This is not a vanilla pudding from a mold; it’s a genuine Packard. And a deadly one, at that. I’m not sure of its exact year, but it’s from that time frame. It’s a car we haven’t yet paid tribute to in our CC style, so here’s the extremely short version:
In 1941, Packard wowed the world with its new Clipper, styled by Dutch Darrin in 10 days. It was met so positively, that for 1942, all Packards wore Clipper-inspired styling. Packard had found its new look.
The Clipper is a gem; although undoubtedly inspired by Bill Mitchell’s 1938 Cadillac 60 Special, it was hardly a copy, as it pushed the state of the art up again by several notches. Elegant, and managing to be both lithe and formal.
In 1946 and 1947, like most of the industry, the prewar cars resumed production. But like everyone else, Packard needed a new post war car. Instead of biting the bullet and investing in a totally new car, like the competition, Packard’s conservative management decided to keep the old body for three more years, since the tooling was not yet fully amortized. So the Packard stylists packed on the pounds; 200 lbs of bulging hips, to be precise, in an effort to modernize the Clipper. Needless to say, it was a bust, especially against the new 1948 Cadillac. It was dubbed the “pregnant elephant”.
Packard lovers endless debate about what killed Packard; most commonly it’s the decision to go down market with the 120/110 in the 1930s. I strongly disagree, as that was essential in the Depression era. This is Packard’s Deadly Sin. Packard was flush enough after the war to have come up with a new post war car. Failing to do so handed the baton to Cadillac, which never looked back.
I think Packard’s real sin was sticking with cars when they could have switched to aircraft. They had been building jets for the military in both WW2 and Korea, and had perfected the tooling and skills. Combining jet engines with coachwork and upholstery skills could have produced the corporate jet. Lear had the idea in ’62, but the market would have been there in ’54.
Building aircraft engines and building aircraft are two very different things. I can’t think of a single manufacturer today who does both.
Saab did, past tense. Yes, I realize that you said “today.”
In the early 1980s when I drove a Saab 96, I got into a conversation with a Boeing employee. I said that since Saabs were so good, maybe Boeing should get into cars. He said, “No, you wouldn’t want a Boeing car.”
Honda still does, sort of. The HondaJet uses HF120 engines that are built by a joint venture between Honda and GE.
Sounds like a brilliant and obvious plan. Just add wings to the pregnant elephant and slap on some jets.
Just fill it with helium. It already looks like a blimp.
Pachard never built jet engines on a production scale. They built the Rolls Royce v12 under license to be used in the North American P51 Mustang. There were no jet aircraft combat ready for front line service in the US during WW2.
Interesting. With my 2020 eyes, I really don’t find the ’48 Cadillac much better looking.
I’m presuming the Cadillac was a better car though.
To me the Packard looks fat, while the Cadillac, with its flatter sides and defined fender line that runs from to the rear fender, looks slimmer. And the Cadillac’s tailfin provides a touch of instant marque identification. As people noted at the time, a person could now identify a Cadillac from the front AND the rear.
These Packards were very well built, but once Cadillac came out with the new V-8 and Coupe de Ville for 1949, it was essentially game over for Packard.
People often point to the fact that Packard outproduced Cadillac in 1948 and 1949. What they miss is that the overwhelming majority of those Packards were medium-price models. Cadillacs were all in the luxury field (as that market had evolved in the postwar era). GM had Buick and Oldsmobile to compete in the medium-price market segment.
It’s telling that Packard sales dramatically declined for 1950, while Cadillac kept moving forward.
Supposedly, the 1948 facelift wound up costing almost as much as an entirely new body would have, which makes it even more of a deadly sin. It was compounded by other poor choices Packard made in the immediate postwar years though. With supplier constraints holding back production (as with other brands) and an abundance of willing buyers, Packard should have built higher-end cars rather than the midrange models they did. They also took way too long to develop their own V8 engine. They did design their own automatic transmission, the only US independent that did, but they’d have been better off outsourcing the transmission and spending the money on a modern engine or body.
Packard President George Christopher, a former GM executive, was obsessed with volume, and wanted Packard to build 200,000 cars in one year. He also felt that Packard should emulate Buick, not Cadillac.
What he forgot was that the prestige and reputation of the “senior” Packards had sold those mass-market 110s and 120s in the late 1930s. Once the senior Packard was a better-trimmed version of the cheaper cars, Packard became just another medium-price marque slugging it out for sales. James Nance realized this error, and tried to reverse course, but he had other issues to address that prevented his ideas from reaching full fruition.
Christopher no doubt believed that the medium-price market offered greater opportunities for more volume, but the competition from Buick and Oldsmobile was just as tough as the competition provided by Cadillac in the luxury segment. Packard was peddling bloated cars based on a prewar body shell against Buicks and Oldsmobiles with the latest Harley Earl styling and automatic transmissions (and, in Oldsmobile’s case, a new V-8 for 1949). Even Chrysler and DeSoto soon had trouble keeping up with the GM marques, and the medium-price offerings of the other independents gradually dwindled in importance during the early 1950s.
When GM came out with its all-new 1954 B- and C-bodies – which also coincided with the end of the postwar seller’s market – it essentially finished off Packard. Even Chrysler and DeSoto were hammered in 1954.
> Packard President George Christopher, a former GM executive, was obsessed with volume
Big mistake in the postwar ’40s, when parts and materials shortages meant there was no way they’d have large volume for years to come. This was the perfect opportunity to build high-priced, high-luxury cars that would reclaim the prestige Packard had in their heyday, and they blew it. Bizarrely, Packard, the world’s first automaker to offer air conditioning in 1938, didn’t get back to offering A/C in postwar cars until 1954.
Geeber, my sentiments exactly. I always saw the post war Packards as competitors of Buick and Olds, not Cadillac. Even the tarted up Caribbeans were more akin to say, a Buick Limited than Cadillac 62. Throughout the fifties and into the sixties competition was always brutal in this field, which GM dominated with a succession of fresh, innovative products effectively targeted to upwardly mobile customers. Packard, Hudson, Nash, Edsel and DeSoto learned the hard way. Even Mercury, propped up by the resources of Ford, barely hung on.
The Packard looks to me like the work of a kid who is turning in his homework under protest. As if they lowered the hood a little, lowered the front grill a little, connected the front fenders with the rear, and turned it, not caring about the grade they would receive. Probably not the actual process, but that was the result. It managed to look like even more than 200 additional pounds.
By comparison, the hood, grill and sides of the 48 Cadillac look much more trim, much more ready to go somewhere. Much more P-38 Lightning than C-47 Skytrain. It matched up very nicely with the new Cadillac V8 in 1949, while the Packard continued to plod along with its smooth, but very heavy, flathead V8. Which is so ironic, as Packard earned so much of its war surplus building Rolls-Royce licensed Merlin engines for P-51 Mustangs, while Cadillac was building flathead V8’s for Army tanks.
I think Packard produced flathead, straight 8 cylinder engines
You are so very correct. Packard had two, very solid, flathead straight 8’s. The did finally produce what was described as a very fine V8, but by then the company was running out of sales, cash and options.
The Packard V8 was built only for two years, although some of them did make it into Nash, Hudson, and Studebaker cars as well as Packards. Two years is looking to be a longer life than the Cadillac Blackwing V8 might get…
Ironically, I suspect there was more immediately-transferrable knowledge to be gained building tank engines than highly-strung supercharged aircraft engines. To wit: after the war, RR engined their cars with the B-series F-head engines, designed for armoured car duty. When they finally came to develop a new engine it was based on American big-block V8s.
The main benefit Cadillac gained from supplying the U.S. military was in transmission development. Those tanks were not just fitted with Cadillac V-8s. They were also equipped with Hydramatic transmissions.
Cadillac’s automatic transmission thus really was “battle tested.” Apparently what Cadillac learned during the war was carried over to the civilian units installed in production vehicles.
Oh, the story of WWII tank engines is very interesting. It actually includes the Rolls Royce Merlin, which was de-tuned to produce the 600 hp Meteor engine that powered the Cromwell, and then the very successful Centurion tanks. Britain’s first really successful tank engine. (The machines used in development were actually slightly damaged engines and engine parts taken from crashes that were still serviceable, but not re-certifiable for use in a new plane.) There was a V8 version, but it was still big and powerful enough that it was only used in tank transporters. And then the Ford GAA, a 500 hp, alloy-block, DOHC eight-cylinder that was cut down from a V12 that Ford had hoped to sell to the AAF as an airplane engine. It became the engine of choice for later model Sherman tanks. Maybe you are right, the level of technology needed to produce a successful airplane engine in that war may have been a little too advanced-and big-for the immediate post-war period.
To fully understand the saga of the “Free-Flow Styled” 1948-’50 22nd and 23rd Series Packards, there is no better source than the book “Packard 1948-1950” by Robert J. Neal. The brief synopsis written here is largely correct. The individual and forces that shaped these unfortunate-looking cars is a fascinating piece of automotive history.
In terms of styling, that transition period from the separate fender and body era to fully integrated envelop configuration was a stylistic mine field. How well each company navigated it, varies greatly dependent upon subjective taste. Cadillac did so very adroitly as did all of GM, which was to be expected given the fully-developed styling powerhouse that Misterl had built. Packard had only a small, nascent styling department which depended heavily on input from in-house Briggs Body Company styling department. Briggs, by the postwar, was building all their bodies except the commercial and lwb sedan/limousines by Henney.
As mentioned, the Clipper was the armature on which this styling was applied. The primary culprits responsible for its styling are: Packard’s notoriously pinch-penny, high-volume-production-crazed president George Christopher; Ed Macauley, long-time nepotism-anointed director of the styling department, son of Alvan Macauley, past company president and current Broad Chairman and Al Prance, head of Briggs styling department. Each got what they wanted included in the finished product. Its appeal or lack thereof is left to individual judgement.
Notwithstanding the styling, the cars themselves are mechanically very robust, well crafted and accessible. They represent one of the best values in collector cars now owing to the high numbers built, overall durability and continued popularity among Packard collectors who appreciate their intrinsic qualities beyond their styling.
That ’42 Clipper looks much better! Imagine opening the hood and seeing a 125 hp straight 8 🙂
Nice history to help clarify the demise of Packard. It is a shame.
While the ’42-’47 Packards are indubitably much better looking, certain ’48-’50 models have charm. Those would be (IMHO) the 2-door sedan, the convertible, and the unique-to-Packard Station Sedan.
That last one adds to Packard’s deadly sin. The Station Sedan uses its own roof and quarter panels, unique to that model. Money to do that could certainly have been used to help develop a new car.
Another factor was Packard’s late-to-the-table development of a V-8. Had they done that sooner (and developing a new car), they might have survived.
As long as I’m on the subject of Packard history, I’d like to throw in a plug for the last president of Packard, James Nance. He made mistakes (how the hell anyone does a corporate merger and NEVER even looks at the other company’s books is beyond me). But he tried to take Packard back to its traditional market while modernizing its product line. In the end, he failed. He was brought in too late, and had too few resources to do what needed to be done. But he made a valiant effort.
“(how the hell anyone does a corporate merger and NEVER even looks at the other company’s books is beyond me)”
Wild Guess: BOTH companies were plummeting like paralyzed falcons. Each was so desperate for what the other offered; and was in such a bind as-was, that there was really no choice but to merge and hope for the best.
If Studebaker hadn’t merged with Packard, would they have lasted any longer in the marketplace?
If Packard hadn’t merged with Studebaker, would they have lasted any longer in the marketplace?
I don’t think so. Both companies were already crippled.
IF the mergers had gone another way–Hudson and Nash not merging with each other, but one with Packard and one with Stude; or if all four had combined, maybe things would have lasted another decade; hopefully longer. AMC hobbled on for quite a while.
Packard was actually in a positive cash-flow position when they began courting Studebaker. Some have posited that they might have done better going it alone. Who knows?
And of course you’re correct regarding desperation. But even in desperation, you look at the other company’s books.
That was about the least flattering photo of a ’48 Cadillac I’ve ever seen. The side and 3/4 view of the sedan is much sleeker. The full envelope bodies were not completely embraced by GM who still kept the separate rear fenders. The ’49 Ford shoebox is a classic as are the Mercuries. The Lincolns, two models, one larger than the other, did not fare so well. The larger Lincoln was dubbed “the water buffalo.” Only a Lincoln loyalist would have bought one of those monstrosities! Obviously there weren’t many, as Cadillac ran away with the market. I guess Packard felt they could only jump completely into the envelope body, as they couldn’t afford to develop any interim models. GM didn’t go to integrated quarter panels until the 1954 models.
Jose, I beg to differ as I actually think the Lincolns were the best looking of the trio! However, there is no doubt that Packard got it totally wrong and really this should have been clear to anyone looking at the mock-ups. How the hell the elephant made it past that stage is beyond me. Given how forward looking the previous models were, it would have made sense to _carefully_ face-lift them – it would not have been that hard and would have saved tons of money until the 53s were ready. There were enough freelance stylists on the market who could have done the update work for reasonable fees.
Stupid, stupid, stupid.
Well, the blue car here sure fits the narrative, clearly being owned by a blind (and possibly claustrophobic) person, as it’s festooned with more feelers than a post-nuclear stick-insect.
Personally, I really like these tubs. Sure, the ’41 Clipper is a glamorous super-beauty, but the ’48’s have a fat richness very much of the ’40’s. Images of giant-armed sofas, thick-beamed fire fenders, chunky home facades, all of a piece. They look expensive, conservative, right for their buyers, and they’re not at all ugly to my eyes. It’s only a short stroll from the driver’s seat to the outer sill, good for the circulation, surely.
Anyway, I always thought they sold well, but dated fast, and that second point was more the trouble?
Is it me, or did Rolls-Royce crib styling cues from the 1941 Clipper for the Phantom V?
The Packards, like Hudson’s, looked like an upside down clawfoot bathtub, without legs. They were no longer elegant. They were just fat. The styling was ok in the mid-fifties, but I never understood the PackardBakers. It was a combination of two cars that had no relation to each other. How was that ever supposed to work?
This really was Packard’s deadly sin, or let’s say, the entire 1948-1950 era was. They could have put the money they used in the restyle into designing a V-8. In fact, one thing that is missed in all the mistakes Packard made is they actually designed a brand-new engine block and associated parts for the 288 and 327 (and later 359) straight-8’s that were introduced in 1948! A brand-new Straight-8, when they already had the 356 and the 282!
Take the money they wasted on the 288/327/359 and the pregnant elephant and design a V-8! Or a V-12! Something to push Cadillac with. Instead, they try to out-Buick Buick, but with a flathead straight-8!
Noting that the Packard-8 was a fine engine and was competitive in power, if not weight or “advanced” reputation, up to 1953 or so.