(first posted 10/11/2016) General Motors entered 1997 with the worst kind of delusional attitude. The company had rebounded from its brush with bankruptcy in the early 1990s, but the core of the company’s dysfunction was far from resolved. Rather than building better cars and trucks, GM’s focus was on financial engineering, browbeating suppliers and deploying the worst sort of marketing gimmickry. Automobile Magazine took a look at what was in store for 1997 from GM’s eight divisions in the October 1996 issue: were there any breakout hits in the making?
One tidbit noted by Automobile Magazine in the front of the October issue was the fact that General Motors was leaving its landmark headquarters building, designed by noted architect Alfred Kahn, and moving operations to the Renaissance Center, a failed downtown revitalization project that had originally been built by Henry Ford II. The General Motors Building was one of the finest examples of neoclassical renaissance architecture in the U.S., and for years showcased the power and success of GM. The Renaissance Center, by contrast, is a dismal post-modern pile on the Detroit River, derisively referred to as “The Tubes.” It was eerily prescient in 1997 that GM was “heading down the tubes.”
GM’s brand management debacle of the 1990s was one of the worst plagues ever unleashed on the company. Given that cars are an infrequent, expensive and emotional purchase (yes, even the most rational buyer makes a statement with their choice of car, even if just to signal “I care nothing for cars…”), a good source for “outside” marketing talent would be from industries that create desire and build strong images, like fashion, technology, luxury goods and entertainment. Instead, GM appointed Ron Zarrella, an operations executive from Bausch and Lomb, as the top marketing executive at the company. Sad but true: a guy whose expertise consisted of crunching the numbers to move contact lenses and saline solution was leading marketing for the world’s largest car company. When you think of the world’s most desirable brands and products, the first thing that comes to mind is vision care, right?
But all the ridiculous packaged goods mumbo-jumbo in the world could not overcome weak products and too many divisions and models. Terrible badge engineering was alive and well, with the Malibu/Cutlass and the new minivans. Chevrolet continued to flounder. Opels were turned into Cadillacs! And it was even worse than all that: read on to learn more about the misguided marketing “wonders” who were going to “save” GM.
If there ever was a corporate “Deadly Sin,” this was it. There is nothing more lethal than ignorance combined with arrogance, and I genuinely pity the many talented people at GM who had to deal with this plague of clueless Consumer Packaged Goods (CPG) marketers. Reading these quotes is so horrifically unbelievable I don’t even know where to begin. Marketing a Cadillac was like marketing baby wipes?!?!? The guy literally talked about discovering how people wipe themselves as if this was some sort of grand consumer insight. Then there were the pompous statements from the Pontiac Grand Am manager, who felt that Secret Deodorant marketing was superior to anything from the car industry. Never mind “The Ultimate Driving Machine” or countless others, including many from GM’s heyday… Or how about the Oldsmobile Bravada “superstar” marketer who felt that selling SUVs was like selling pet food. Of course, members of the “CPG brain trust” preached that you could position a Chevrolet SUV clone from GMC as being for a different customer than the Chevy itself. Or using “brand positioning and consumer interviews” to make a Buick Regal so exciting that people would “walk over broken glass to get it.” Or learning brand building lessons from the scintillating world of pencils. Seriously, what were these guys smoking?
The blame for this disgraceful mess should be placed at the feet of John Smale, from the GM Board of Directors. Smale was the CEO of Proctor & Gamble, the Cincinnati, Ohio-based Consumer Packaged Goods giant. He joined the GM Board in 1982, and along with other Board members, presided over the systematic destruction of one of the world’s greatest companies. This Board rubber stamped all of GM CEO Roger Smith’s inept moves, allowed the disastrous 1984 corporate reorganization, the idiotic purchases of entire companies in unrelated industries, the creation of a unneeded new divisions (Saturn and GEO), the outrageously expensive and problematic GM10 program, etc. etc., etc. All the while, General Motors was hemorrhaging market share, investing in malfunctioning assembly line robots instead of much-needed new engines, and falling incredibly far behind all of its rivals while fielding uncompetitive, out-of-date products. Where was the management accountability for this unmitigated disaster? GM’s Board did nothing to address the appalling business degradation for years.
Finally, facing the specter of bankruptcy in 1992, Smale acted and ousted Bob Stempel, who was Roger Smith’s hand-picked (and Board approved) successor. Of course, Smale himself and the rest of the Board were far more culpable for GM’s woes than any of the individual leaders: the Board’s job was to hold management responsible for protecting and growing the company, and they failed miserably. After the Board coup, the cure to “fix” the company turned out to be worse than the disease: Smale unleashed the CPG reign of terror on GM, where the wildly unqualified CPG marketers damaged GM’s brands even further and put the company right back on the road toward its next bankruptcy.
The complete incompetence of the General Motor’s Board led to devastated communities, damaged dealers and disappointed customers. Just like Liquid Plumr (a brand these clods no doubt revered), the Board took GM down the drain, and no amount of Tide was ever going to wash away that ugly truth. OK, I’ll get off my soap box now (pun intended) so we can see the rest of the news from GM for 1997.
In spite of thrilling developments like PASS-Key II, daytime running lights and easier turn gas caps, Buick sales dropped 16% for 1997. Some of that was likely due to the loss of the Roadmaster (taken out of production so The General could build more SUVs at the Arlington, Texas plant), as well as a slow ramp-up for the redesigned Century and Regal. Too bad the CPG brain trust didn’t implement some smart tie-ins, like a 3-year supply of Geritol standard with each LeSabre, or maybe a gift-with-purchase like “The Clapper” so turning your lights on and off was stupid easy, just like driving a Buick…
| Buick Division | 390,661 |
| LeSabre | 150,744 |
| Park Avenue | 59,637 |
| Skylark | 57,904 |
| Century | 53,486 |
| Regal | 50,691 |
| Riviera | 18,199 |
The Butt-wipe Maestro at Cadillac must have been very pleased with himself, as Cadillac sales rose 17% for the model year, with most of that growth coming from the new Opel-cloned Catera, the pathetic “Caddy That Zigs.” That horrific “non-Cadillac,” marketed with a cartoon duck named Ziggy, essentially became the Cimarron II. Somehow, for the first model year, Cadillac dealers found enough suckers to take delivery of one that GM surely viewed the Catera as a “huge” success. Here are all the results from the “wreath and crest” and “zigging duck” division:
| Cadillac Division | 195,497 |
| DeVille | 101,363 |
| Seville | 45,283 |
| Catera | 28,704 |
| Eldorado | 20,147 |
GM’s “Bowtie” division was a hot mess in 1997. Old products like the Lumina and Cavalier were subpar rental car fodder. Of course, so were “new” products like the Malibu and Venture. The best car available in Chevrolet showrooms was from Toyota, in the form of the GEO Prizm. Overall sales were down 6% year-over-year, and profits on most (if not all) carlines were virtually nonexistent. Frankly, if it weren’t for trucks and SUVS (49% of sales), Chevrolet would have been down for the count–“Like a Rock” indeed. Here are the results by model:
| Chevrolet GEO | 2,381,666 |
| C/K Pickup | 534,344 |
| Cavalier | 315,136 |
| Lumina | 234,626 |
| Blazer | 221,400 |
| S-Series Pickup | 192,314 |
| Tahoe | 124,125 |
| Astro | 111,390 |
| Malibu | 100,266 |
| Suburban | 99,068 |
| Chevy Van/Express | 83,642 |
| Venture | 76,171 |
| Monte Carlo | 72,555 |
| Geo Prizm | 62,922 |
| Geo Metro | 55,629 |
| Camaro | 54,972 |
| Geo Tracker | 33,354 |
| Corvette | 9,752 |
For almost its entire history, the consumer products from GMC were nothing more than Chevrolets with different badges and different grilles. The strategic intent was to allow non-Chevrolet dealers to sell trucks too. The “market saturation” approach was a market share grab and nothing more–GMC couldn’t really meet the criteria of being a brand in the sense of offering anything unique. However, the CPG wizards were convinced they could craft a meaningful “brand” for “unique” consumers, just like they thought P&G’s Tide detergent was “vitally” different than Gain detergent. Never mind that most shoppers just picked whatever laundry detergent was cheapest or had the smell that they liked the most. If only GMC had touted a “new Spring Fresh scent” or placed coupons in Sunday circulars, maybe sales would have been up instead of flat for 1997.
| GMC | 438,134 |
| Siera Pickup | 171,674 |
| Jimmy | 75,817 |
| Yukon XL | 43,137 |
| Sonoma Pickup | 41,714 |
| Safari Van | 35,787 |
| Yukon | 35,566 |
| Savana Van | 34,439 |
Poor Oldsmobile. The rocket division was a dismal shadow of its former rock star days in the 1970s. Sales for 1997 were down 28% and were barely ahead of Cadillac within the GM portfolio. The best product in the line, the Aurora, only started carrying the Oldsmobile name in 1997–the brand’s image had become that toxic. Of course, if only the CPG marketers had been able to implement more campaigns, things might have turned out differently. Perhaps loading the back of Bravadas with Dog Chow and Meow Mix. Or maybe brand advertising announcing that Oldsmobile was “recommended by 4 out of 5 dentists…”
| Oldsmobile Division | 211,203 |
| Eighty-Eight | 70,503 |
| Cutlass Supreme | 59,524 |
| Achieva | 52,544 |
| Bravada | 28,481 |
| Aurora | 27,927 |
| Silhouette | 24,615 |
| Cutlass | 18,112 |
Believe it or not, among all the GM divisions, Pontiac actually placed second in sales behind Chevrolet for 1997, and sales were up 27% for the division. What drove the success? Easy–the new Grand Prix, which saw sales rise 90%. Was it the marketing angle: “Crunchier and Munchier” or “Now Even Cheesier” or “Wider Is Better” or something like that? Or maybe it was that the Grand Prix was the best of the revamped W-Bodies and buyers liked the product. Nah, must have been the marketing. Whatever the cause, the divisional results were pretty good, especially given that Pontiac offered no SUV models during “truck crazy” 1997.
| Pontiac Division | 702,572 |
| Grand Am | 235,738 |
| Grand Prix | 159,033 |
| Sunfire | 152,023 |
| Bonneville | 79,392 |
| Firebird | 32,692 |
| TransSport | 43,694 |
Over at Saturn, the division continued to compete with in-house sister Chevrolet for small car buyers (c’mon, do you really think Civic and Corolla intenders were cross-shopping Saturn in 1997?). The allure of dent resistance did lift Saturn sales by 7% compared to 1996: after all, the “handy plastic container” had been a staple of Tupperware for years, so why not cars?
| Saturn Division Cars | 314,992 |
| SL | 213,182 |
| SC | 70,711 |
| SW | 31,099 |
The Trans Sport may have been “in the game” with the arrival of the updated U-Body minivan, but it sure couldn’t play. The newest GM offerings didn’t even come close to the class-leading Chrysler minivans. Plus, why was Pontiac, the “excitement” division, even selling a minivan in the first place?
OK, finally, one car from GM for 1997 that was decent. Not spectacular, but not dreadful either. At least the Grand Prix did have a unique roofline and more aggressive styling than its W-Body siblings. The corporate Supercharged 3.8 Liter V6 was unrefined but quick (and shared with other divisions). But given that the Grand Prix was a large sedan with aggressive styling, why on earth was the Bonneville still around? Ah yes, brand management–each GM car model had its own brand manager, searching for their “own” customers, and not bothering to look for overlap or how the models added up to building a brand image for Pontiac. Of course, Pontiac was the brand, but that fact was conveniently forgotten by the CPG brain trust: they just focused on individual models. A pure, unmitigated mess.
So, let’s respond to the statement posed by Paul Lienert in his introduction to GM for 1997:
“If GM can achieve meaningful differentiation among its eight domestic nameplates and dozens of models, then brand management will be a success. If it develops into a cynical attempt to use advertising and marketing to give a different aura to vehicles that are essentially the same, it will likely be a humiliating failure.”
Well, we all know how that turned out.
John Smale and Ron Zarrella (who went back to Baush and Lomb as CEO and then was busted for lying about his resume) deserve the infamy. They can join Roger Smith in the Automotive Hall of Shame as leaders who did the most to destroy GM.
Where to begin! I guess the Cutlass/Malibu is as a good a place. What a pathetic attempt at a model. It’s a wonder they tooled up a new grille and taillights, given that the rest of the car is exactly the same.
Plus GM was in full-Tupperware interior mode at this time with the penalty-box interiors and plastics that despite being new, were poor compared to 10-year old Toyotas. This was also around the time that GM went with a poor supplier of buttons. Almost every used GM I see online from this era has worn-off buttons on the radio, etc.
Good job calling out those responsible – but typically they land on their feet, usually in big piles of money, while those in the trenches pay the price (as well as consumers – no doubt for some of them their last GM product – ever).
Peter DeLorenzo wrote about the ’97 Malibu/Cutlass in his book “The United States Of Toyota.”
They brought in the current Honda Accord to benchmark.
Of course, given the time it takes to design and bring a new product into the marketplace, even a fourth-grader would understand the futility of this logic. The Malibu/Cutlass was obsolete before it ever hit the showroom!
Americans today have lost the nerve to punish scoundrels for wrongdoing, unless the culprits are nobodies. I have seen this in many different venues.
In going back through to the Gilded Age, did we ever have the nerve to punish scoundrels for industrial wrongdoing?
Traditionally the Malibu and Cutlass were carbon copies of one another as always. When both cars were RWD A from 1964-80 and then later on 1981-83 RWD G-Bodies they were duplicate cousins of one another made from the same “cookie cutter” design. Its ironic though that the 1997 to current Malibu were actually “spiritual successors” to the FWD L-Bodied Corsica/Beretta, FWD X-Bodied Citation, RWD X-Bodied Nova and Chevy II. The Cutlass meanwhile can be considered an Achieva/Alero “variation” since all 3 sedans were made from the same chassis and just like FWD Malibu, it was also a successor to the FWD N- Body Calais/Cutlass Calais, FWD X-Bodied Omega and RWD X-Bodied Omega. The RWD A/G-Bodied Malibu were replaced by the FWD A-Bodied Celebrity, FWD W-Bodied Lumina and Impala. The RWD A/G-Bodied Cutlass and Cutlass Supreme were replaced by two different similar sized GM FWD A and at the same time W-Bodied cars collectively known as the Cutlass Ciera, Cutlass Supreme and the Intrigue which replaced both the Cutlass Ciera and Cutlass Supreme.
The RWD era Cutlass and Malibu lines were related, but by no means “Cookie Cutter.” They always sported substantially unique sheet metal, interiors including dashes, and frequently unique engine and transmission offerings.
The G Special RWD coupes lived through 1988.
Yup. A 1965 Chevelle/Malibu and a 1965 Cutlass shared the same shell, but they looked quite a bit different inside and out, had different automatic transmissions (although you might have a hard time telling the difference), and completely different (unrelated) engines.
I didn’t know ’bout the Bausch & Lomb part. Only Proctor & Gamble.
What utter crap GM built in the 90s. Just. Plain. GARBAGE.
True, I owned three GM vehicles from the 90’s. ’94 Astro, ’97 Blazer and a ’91 Caprice…all bought several years old. I was fortunate, none was a lemon and I got to keep on driving my beloved Bowties. Also, you’ll kindly note all three came from lines where their give-a-damn hadn’t busted: B-Bodies and Trucks.
My neighbor, eternal Ford guy, happened upon a ’93 Lumina Euro, Chevy’s, ahem, ‘answer’ to the ’93 Ford Taurus SHO that I’d bought for my son’s 16th birthday. (I know, total SMH moment if you’ve driven an SHO, what was I thinking, giving that kind of power/speed to a 16-year-old…thank God he never crashed the thing!)
The SHO drove like a premium car, even at 125MPH, even in the state of disrepair this SHO was in after sitting unused, outdoors for the previous five years. The fit and finish, the appointments…there was absolutely NOTHING about the Chevy that was better, except it was easier to work on under the hood.
Has anybody reading this site ever run across anybody, ever, who raved about their 90’s GM car? Because I never did. Toyota, Honda, Mazda, even Nissan…even Ford got the love…GM was all about cash on the hood.
All this said, I’ll throw in the caveat that I thought the Blazer was tighter and more roadable than the Explorer with its deliberately-soft tires, having driven both when new.
E I G H T divisions…really? Would we have really needed “a different kind of car” from “a different kind of company” had GM not screwed up the lines they already had so badly? Egads.
These are the shadows that loom over the General today, while they build, arguably, the best vehicles in their history. Will enough customers give them a shot to rebuild, at least, a small portion of their once-insurmountable market share?
I’m afraid it’s going to take many more years, combined with a few more whoopsie-daisies from Toyota and Honda, before perceptions turn in GM’s favor.
I don’t know, Chas… I liked the one 1997 GM car I purchased for myself…
I loved my 1997 Buick Lesabre that I bought 3 years ago. It gave me a comfy ride and its v6 engine was more then enough to motivate the car off the line. It did not give me a lick of trouble the whole time I owned it. and looked and drove great. I sold it to a friend for her son to drive and it gave him no trouble until he was hit in the parking lot by some idiot woman talking on a cell phone and driving 50mph. Still he walked away without a scratch(unlike the woman)
I have a 1995 Caddy Deville with the 4.9l V8. I have had no trouble at all with it since I got it. It is wonderful to drive and is in good shape.
I have had trouble with a couple of 2000’s GM cars but every time I took them in to the shop GM made things right with little cost to me.
Contrast that with the only Toyota product I have owned(or will ever own) my Scion XB that I bought new. It was a fight to get Toyota to honor the warranty, arrogant dealers, Toyota USA which had its head up its @$$ all have driven me away from Toyota for good.
That era of LeSabre was one of the very few lights in the GM darkness. After my 1989 Bonneville finally became too rusty to be trusty, I went for a 1995 LeSabre in 2003. I can vouch for their crash-worthiness, as I was involved in a 60-mph five-car pileup in the winter of 2005 with mine, and I walked away without a scratch. It was comfortable, good for 25-30 mpg on the highway, and had enough power when I wanted it. No, it wasn’t an “enthusiast’s” car, but I wanted a big comfy cushy car, and the LeSabre was a fine choice.
+1 on the LeSabre being a bright spot. There are still quite a few on the road out here. It was a best seller at a time when GM car products were out of fashion. The door handles and shape made it look like a Buick. A reliable car with some character.
Leon, Nissan has always treated me well warranty-wise. The very few times I’ve had to take mine in for work (at different dealers) resulted in the problem being quickly resolved and me driving away happily. They may not be the hottest thing in driving dynamics or styling, but I’m on my 5th Nissan. My perception is that they try harder than Toyota or Honda. But…they’re only as good as their last car. If they start screwing me, I’ll walk.
Now imagine if Chevrolet or Ford had been able to keep my loyalty like that. But they didn’t try to. Build quality and dealer experiences did them in.
+1 for some shining lights from GM back then (though definitely far from all).
I loved the 1995 Riviera when it came out (I even ordered the sales literature package – VHS!) and had an opportunity to pick one up recently with very low miles (42K at purchase in May, just over 51K now – 80-mile round trip commutes add up). It feels well put together, the materials are nice, it rides and handles perfectly adequately – it is a luxobarge after all, but still goes around a corner just fine. Still smells like a new GM car from back then. Super comfortable, roomy, and powerful enough with the 3800 Supercharged. The stereo isn’t even half bad – I added a Bluetooth puck via the cassette deck. Mine is Light Adriatic Blue on blue leather – yes, I would have had the darker blue exterior, but hey, you don’t get to order 21 year old cars! I’ve almost even forgiven it for being front wheel drive. (Almost.)
Well played, Buick – well played.
I loved my 1998 Grand Prix Se 3800, my 1996 Lumina LS and my 1996 Caprice Classic . All 3 were very reliable, never broke down and the interiors actually held up well.
The infamous “brand management”, A term I had forgotten about until now. Ugh, Corporate “BS” like “synergies” & “brand management” is one of the reasons I’m glad to be a blue collar guy. Meanwhile I my “Team of Associates” (Co-workers) are “directing our focus” (working) on “restructuring this asset” (ripping the drywall out of this building). Later, we will “have a breakout session” (Guzzle some Yuenglings at the closest bar)..
Yes the whole “selling cars is no different than selling detergent” thing at GM.
It made me want to curl up in a corner and weep for the once great GM, and I was only 19 years old in 1997. Might as well have sent every brand that wasn’t Chevrolet and Cadillac to its grave that year just based on the corporate culture. (We wouldn’t even have Buick if it wasn’t for the Chinese.)
Somehow all of the talk about butt wiping seems appropriate with the way the Catera turned out.
When I think GM in the 90s, I think of Buick LeSabres and Park Avenues. They certainly could have been worse. By 1997, it seemed that only the older platforms were much good.
For all of the disasters coming out of GM at that time, we have to acknowledge that Chevy was selling about 100K Suburbans a year along with another 40K+ Yukon XLs from GMC. This may have been the only GM vehicle being built then that had the classic GM attributes of stylish, well appointed and mechanically decent. Add another 160K Tahoes and Yukons and imagine what the bottom line would have looked like without the mega profit that each one of these brought in.
I had a friend who went to work as an engineer in GM Truck Division in Pontiac in early 1997. In about June or July of that year I went to visit him and of course he had to show me what they were working on.
Of note:
He showed me full-sized mockups of the new for 1998 C/K series pickups. Even he, Mr. Die-Hard GM, said they were so little changed visually from the outgoing series that dated back to 1988 he was concerned about people actually noticing them.
However, he said selling them would be no problem. GM made $15k per Suburban and Tahoe. He said pickups were around $9k or so depending upon trim.
He showed me several reports, with quotes, from various focus groups. While I won’t go into some of the specifics, let’s just say if they trusted these people to produce product it’s no wonder the market wiped their butt with GM.
With one of GM’s “oh shit” moments, he got downsized and, last I heard, he went to Ford and was quite happy.
Of course, he was soon hitting on The Future Mrs. Jason and that was the end of that.
I can entirely believe that.
When I went back to school for my master’s a few years ago, I had a class taught by a professor that had done materials analysis and energy lifecycle analysis for plastic and composite fuel tanks for the 1998 full-sized GM vans. Fun fact-they were instructed to use eight years or 104,000 miles as their “lifecycle.”
And that was for a fuel tank. And then we wonder why the ignitions killed people and GM went bankrupt.
Wow. Any idea when ‘planned obsolescence’ shifted from aesthetics to durability?
I’d like to know that myself, I’d much rather drive a dated looking car than a “timelessly styled” shit box! Back when GM had a 2-3 year styling cycle, you could buy the out of style five year old model for a song, but it would’ve at least lasted you awhile.
The bean-counters were running the show by the 1980s, especially at GM. At least at Ford they didn’t install a bean-counter CEO until Trotman in the ’90s (which, coincidentally, is when Ford quality overall shit the bed), a dive from which it took them 15 years to recover.
These days, I’d argue that it hasn’t. I know Ford designs on a 150,000-mile life cycle these days (so they’re intending 95 or 98 percent of whatever component to run for at least 150k). My 1995 F-150 with 196,000 miles runs like a top and has done three different multi-state trips in the last six months.
Also-average age of the U.S. fleet is now over 11 years.
Think about a car from the era when there were annual styling changes (ending in the late ’60s I’d say) lasting 150k or 200k without ever cracking open the engine. Hell, my ’78 Continental with 136,000 runs through a quart of oil every 400 miles or so and shows clear signs it needs at least valve work done.
I’d argue that when the engineers are allowed to do their work and the leadership understands the value of that work, the company does well. When the board installs a CEO with a finance background, the company goes to hell. In Ford’s case, Trotman (’93-’98 and the disastrous Ford 2000 reorg) and Nasser (’98- Dec. ’01 and his disastrous spending spree on car brands and non-related businesses) were both finance guys who got the CEO job because of their record of cost-cutting. Red Polling (’90-93) was a financial analyst that got Ford’s accounting sorted and put together, and Don Petersen was an engineer.
So Ford in the ’80s was led by people that understood engineering and smart decision-making. Ford in the 1990s was led by cost-cutters that didn’t understand engineering or smart decision-making. Not coincidentally, there’s a huge difference in Ford quality from those two eras.
Cheers for that. I’ve just been reading ‘Skunk Works’ about the stealth bomber and it’s interesting to read of the knife-edge tolerances in manufacture, to the extent that the F117As used in Desert Storm could only be used for a month before they reached their operational ‘limit’.
It’s important not to overstate how long cars used to last. A ’60s American car would require a lot of work to keep it running satisfactorily past 100,000 miles. There was still the general expectation that engines would need a valve job after about 50,000 miles, just as in later eras there was the expectation with a lot of later Japanese engines that the timing belt and water pump would need to be done at 60,000, and the amount of maintenance involved in reaching that point was a lot greater than most modern cars need (including stuff like chassis lubes and tune-ups). Certainly, Detroit engineers and executives of the sixties would not have claimed they were in the business of making cars to last 150,000 miles or more.
Some cars did, of course, and some of those are still on the road, but that’s more a reflection of the cost and complexity of maintenance and repair (and the willingness to do them). The endurance of old cars of the pre-electronic era has more to do with having readily available cheap parts that can be replaced without vast technical knowledge or expensive tools than with the cars themselves being more intrinsically durable. This isn’t to say a car’s lifespan can’t be cut short by aggravating penny-pinching on the part of the manufacturer, since that happens pretty often, but it has to be taken in the context of cars that are more complex and expensive to fix, which lowers the threshold at which doing so ceases to be worthwhile.
As for the Stealth Fighter, any jet aircraft, especially a military aircraft, requires enormous amounts of maintenance per flight hour. For the F-117, this was exacerbated by the fact that maintaining its low radar signature — really its only virtue as an airplane — required scrupulous attention to panel fit and the condition of its radar-absorbing material. A little misalignment or wear could easily compromise the precarious arrangements that kept it stealthy. Imagine if on top of the regular maintenance cars and trucks require, any minor dent, scratch, or bird dropping might result in your being hit with a missile or AA artillery!
The GMT-800 trucks flew out of the showrooms. Customers seemed to like the styling…considering that they sold nearly 700,000 of them in the first year and 850,000 the second!
To GM’s credit, it seems like they’re pretty smart about truck styling. Their strategy over the past couple decades with truck styling and engineering has been to let the others lead, while they remain a less-flashy and more conservative choice. Those that want the latest-greatest go Ford or (now) Ram, the more skeptical types go GM. If I were in the new truck market (or the 1997 truck market for that matter), I’d go for the Ford, but I appreciate and think it smart of GM to offer the alternative.
1997 was such a terrible time for midsize cars. The Malibu/Cutlass debuted so much heavier that they were too much for a four. This was how half of Corsicas were sold. So EPA numbers were actually down despite finally getting a four speed auto.
The Camry was also heavily downgraded with a cheaper interior and Tempo like styling. At least it avoided going to a pushrod four as was rumoured at the time.
The Accord was still one year away from it’s brush with the cost cutters but they were hard at work on the Contour.
The Altima and the 626 were given some of the most bland updates ever.
The only bright spot in 1997-98 was the introduction of the VW Passat back on the Audi platform after it’s time as a stretched Jetta.
The real problem was just too much production capacity in the compact midsize realm. The Japanese had added much new capacity over what the domestics already had and now people are switching to trucks, So Malbus are selling at a quarter of the rate of the Corsica/Baretta 10 years before and even the Japanese are hiring cost cutters. Depressing time for compact fans.
“Catera – Cadillac’s much-talked about new sedan will be in dealerships by fall to do battle with BMW’s 328i and the Mercedes-Benz C280.”
Hahahahahahahahahah!!!!! The “battle” was over even before it began.
GM was hailing that the Cadillac Catera was supposed to directly compete with Germany’s best but it was as bad as a joke as the Cimarron was especially since it was a pseudo-luxury Cavalier. The Cadillac Catera for all its intents and purposes was actually nothing more than an Opel Omega in which Chevrolet in some South American Countries called this the Chevrolet Omega and in others YES even a Chevrolet Lumina (which was totally unrelated to the slightly larger U.S. Chevrolet Lumina produced back then). Even Holden got into the Opel Omega craze by producing the Holden Commodore. Besides the pseudo-luxury appointments, the Catera was not that much larger than the Chevrolet Malibu and its more of an Opel or even a Chevy rather than a Cadillac. As shown here on my post, Chevrolet fell in love with the Lumina name so you can either have it as a Catera much like the one in the center below, a Pontiac G8/Chevrolet SS (second row left), a FWD W-Bodied Buick Regal/Century (second row right) or the two generations of the U.S. Chevrolet Lumina (both on the top row).
To your point, when the Catera came out, I thought they’d actually just redone the bodywork on the Malibu and slapped a Caddy badge in the grille. It wasn’t until well after no one remembered them that I learned they were Opels in other parts of the world. I remember seeing one at the gas station in my small domestic-loving town when they first came out, looking at it while the owner was paying for the gas, and wondering why anyone would spend their money on it, since it looked like a slightly-nicer Malibu for twice the money.
Just….wow, that page about the “brand managers”…. I mean, “basically, positioning a brand, like Bravada, in the sport-utility segment is the same as positioning cookies or pet food.”
I remember how the TV adverts from this time all had separate taglines for each model that would play at the end. Like at Buick, instead of a memorable marque-wide slogan that would encapsulate what your brand stood for, like “the ultimate driving machine”, we got “peace of mind”, “the power of understatement”, “the official car of the supercharged family”, and “discover a little luxury” depending on which Buick it was (do any of you remember which car, er, ‘brand’, used which of those taglines?) I doubt I could, even if you asked me. Oops I left out “you’re due – definitely due”; Sounds like something I might hear at the hospital if I were 9 months pregnant.
Chevy wanted to end their advertising with a brand-wide tagline but also had to include the car-specific tagline, which made the end of the commercials have two slogans in a row. Like “Impala – let’s go for a drive!, from Chevrolet, like a rock” or whatever the Chevy slogan was that year.
The old GM building looks so much better than the RenCen. Why exactly did they move? Also, “Intricate tile work decorates the hallway outside the cafeteria. The tiles were supplied by the Flint Furnace Tile Works, a GM subsidiary.” Didn’t know GM was ever in the ceramic tile business….
Take a good look at that black Catera in the magazine. Is that not the most generic-looking car you’ve ever seen? There is just nothing on that car that says Cadillac.
Brand management done well can work. This is brand management done terribly by people who are too full of themselves to see their own absurdity, people who know nothing about cars but think whatever sells frozen dinners or mouthwash can sell cars too.
“the official car of the supercharged family” – Yes… The Buick Regal GS. If memory serves, Tiger Woods hawked that car.
My Dad bought one, and when he was done with it, my wife at the time (she was a GM Mechanic at a Pontiac/Buick dealership) bought that car. It was nice, but its build quality seemed somehow inferior to the GTP I had (pictured above). This is kinda surprising considering that Buick was a more expensive brand than Pontiac.
When she and I split up, I went back to Ford, no longer having a GM Tech in the immediate family. ;o)
I remember vividly going to the Chicago Auto Show with my Dad during this era and us making fun of the Buick display with the dozen cardboard Tiger Woods cutouts outnumbering the people in the display.
There was a sort of tepid enthusiasm for the Regal GS, but compared to the Grand Prix GTP it was a total blob.
Good word “blob”… It handled that way too; it was definitely set up for an older demographic than my GTP. The Regal GS had a much softer ride.
While both cars accelerated the same, the GTP was much better in the curves. Interestingly, the governor was set at 126 for the GTP as the article states above, but the Regal GS was limited to 110. A function of the stock tires’ speed rating no doubt. But with the way the Buick did not handle as good as the Pontiac, I wouldn’t have wanted to be going 126 in it anyway.
For the record: here’s which tagline was used for which Buick:
“peace of mind” = LeSabre
“discover a little luxury” = Century
“the power of understatement” = Park Avenue
“the official car of the supercharged family” = Regal
“you’re due – definitely due” = Riviera
That last one still cracks me up…..
I don’t remember and don’t feel like researching what each Chevy’s tagline was, but these two are worth noting:
“let’s go for a drive!” – Impala
“let’s go!” – Venture minivan
Lots of brand distinction there….
Someone here should write up a compilation of late-’90s GM brand-management taglines that were used for each “brand” (that is, each car) and see if any of us can correctly match them up to what GM car was being advertised.
GM’s products at the time seemed to be clueless flash and vapid styling covering outdated mechanicals. My dad was a GM man but at the time found nothing appealong in those ancient ugly offerings, in ’97. He felt they were little better than his ’88 Bonneville. He kept that car going 2 more years and bought a 99 Concorde.
I have a 97 DeVille that I bought used. GM engineers managed to filter out anything regarding road feel out of the beast and managef to make it a floaty boat which simply would never appeal to anyone who had enjoyed a decent Mercedes.
However, I was impressed with its upmarket build quality and materials. It no longer felt like a Chevy with tacky trim. It felt like a quality product. And it is. Wrecking yards are full of DeVilles with perfect paint and interiors, (and all with bad head bolts.)
By 1997 the Deville was sharing most everything with the Seville, so naturally there were some compromises in it’s tuning. The Northstar was also perhaps less appropriate to the mission than the older 4.9 with so much of it’s power at engine speeds a Deville driven as intended will simply not see. It is interesting to note that it was selling at a higher rate than the rest of the line combined. Bet it would have even higher without the compromises. Cadillac might have been better off perfecting the Deville and preparing luxury SUVs than chasing import buyers with Cadillacs they neither wanted nor cared about.
Still going after 20 years in the Ontario climate says something about GM quality.
I gotta save “Butt-Wipe Maestro” for future use.
Yep! Seems pretty fitting that a guy who marketed poop wipes was trying to market 1997 Cadillacs.
When I read Robert Baird Jr’s poop piece about marketing, I thought for sure this was a page out of National Lampoon.
A replica of the GM lobby was featured in season 6 & 7 of Mad Men. One of the partners (Pete Campbell) could not drive a stick shift and knocked down a display while behind the wheel of a ’69 Camaro.
I did a quick bit of research hoping that the Mad Men scene was done on location in the Cadillac Place (old GM) building. But, it appears it was done on a set that did a good job with the spirit of the old lobby. It almost seems like they could have broke even going on location vs. the elaborate set. I wonder if the set is a stock “grand old ballroom” set that gets reused, or just a grand old building somewhere in L.A.
After visiting the Griffith Park Observatory in L.A. last year, and now seeing it in practically every movie and TV show, I have the impression that a lot of L.A. buildings get used time and again.
Not just buildings, the 6th street bridge over the LA river often doubles for freeways, scenes with a tunnel use the second street tunnel, and scenes set in futuristic worlds use lower grand ave.
What a great write up. I had no idea they had enough buffoons in marketing to staff a circus. Oh, wait, it was a circus, silly me. And GM trucks were mechanically decent at that time, but really only because the engine was designed 44 years earlier. Feel the craptasticness….
And by ’97 they’d fixed the structure enough that they didn’t all get what I call the “Chevy Sag.” The pre-’95 trucks all seemed to have frames that succumbed to rush, allowing the cab and bed to sag so badly in the middle that you’ll sometimes see them touching on old beaters in the salted North. That said, I completely understand, based on the ’77, ’92, ’98, and ’05 Chevy trucks my dad’s owned how Ford’s been the number 1 truck for nearly four decades now.
We don’t salt here in Oregon, but I have seen plenty with the “Chevy Sag” The frames are just wimpy and simply bend on ’88-94 trucks, when they were actually used as trucks.
Aww… I like the Renaissance Center. Nothing against the old building, but still…
I have to agree. I didn’t fully appreciate until now how GM got to be in the Ren Cen, but it has been the face of GM for 20 years. It looks like a headquarters for a modern car company.
The old GM building obviously has a lot of historical detail, but Ford’s 1955 headquarters still looks very modern, and Chrysler had a shiny new headquarters completed in Auburn hills in 1995. The old GM building, now named Cadillac place after the founder of Detroit, Antoine Laumet de La Mothe, sieur de Cadillac had to seem pretty stuffy and dated. After GM moved out, it required a significant overhaul.
In the early 80s almost every vehicle my extended family owned was a GM product. By the late 90s the last one standing was my mother’s LeSabre. She owned another after that, and both were decent cars (at least by GM standards.)
Every one else in the family had moved on by the early 90s or so to Ford or Japanese/German makes.
Sweet merciful Jeebus GM was a mess! Growing up in a GM family where I did meant I never really understood the GM situation as I was growing up. There were always a ton of GM products around, and if I go home there are still a ton of GM products around. They’re bought by conservative Midwesterners whose daddies and grandaddies bought GMs, and they’ll buy GMs.
But wow, what a mess! The Malibu was the poster child for automotive Novocaine. The Oldsmobiles were a confused mess. Catera… happened, and it shouldn’t have. Suckfire, erm, Sunfire was an uglier version of an already shit car.
Someone else said it above-it seems like the few lights in the GM darkness were the old platforms-the H cars were nearing the end of that generation and the platform had over 10 years on it by then. The W Grand Prix managed to still convey Driving Excitement with the new version. And the trucks, with their 1970 engineering, were still trucking along.
Looking back on this, it’s absolutely staggering how bad GM was in the shit at the time!
Hah! Suckfire. I’m going to use that one.
It’s interesting to see a good honest write up, yet those in media and advertising, will defends their bretheren even in death. The New York Times wrote “Mr. Smale helped rescue the automaker from the brink of bankruptcy and returned it to profitability.”
Funny from the guy who was quoted at P&G as saying “we don’t want to think in quarters or even years but in terms of decades and centuries” How’d that work out for GM again?
Maybe its an unwritten rule that you have to be nice to people in their obituaties so they don’t come back and haunt you…sounds like the haunting was already complete at GM.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/business/john-g-smale-procter-gamble-chief-dies-at-84.html?_r=0
Reading page 97, the thought going through my head was something like this…
Also, for a moment I thought the Trans Sport’s dashboard either had an electrical fire, or was made of taffy.
I don’t find a single one of GM’s offerings from this time frame even remotely attractive. They all look bland, even the Grand Prix someone on here likes. I’d have been better off buying that 69 Miller Meteor Hearse I looked at.
For 11 years I owned a 1969 M+M 42″ roof combination (ambulance/hearse) – it was a very nicely-styled vehicle indeed. They are getting really hard to find these days.
Recently purchased a well kept ’95 Prizm for $700. Had a sometimes no start problem (which the owner disclosed). A $40.00 distributor out of a Corolla from U Pull fixed that. A well built car, and I like the styling tweaks, to me a little better looking than it’s assembly line Corolla mate. 200k miles and still uses no oil. Even the AC is still frosty cold.
One of the few non truck bright spots of GM during this time period. Much better than the ’95 Saturn SL2 we had years ago, although it did run for 267k miles before the timing chain went and sent it to U Pull. But that car always drank oil like it was going out of style.
Family also has a ’97 S10 4 cylinder 5 speed for about 10 years now, it’s up to around 200k and has been mostly trouble free. The wiper motor would at times stop working, but I found a recall when we first got it and that was repaired for free. Only has needed water pump, battery, and pinion seal since we have had it. Really underpowered with that 4 cylinder, though.
The baby wipes, etc comparison sums up GM’s Deadly Sin here…….the main problem being that the guys that are in charge of the company know nothing of cars and could generally care less. When you don’t know what you’re selling, and compare it to marketing in general, that’s a huge liability, because a baby wipe is a consumable. You use it and then throw it away. Many vehicles *end up* being a consumable in that many (most?) people drive them until they’re all used up and then get rid of them, and then get something new. But people generally take pride in what they drive, even if they’re not car people and even if it’s just basic transportation. They still have to have enough belief in faith in your baby wipes, if they’re to buy the next package.
Fortunately for us Opels were fitted with Buick and Chevrolet engines and called Holden Commodores and sold well other Opels built as RHD Vauxhalls were rebadged Holden and mailed down under some Toyotas were rebadged Holden and added to the Australian fleet however that stupidity never left their shores to their export markets none of the American models ever came here new so we missed out on all the faulty models yay.
This is even more depressing than Ford’s 1977 line-up. At least there were tape stripes and chrome to cheer things up. Worst generation of Camaro ever, check out the cartoon-like windshield.
I had mercifully forgotten GM’s brief foray with ballyhooed model level “brand managers.” Wow, reading the profile comments from those managers is beyond painful. I almost feel sorry for them, seriously stupid comments live a long time in the digital age. The Buick Regal guy came closest to not coming off oblivious to where he was now working.
Oldsmobile was a pretty serious mess in 1997. That placeholder Cutlass sure ended up a symbol of cynical marketing. I imagine the decision makers did have a dilemma – if the corporate edict was to kill the popular A body Ciera after 1996, Olds was in a bad place and likely to lose some significant sales. From an image standpoint, they probably would have been better off offering a value version of the Cutlass Supreme to replace the Ciera. If anything, giving that Cutlass the Ciera name may have made its mission clearer and less cynical.
I read and re-read those whiz kid interviews and with all those words on the page they didn’t make one straight answer. What a pile of crap and anyone who hired them deserved what they got. I remember the brand management stuff back then and I thought it sounded like Tony Robbins malarkey and I feel vindicated 20 years later.
Hahahahaha……replace “Tony Robbins malarkey” with “Amway crap” and you’d be closer. At least Tony Robbins knows what he’s doing. The pitch that Amway would give people is that “you buy toilet paper and soap already right? How about buttwipes for your baby? See, you’ve already bought a share in your own company, why not own a franchise!!!!!”
And a decade later they were bankrupt. Thanks for the piece, a well-written and disturbing trip down memory lane.
Bob Lutz wrote about GMs brand management strategy in his very amusing book, Icons and Idiots. Guess which category he placed Zarrella and his “butt-wipe maestros”? (Maximum Bob probably wishes he’d thought of that phrase)
I choose the Sunfire as the poster child for the failure of brand management. They were trying to build a sporty premium compact out of a bottom-rung bargain car without replacing any of the outdated mechanicals or putting appreciably more money into higher-quality trim than the Cavalier.
Maybe if they hadn’t blown so much money on headhunting surely high-priced marketing experts, they could’ve put it where the customer could see it.
I choose the Sunfire to illustrate the point, but if I had to actually BUY a 1997 GM compact car, I choose the Prizm.
The Prizm just wasn’t my kind of car, but no doubt it’s Toyota DNA through the NUMMI venture probably made it one of the best cars in GM showrooms in 1997.
A few college friends of my daughter are driving old Prizms, they rust after 20 years, but they hang in there.
I’d agree. I was wondering if my “Sunfire as dressed up Cavalier” qualm qualifies enough as a Deadly Sin, since there is a long list of them. The Cadillac Cimarron as rebadged Cavalier would be much higher on the list, but in terms of late 90’s cars, the Sunfire not offering any appreciable advantage to the Cavalier, mechanically, would be one of the worst examples of that particular era.
Things always seem to look great in the boardroom. And you have to wonder who had voiced dissent with bad ideas at GM, only to be told to shut up and do the job. For the people that helmed these ideas at GM, it doesn’t really matter to them……if they get fired, it’s just another page on their resume, ‘ya know? They don’t care about the long term viability of those companies, and as the bigger that those companies get, the bigger their bravado gets on the bad, ill advised ideas. For all intents and purposes, you may as well have a robot running the company; devoid of any real world knowledge of what people want, and just running bizarre algorithms and programs. It’s the same reason that I kick ass at Madden Football.
“If it’s urine versus a bowel movement, people use a wipe very differently… “How do I apply this to Cadillac?””
Honestly, it’s literally the GM cars from this era that most heavily influenced my perception of GM, and let’s just say as a result, my view of America’s largest automaker has never been that positive.
George, you’ve done a very fine job explaining the mess of GM in 1997, so there’s really not much else I can add, except to reiterate the fact that GM was in deep shit by this point. Cars that weren’t all that appealing to begin with, badge engineered across the various divisions was just nauseating.
One note of disagreement, I never found the 1997 Grand Prix a bright spot or even a moderately appealing car. Despite its slick shape, largely generic design elements, over-application of plastic exterior prosthetics, and a over-styled/subpar quality interior made the Grand Prix another eye roll for me, and another defining car of Pontiac during my lifetime – a reason I never had any affinity for the brand.
I’m surprised that the article didn’t mention the car that in my opinion was the shining light during all of this GM darkness…..the new for ’97 Corvette. I remember it being touted as a true “world car” at the time and still believe that the styling holds up well (probably better than the interior). I currently have a 2002 Z06 and it’s the only “modern” GM vehicle that I have owned. I love the car and have never had a problem with it but the thing that drives me nuts is that you pretty much get a creaking sound every time you touch or use an interior component. You go to sit in the seat….creak, pull the door panel….creak. The worse is opening the center console cover….it is like a symphony. Ironically there is no rattling or creaking at all while actually driving.
On the flip side I also have a ’97 Toyota T100 and at 150,000 miles NOTHING creaks.
I can remember seeing the Cutlass in magazines, and wondered who signed off on it….
Eight divisions? Madness. So then they created Hummer…
I understand why GM created Geo and Saturn: They recognized that by 1988–89, there were a lot of buyers who were just not going to consider a new Chevrolet (or Pontiac, or Oldsmobile) small car, no matter what.
Geo was sort of the automotive equivalent of store-brand generics for import shoppers. It’s not much of a brand identity, but as a regular generic buyer, it has its appeal from a consumer standpoint. The real dilemma from GM’s standpoint is that it didn’t so much address the problem as reinforce it. My impression is that Geo buyers were generally well aware that the cars were built by somebody else and that that was the whole point — save a couple hundred dollars buying a new Corolla from a resentful Chevrolet salesmen rather trying to haggle away the ADP at a Toyota dealership. The future aspirations of somebody buying a Prizm, if not another Corolla or Prizm, probably ran more to a Honda Accord or Nissan Maxima than a Lumina.
I don’t see Saturn as unnecessary so much as a very expensive missed opportunity. Saturn started off with a bunch of good ideas and some fixable shortcomings. The $6 billion price tag was pretty harrowing, but the early cars were a solid B effort and the merchandising approach suggested that somebody at GM was paying attention to the litany of complaints compact and subcompact buyers had about domestic cars. There’s no way GM could have done that with Chevrolet, Pontiac, or Oldsmobile without going to war with dealers all over the country, and even if they had, a lot of Boomer and Gen X buyers would still have said, “Chevrolet? I don’t know…” And the initial push to make Saturn a return to the days when the automotive divisions largely went their own way is the only thing that kept the cars from being just another dreary J-car rehash full of cheapo parts bin bits.
Had GM been willing to continue a process of consistent improvement and been more on the ball about product development (it took them what, six years to get into the compact SUV game?), they could have made Saturn a viable entity. Unfortunately, it felt like they ran out of vision — the L-Series kind of screamed, “We don’t know what to do next,” and the Ion seemed to add, “And we don’t care anymore.” (I mean, I’m sure somebody cared, if only about the bottom line, but it was the kind of car that smacked of wanting to fill a slot rather than offer a compelling product, which is exactly the kind of thinking Saturn was originally supposed to counter.)
Agreed on both counts. Geo was created because GM needed a way to say “hey, we have some real Japanese cars to sell but nobody is looking at them because they are badged as Chevrolets.”
My take on Saturn is that its early success was due (in part) by going backwards and becoming what every GM Division had once been – a semi-autonomous auto company. GM built great cars when GM didn’t actually build cars. Cars were designed and built by the various Divisions. Once the process centralized, GM never seemed to adapt well. Ford and Chrysler had always been much more centralized, so never had that hurdle to deal with. Saturn was the late experiment that sort of proved the old rule.
I think that you nailed it here, JP. My take on Saturn was that they had more autonomy to do their own things……sort of like an independent record label in the music industry that has major distribution: innovative ideas, but with the monetary backing to get it out there to a wider audience. I’ve never been a big fan of Saturn, but my personal take is that they were at least doing something different, and that they were a different flavour to what GM were offering. My take is that Saturn was meant to be positioned to take on the North American demographic that were leaning more towards imports, due to having been disenchanted by GM and other domestic brands that had let them down, but I think that once people realized that Saturn was affiliated with GM, that there was still that stigma or wondering how good the product really is.
I recall reading that the Saturn plant, originally, was also managed by Saturn instead of GM at large (GM Assembly or whatever it was called), which allowed Saturn to adopt a lot of the Japanese production techniques that were being closely studied by everyone at the time. As GM proper asserted more control over Saturn (and by extension the plant), they also limited employee involvement, which helped Saturn become just another GM car.
I mean, the first Saturns even used different keys than the rest of GM’s lines! To this day, I don’t think GM used that keyway on any other product.
Before the “Opelization” of Saturn (remember that the Saturn L Series was based Opel Vectra B, Saturn Astra based on the Opel of the same name, Saturn Aura based from Opel Vectra C/Signum and a handful of others mainly from Chevrolet, Pontiac and Buick roadsters, compacts, minivans and SUVs), Saturn used to have its own unique identity from the start which does not shared its cars with other GM Divisional Cousins vice versa. Just to cite a few the two generations of the Saturn S Series line were Saturn only exclusives and it was only a stand alone product line back then which at first was uniquely different and it identified with its own true self identity and mission. The L Series actually started the permanent “watered down” changes on the Saturn Product Line and identity which eventually lead to its demise.
It’s an interesting dilemma. My biggest issue is that GM’s small car train wreck was entirely predictable if the company and its board had been paying any attention at all in the 1970s. If so, they would have demanded that FWD X- and J-Body cars be better from the get go. That was the real missed opportunity, and then the 1980s would not have required the full “damage control” mode that resulted in GEO and Saturn. Plus, the root cause problem was that Chevrolet small cars were not good enough, and that was the core issue GM should have addressed. Imagine what a $6 billion investment in Chevrolet small cars could have yielded (of course, it was GM in the 1980s, so you could reasonably argue “nothing” and use the GM10 program as “Exhibit A”). But new world-class multi-valve 4-cylinders, fresh bodywork, attractive interiors and consistently high quality would have gone a really long way toward improving Chevrolet’s reputation in small cars.
As for the merchandising of Saturn, I agree that was the best aspect of the brand. Not so much the “One Price, no haggling” approach which has died out (probably thanks to readily available information online), but the notion of friendly, respectful sales people. Could GM have sold Chevy dealers on doing that minimal amount, with some sort of financial incentive to dealers to conduct better training and hold its employees accountable for customer satisfaction scores? I think so–it was probably the “no-dicker sticker” that would have been the showstopper for most of GM’s retailers.
Ultimately, I think Saturn cannibalized more sales from within GM than anywhere else. For Japanese intenders, a “B-grade” effort from a domestic was never going to be as appealing as “A-level” Japanese brands, and they would pay the premium for the superior product. Chevy buyers, on the other hand, could get a car that was better than a Cavalier (low bar) and have a better showroom experience at Saturn.
Plus, there was no “move-up” strategy at Saturn. Oldsmobile tried to position themselves as that choice, to a degree, but it was too much of a stretch. For too long, Saturn only covered the subcompact market, which seemed to have a firm ceiling of total available sales. Dealers who had opened Saturn franchises must have been furious, resulting in yet another black eye for GM.
I completely agree with Jim: Saturn was expensive because it was an actual division again, not just a marketing organization.
If Saturn hadn’t existed in that way, GM would not have spent the $6 billion on product or developing new merchandising strategies. And even if they had, it would have needed to be a decade earlier than Saturn. If the X-cars had been all they were cracked up to be and the J-cars had been world-class efforts that weren’t left to fill out rental fleets, things might have been different and GM wouldn’t have ever needed to even consider bothering with Saturn. But there wasn’t any one decision or missing feature that sank Chevrolet’s reputation in the smaller car classes. It was the death of a thousand cuts on a bunch of different levels. By the time anyone at GM became worried (which I have to assume is what produced Saturn), it was too many things in too many places to simply fix, even by throwing money at them. I think the logic with Saturn (and to some extent NUMMI) was, “Okay, if we set up a NEW organization, we can build it the right way and make good choices that can then be a beacon for the rest of the corporation.”
I have always suspected that the one-segment problem actually became the breaking point for Saturn. It was one thing to make the S-series (“What if we had a C-segment car that wasn’t strictly a price leader?”) and have it be a pretty much all-new product, not a made-over J-car full of miscellaneous parts bin stuff. However, the logical next step for Saturn as an entity would have been an Accord/Camry-class car, and I suspect that caused some senior management eyes to roll up TILT. (“But… the Lumina/Grand Am/Achieva/Alero!”) And it would have cost even more serious money. So, they flailed around and came up with an Opel, then flailed around trying to rationalize how that made sense for Saturn as a “New Kind of Car Company.”
I kind of think the killer for the one-price philosophy might have been Ford doing the same thing with the late 323-based Escorts. After the Focus arrived, Ford value-packed the old Escort and started advertising it for fixed prices under $10K. So, it lifted Saturn’s no-haggle approach and combined it with the dirt-cheap-discount-wheels approach, which if I’m recalling correctly undercut the Saturn SL1 by quite a bit.
All great words here…….another comment that nails it here, yet again. Maybe it’s just that hindsight is 20/20, but you get the impression that some people that post on CC know more about building better cars than the big automakers do. Then again, we’re not businessmen…….the business side of the industry repeatedly goes to war with the engineers and tastemakers, and vice versa. “We want to sell great cars here” versus “we need to make money here”
This was not a pretty lineup. For me, the choice would be pretty much a tried and true Park Avenue, or join the trendsters and thrown down for a tricked out ‘Burban. I’ve driven the DeVilles from those days. I wasn’t impressed with a ’95 I drove, it wallowed in ways the BOF models didn’t…can’t imagine the Northstar powered version would be preferable given its issues. With the Fleetwood gone, if I wasn’t going SUV (or even if I was) I might have been happier over at the Blue Oval.
“elieve it or not, among all the GM divisions, Pontiac actually placed second in sales behind Chevrolet for 1997, and sales were up 27% for the division. What drove the success?”
IMHO, the word got out that Pontiac was becoming a waste-bucket division like Mercury was, over at Ford – but the big difference was, Pontiacs largely were re-badged Holdens from Australia (with all the pizzazz that division had preserved from the Detroit accountants) and only RWD as a result. Bottom line?? – the only division of the Big Three still making cars with some beef to them.
With some proper marketing, Pontiac could have reclaimed its position of market prominence that John DeLorean had begun carving out for it, 40 years previous. Instead, it died an ignominous death by Obama fiat.
The only Pontiacs that were facelifted Holdens were the GTO, which was still about six years away, and then the G8, neither of which did anything for Pontiac sales. Pontiac’s products of this era were all on domestic platforms, and the only RWD model was the Firebird. The main thing distinguishing Pontiac at this point was styling. Which in the main wasn’t bad; the Sunfire was ghastly, but the Grand Am and Grand Prix looked pretty good as long as you didn’t poke too closely at the details or sit down inside. (They must have been knockouts at the concept stage, but what the stylist gives, the accountants taketh away.)
I was looking this article up to find the ridiculous brand manager interviews, but way late I have to nominate this as “least factual comment ever on this site.”
Funny that they mention all the Opel input with the U bodies and Catera while Russelheim’s real talents were left ignored. For all the excitement over German input in the minivans and the outclassed Omega, no expertise was used in making a good mainstream car: no Astras or Vectras out of which to create locally produced Cavaliers and Malibus. Of course, Chevy today does just that, with the Malibu using a shared platform with the Regal/Insignia and the Cruze being a palatable GM Korea (Daewoo) interpretation of Astra mechanicals for the US.
Why didn’t they do that earlier? Why didn’t Ford, for that matter? Would save the expense of conceiving and tooling up a J or L-body replacement.
One thing to say in GM’s favor during this time: they kept their European assets and can today use them properly in the post-bailout era.
I forgot all about the branding adventure by Zarella. No wonder DeLorenzo and many others went apeshit – what unmitigated crap to be shoveled! It truly had to be embarrassing for those in the RenCen who had spent their adult life striving for a top product and value for the GM customers.
The 2009 cleansing should have collapsed GM into 2 branches; Chevy/Saturn/Cadillac & Olds/Buick/Pontiac/GMC. Each company would have had a handful of models that catered to their brand.
Six years late to the comments but I read every single one, and no one mentioned what was my first reaction to the Brand Manager interviews: this is all satire. I mean, this was Automobile Magazine, not CR or even R&T or Motor Trend. No one in the real world would compare Cadillacs to baby wipes, down to the detail of describing urine vs poop. Or pencils, or mouthwash or deodorant. Would they? Please tell me it was all a joke. Please …
You had me convinced way up top when I saw Cadillac being sponsored by Efferdent in the ad copy. What better sponsor than someone who keeps dentures clean for the up and coming millenial crowd?
Someone on my street has one of those Trans Sports, or Trans Ports or whatever they call it. It has been plying these streets for over some 20 years now as I realize it. At least one happy GM buyer around here. Many many more Hondyotaundaikiaru however.
My favorite of the group is the new Saturns. I never expected much from them and they met that expectation. The Gran Prix was a good product as well.
Marketers are bad sales people with college degrees. They clutter everything they touch and rarely offer any meaningful direction for any brands. The only good marketers are the ones who were actually good at sales and skipped college. The next useless clutter of humanity are called project managers. They are people with college degrees who learned a software program for managing projects.
Bureaucracies are filled with people with no idea how to do the jobs they are supposed to manage, and the people they manage know it and have no respect for them. The worse thing that happened to the automobile industry was hiring college graduates who couldn’t fix a flat tire on their own cars. The industry is full of these overpaid ignoramuses.
For thirty years, I have been in government agencies and responsible for administrative support. And for thirty years, I have had to guide young morons fresh from a university, towards understanding what it was, they were supposed to have learned, at that university. The moment they get even a modicum of experience, they get promoted to another position, where another administrative support person like myself, guided them towards understanding that job. Thanks for 20th century thinking, this is supposed to be how things improve. LOL. Right. Looking forward to the day when 21st century thinking actually begins.
GM was a bureaucratic nightmare for over seventy years and it is a miracle it exists today after all those years of clusterfark corporate thinking. Billy Durant, Henry Ford, Walter Chrysler, and the Studebaker brothers would be kicking these morons out into the streets if they were still in charge.
The marketing “Whiz Kid” describing the Pontiac Grand Am in terms of ‘packaging’ really does explain the grotesque amount of chunky plastic cladding (‘packaging’) that adorned Pontiacs from that era. Most other brands were wearing plastic add-ons presented as “design,” too – but Pontiac seemed to specialize in the automotive design version of ‘ugly bridesmaids dresses.’