320neo. But this latest incident may be a sign that the old 737 airframe has reached its limit and time to proceed with the much anticipated new design single-aisle 797 that promises to replace the 737 and 757.
As to the comments about “If it’s a Boeing, I’m not going” reminds me of an acquaintance who works for Boeing and insists on flying Airbus. His reasoning: If the Airbus suffers an incident or crashes, he can sue Airbus. As a Boeing employee flying on a Boeing, he is prohibited from suing Boeing.
With regards to pilots’ unfamiliar with MCAS issues and comparisons to the Corvair, I thought of “Ate Up With Motors” entertaining article on the Porsche 356 and it’s habit of “swinging its tail around to discuss the matter with you” when the novice driver unfamiliar with rear-engine bias/swing-arm suspension lets up on the throttle in mid-turns. (Was Porsche transparent about this characteristic?)
I hope Boeing, the FAA and airlines work together to fix the problem instead of the blame. I’m optimistic that the 737 MAX will be flying again and it’s reputation restored as was the DeHavilland Comet, Lockheed Electra L-188 and McDonnell Douglas DC-10.
If the Max is inherently unstable will the airlines even be able to get these planes insured ? Very much appreciate this website and all the hard work that goes into it. This topic has everyone talking, and since the readers here are all machinery enthusiasts there has been some great discussion. And the politics is mostly kept out, which is great. I started out as a kid reading popular science, popular mechanics, and mechanix illustrated and have had a lifelong interest in all kinds of technology. So thanks Paul for a great website.
Boeing already was aware of the cause of the first crash, and not grounding the planes and installing backup sensor and warning lights on all the affected models was probably the most arrogant and likely lawyer driven decision to try to weasel out of lawsuits from the first crash as this would make it obvious there was a design defect. But crash number 2 pretty much shoved this thinking right up its ass.
No one may see this story by the NY Times but it IS interesting. I like the part where Boeing felt they could rest on their laurels and not really have to take Airbus seriously since they (Boeing) were top dog. How often has that thinking led to issues…?
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html
I read it, and was tempted to do a follow-up. Yes, it has all the classic signs of a complacent company at the top of its market for too long.