Slipping U.S. Jeep sales have been in the news a lot in recent years, leading pundits to ponder if the Jeep brand is on its way out. However, even a weakened modern Jeep is still enjoying a level of prosperity that its makers could scarcely have imagined in the ’50s and ’60s — Jeep sales through October 2025 were fifteen times total Jeep retail sales back in 1960, which had been a record year for Jeep. I recently found an interesting selection of trade journal ads from 1956 through 1961, back when Willys Motors was still desperately trying to convince dealers that selling Jeep could be a moneymaker. Let’s take a look.
The great industrialist Henry J. Kaiser (1882–1967) succeeded in nearly every business venture he ever tried except for passenger cars. His one-time automotive business partner, Joseph W. Frazer, had unwisely prodded Kaiser into steering their car company, Kaiser-Frazer, into the fray of the mainstream market, where they hadn’t a chance. Kaiser himself then undermined the commercial prospects of his compact car (something he’d been wanting to build since before the end of World War 2) by allowing an unrealistically low base price to become a condition of a vital federal loan. Kaiser eventually parted ways with Frazer, merged the renamed Kaiser Motors with Toledo-based Willys-Overland, and terminated U.S. production of the struggling Kaiser and Willys car lines (although both enjoyed second lives in South America).
By fall 1955, this left Willys Motors with a modest lineup of Willys trucks and Jeep products. The Jeep name — which Willys had finally managed to trademark in June 1950 — was well-known around the world, and Jeep 4WD was a unique selling point, something the earlier Kaiser, Frazer, and Willys cars had mostly lacked. However, the idea that Jeep could ever be a real commercial powerhouse would have seemed absurd. In 1956, its first full year with no Kaiser or Willys passenger car production, Willys built 65,579 Jeep and Willys vehicles, but only 23,488 of those were sold to domestic retail customers, a meager 2.63 percent of the U.S. “commercial car” market.
I was unable to get a clear picture of how many Jeep franchises there were in the late ’50s. R.L. Polk regularly compiled estimates of total passenger car and truck franchises for major domestic brands, but Willys was such a small player that it didn’t get its own tally in the truck listings, and while it was still listed among passenger car franchises (totaling 1,561 in 1957 and 1,368 in 1958–1959), I’m not sure how many of those sold new Jeeps and how many were “service only” holdovers from the passenger car days.
Willys seems to have been concerned about the same thing, which is why these ads are so interesting. They ran in Automotive News, the auto industry trade publication, so they were aimed not at retail customers, but rather at car dealers, trying to get them interested in taking on a Jeep franchise in addition to whatever cars or trucks they were currently selling. (The trade called such arrangements “intercorporate duals.”)
These ads were scanned from microfilm, so they were unfortunately a bit fuzzy and blotchy. I’ve tried to clean them up as best I could.
This first ad reflects on the aftermath of 1955, which had been a record sales year for the auto industry. It had been a bonanza for automakers, but not necessarily a profitable one for new car dealers, who had often been strong-armed into accepting more cars and trucks than they wanted and then had to move aggressively to dispose of that inventory however they could. This led to a lot of bad loans and repossession; “bootlegging” (selling cars and trucks to non-franchise dealers, often across state lines); and a glut of trade-ins that sometimes exceeded what a dealer could hope to profitably resell. The key part of the ad copy reads:
Was your 1955 net disappointingly small?
Did your 1955 year-end statement show a discouragingly low net profit, in spite of the highest volume you’ve ever reached? Did many of your trades result in just exchanging dollars after you figured the wash-out sale? Was the return on your investment far lower than that of independent businessmen in many other industries?
What you can do about it.
You can make your present facilities produce a much healthier net profit for you in 1956, by adding the franchise for the ‘Jeep’ family of 4-Wheel-Drive vehicles. In 1955, more than 600 new dealers enjoyed the potential profits of a ‘Jeep’ franchise — and many of them added the ‘Jeep’ franchise to their present line.
You don’t give up anything.
You can retain your present line, and thus spread your overhead over two lines. A small addition to your present investment will enable you to do a profitable sales-producing job on ‘Jeep’ family vehicles.
What this can mean to you.
The ‘Jeep’ franchise, plus your present line, can mean greater profits because your investment in facilities, and your Service and Sales Department overhead, will be spread over a much wider base. There are prospects for ‘Jeep’ 4-Wheel-Drive vehicles everywhere — among your customers and throughout the area you now service.
If you’re wondering about all the single quotation marks around “Jeep” in these ads, Willys was fighting a desperate battle to keep their hard-won trademark from becoming genericized, and the quotation marks were to emphasize that capital-J Jeep was a brand name, not a generic term.
Never having worked in car sales, “washout” was not a term I was immediately familiar with. What it means is figuring the net profit on a sale involving trade-ins. For instance, if a dealer sells a new car, takes a trade-in on the sale, and then sells the trade, the profit or loss “after washout” is calculated based on the sale of both the new car AND the trade. This can get surprisingly complicated because the sale of the trade may also involve a trade-in, so there may be a whole series of trades before the “washout” can be determined.
This 1957 ad goes the previous ad one better by actually quoting Jeep dealers’ average after-washout profits:
Is your gross profit retention as much as $475.16 after the washout? That’s precisely the profit that actual washout sheets show many ‘Jeep’ dealers are averaging, per vehicle, in a year ‘round market! It’s the kind of profit potential that’s also open to you, as a franchised representative handling the famous ‘Jeep’ family of 4-wheel drive vehicles.
Handle ‘Jeep’ vehicles exclusively or as an addition to your present line! Whether you handle ‘Jeep’ vehicles exclusively, or as an addition to your present line, they’re a great profit opportunity. If added to your present line, you don’t give up a thing! You retain your present operation and add the profit potential of the ‘Jeep’ vehicle franchise. You use the same physical facilities, with little increase in operating expense, and you add substantial profits.
Here’s what you can do right now! Look into the franchise that’s showing a gross profit retention of $475.16 after the washout! Most of the customers for 4-wheel drive ‘Jeep’ vehicles are farmers and businessmen who have a definite job for these vehicles to do. There’s no wheeling and dealing competition down the street. Nearly 50% of all ‘Jeep’ vehicle sales are clean deals. What’s more, ‘Jeep’ vehicle resale value is far greater! And there are additional profits from the sale of a wide variety of special equipment.
A “clean deal” or “clean sale” means a sale with no trade-in. It’s “clean” because the dealer immediately knows how much money they made, with no trade to dispose of and no need to wait for the washout to figure out profit and loss. The reason these ads stressed Jeep resale value was to emphasize that if the dealer DID take a trade, they wouldn’t have to sell it at a loss just to get it off the lot.
The last line of the ad copy, emphasizing special equipment sales, is very interesting. In the ’50s, Jeep vehicles were working vehicles, used for many tasks. Willys had an extensive Jeep Specialized Vehicles and Equipment Catalog, offering equipment that ranged from plows and winches to built-in tool lockers. Much of this equipment was actually made by third-party suppliers like Koenig and Turner, but a dealer could order it for a customer through Willys.
I’m not sure how enticing that idea actually was for dealers looking to take on a dual franchise. The additional opportunities for after-sale upgrades and service had to be balanced against the hassles of having to get car dealer service technicians to install and service a wide range of non-automotive equipment, and for salespeople to be familiar enough with it to actually sell it to customers. It could be hard enough for sales and service staff to keep abreast of the options and accessories available on a single car line without expecting them to also know how to sell and fix hydraulic lifts and snowplows.
This 1958 ad (which ran again in 1959) repeats much of the same pitch, but note that it scales back its claims a bit:
Compare your present profits with the profits you can make… and keep…as a ‘Jeep’ dealer. ‘Jeep’ dealers report average retained gross profits of $447.74 per sale—after washout! This kind of profit can be yours— with the ‘Jeep’ Dealer Franchise.
Retain higher gross profits. As a ‘Jeep’ dealer, you will not be competing with every other dealer in town on trade-in overallowances and discounts. For many jobs in agriculture, industry, public service and business, only ‘Jeep’ 4-wheel drive vehicles have the extra traction to get the job done better and faster. In addition, 40.2% of all reported ‘Jeep’ sales are clean deals, and the constant demand for trade-in ‘Jeeps’ regularly brings prices well above book value.
Make more profit on your present investment. If you’re an automotive or truck dealer, you can add the ‘Jeep’ franchise to your present line with practically no increase in overhead! ‘Jeep’ vehicles will expand your market to a wide range of new prospects in business, public service, agriculture and related fields. Along with high retained profit on ‘Jeep’ vehicles, you’ll make extra profits on parts, service and ‘Jeep’-Approved equipment. When a ‘Jeep’ owner has a new job to do, he returns to his ‘Jeep’ dealer for special equipment.
Notice also that the ad pushes the special equipment idea pretty hard. Jeep was affected by the late ’50s recession, although not as bad as some car makes: Their 1957 retail sales were down by 6.3 percent from 1956, to 22,005, and 1958 sales improved only slightly. When selling fewer vehicles, the idea of making some extra money through after-sale service becomes more enticing.
Business began to pick up again 1959 and 1960, when Jeep retail sales topped the 30,000 mark for the first time.
This 1961 ad proclaims:
Only the ‘Jeep’ vehicle is so rugged, versatile, proved. And its resale value is so high you do a ‘double take’ at the book listing. The ‘Jeep’ Universal depreciates as little as 10% in two years—and that’s a fact!
Customer loyalty isn’t the only reason a ‘Jeep’ franchise is so valuable. There’s profit: ‘Jeep’ dealers average $400 gross profit per vehicle after washout.
And sales volume: at an all time high and still climbing. Advertising support: Hong Kong and Maverick—two top national network TV shows help sell ‘Jeep’ vehicles week after week all year.
You can add the ‘Jeep’ franchise to your existing line with little increase in overhead. Why not get all of the facts right away!
For Jeep, sales at “an all time high” meant 31,385 U.S. retail sales in the 1960 calendar year, an average of 22 new Jeep sales per franchised dealer. For comparison, that was about half the average per-franchise sales of Ford or Chevrolet truck dealers that year.
The references to Maverick in these ads were a little misleading. The irreverent Western TV series, then airing on ABC with star James Garner, was not sponsored by Willys Motors, but by Kaiser Industries, the parent company. (Willys certainly couldn’t afford even a fraction of the $3.7 million Kaiser spent on TV in 1959!) Nonetheless, Maverick was a popular show, and getting even an occasional Jeep spot on it was good for business.
Did these appeals work? To a point. They did gradually succeed in attracting more dealers: By 1967, the year Henry Kaiser died, Jeep had around 1,800 franchises, which sold almost 40,000 vehicles that year. However, average sales per dealer per annum remained a mediocre two dozen or so. Kaiser Jeep (as Willys Motors was renamed in early 1963) was profitable, but it was heavily dependent on government sales. The Kaisers had never really gotten their heads around the retail business — it was too uncertain and too volatile compared to fixed-price government contracts — and after Henry’s death, his son Edgar no longer had much desire to try.
I think these old dealer ads demonstrate the basic problem with their approach. Telling prospective franchisees that Jeep could be a profitable little sideline probably made sense for a while: Kaiser-Frazer had gotten hammered trying to go head-to-head with the majors, and the Kaisers desperately needed a sustainable niche. Jeep gave them that, but their strategy meant that it was likely to stay a niche indefinitely, even with interesting new products like the Wagoneer. It wasn’t until after the sale to AMC in 1970 that Jeep was able to really build its retail business. Here’s a dealer ad from early in the AMC era:
Notice the big shift in tone and focus — instead of talking about how Jeep was a way to make a nice little profit on a low-investment sideline, the ad copy emphasizes VOLUME: fantastic boom, cashing in, an exploding market. There’s also a new and slightly off-color tagline (“Toughest four-letter word on wheels”). This more aggressive approach DID work: Jeep retail sales topped 50,000 in 1972, and by 1978, they were over 163,000, more than the Kaisers would have dared imagine.
I don’t know if there’s any particular lesson here for Jeep today, except that over the years, the brand has survived all manner of dubious husbandry — some overly timid, some overly aggressive, some just careless and sloppy — and bounced back strongly. Even in its present decline, it’s still going to top half a million U.S. sales in 2025 (it was up to about 450K by October 1), and a brand that big isn’t easily killed.
Related Reading
Curbside Classic: Willys Jeep CJ-5 (1955-1963) – The Making Of An Icon (by Paul N)
Curbside Find: 1957 Jeep FC-150 Forward Control (by Jim Klein)
Vintage Dealers: Jeep Willys Dealers In The ’50s-’60s (by Rich Baron)
Vintage Dealer Snapshots: Jeep Dealers — From The ’50s To The ’70s (by Rich Baron)
Any tech worth his salt would have no problem installing and servicing the special equipment, especially in the midwest.
How many dealer techs could barely fix regular equipment on a standard car line, and balked horribly at anything too new and novel?
Anyone who suggests that Jeep is a dying brand does not understand the car market or the power of the brand. Yes, there have been some declines recently and much more competition as Jeep has expanded massively into the general market and meanwhile there is more competition in the off-road market, like the Bronco). And there’s more to come, with the Scout.
Yes, Edgar Kaiser bailed a bit early.
Jeeps of that day were about the simplest vehicles being sold, and were probably no harder to service than the Model As and early Ford V8s that all the mechanics learned on. I would imagine that the biggest impediment to getting new dealers was the need to invest in a second parts inventory and promotional materials like signage and advertising.
AMC was a perfect owner because Jeeps went into a dealership network that had been largely built during Rambler’s boom years a decade earlier.
I was not talking about servicing Jeep vehicles generally, I was talking very specifically about selling and servicing the additional stuff offered in the Willys special equipment catalog, which included a whole assortment of non-automotive equipment from different third-party manufacturers, such as plows, winches, post hole diggers, and who knows what else.
I love these industry ads – definitely presents a different viewpoint than consumer ads. It took quite a visionary (or maybe just a lucky gambler) to see a future in Jeep (sorry… ‘Jeep’) sales in the late 1950s.
Here’s a another ad for your collection – Willys was a bit more sanguine with this ad – insinuating that dealers would get wheelbarrows full of money with a Jeep franchise!
Oh, that’s great! I hadn’t seen that one before or I would definitely have included it.
Never fails for the critics to go after Kaiser Frazer. They seem to expect Henry and Joe to have a crystal ball to read the future. While Joe was the pragmatic one, Henry kept pushing, and he did achieve what the experts thought was the impossible. The purchase of Willys was genius, even with all the ups and downs, Kaiser and Willys production moved to South America, Kaiser Willys sold to AMC, as we all know, Jeeps are still in production. Kaiser-Frazer ended up much better than say Packard or Hudson, those being just cancelled.
Kaiser-Frazer was always catastrophically under-capitalized, and was never going to work in the way it was intended. That didn’t require any special insight, even in 1945. Kaiser really always wanted to build different kinds of vehicles that Detroit wasn’t then making — which he eventually did — but he was used to contracting, where you might have some lean months before you could deliver, but then when you did, the money would start rolling back in, which isn’t how things work in passenger car manufacture. Frazer wanted to be Walter P. Chrysler, which was utterly unrealistic, and while he better understood the practical realities of making and selling cars, he kept pushing for them to compete with mainstream middle-class models, which was commercial suicide.
The Kaisers consolidating on Willys WAS a good move, and a much more realistic move than what they had been trying to do before. However, they didn’t have any vision for how to grow Jeep more than incrementally from where it was in the ’50s.
Okay, Willys trademarked Jeep in 1950 per the article. why were they still so defensive in 1956 when the trademark should be solid, IH was building only full sied trucks then, and Ford, who was the only other manufacturer that really could claim the rights to “Jeep” had no interest in entering Jeep’s market?
Ford designed the M151 for the US Army in the 1950s. It looked like a Jeep and probably everyone in the army referred to it as a Jeep. Kaiser had to keep reminding people that Jeep was their trademark.
Registering a trademark is only one step. Maintaining a registered trademark also means you have to defend it vigorously, both against other commercial users and against it becoming a genericized term. Scotch tape and Xerox copiers went through similar battles, because if something becomes just a synonym for a particular type of product, it ceases to be a trademark.
The attached image is another example of the problem Leaper mentions: Chrysler and the Army were working in the late ’50s on a small VTOL vehicle for the military that they called the “Aerial Jeep.” Willys objected, and so the papers presented to the Society of Automotive Engineers all got this apologetic little cover note:
I wonder how much gro$$ my father left behind with the “good deal” he got on his Jeep, starting in 1949-50 in Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin. The dealer, IIRC, was on the other side of the water from Sturgeon Bay working out of a gas station (?) perhaps. This was his first “car” ever. I remember it best because we managed to get thru a blizzard on old U.S. 20 coming back from visiting one of his Sargents, from his USAAF days in Europe during WW2, who lived in South Bend, IN. Other than snow plows we were about the only car that made it back to Chicago, and then a long drive north back up to Sturgeon Bay. .
The Jeep was a basic RWD version, but did have ground clearance a normal 50s family sedan did not have. Therefore it kept chugging along; the 3 speed stick helped, too!
Curiously I now live 12-15 miles east of South Bend, IN, and we are getting a dose of lake effect snow currently. That is what we drove thru all those years ago in his “good deal” Jeep! 🙂 DFO