Oldsmobile’s sales had been steadily collapsing by the time the new Aurora arrived in 1995. Its arrival came as a surprise to those who still paid attention. It looked like nothing else in Oldsmobile’s lineup, and it’s no wonder. The 1989 Tube Car concept on which it was based wasn’t originally meant for the division. Instead, according to Chuck Jordan, the Tube Car was created by GM’s stylists as an exercise, and Oldsmobile’s management appropriated it. It was the styling statement the division hoped would reignite its fortunes.
For a car meant to revitalize the division, all references to Oldsmobile were curiously absent. Both in print materials and on the car itself. Whatever the thinking was behind the approach, it might have worked too well. As one survey owner noted “To this day, people compliment my car. Some are still unsure of what kind of car it is. I love telling them that it’s an Oldsmobile and seeing their reaction.”
It was a rather curious way to ‘revive’ an ailing brand.
Regardless, a lot of hope was placed on the Oldsmobile Aurora’s nicely contoured fenders. The automotive press generally praised it and sent much goodwill its way, hoping the car would point the “way out of the abyss” for the division. And when it came to the meaty stuff, the car delivered; the 72 owners Road & Track surveyed were quite pleased with Oldsmobile’s new flagship. With the Aurora’s Northstar-derived V-8, performance and styling were the car’s best attributes, delivering on looks, power, and moves. GM’s stylists also delivered on the Aurora’s cockpit, offering a nicely styled driver-oriented layout.
No mention of any failings on the Northstar-related engines, which must have been lurking in wait. And while much had improved with GM’s assembly since the ’80s, weaknesses still showed up on the Aurora. Assembly, reliability, and finish were amongst its worst-rated attributes, along with mechanical and electrical glitches of various ilk. While none were of a serious nature, they were a blemish on the vehicle’s record. Last, the Aurora’s resale values were miserly.
To the question “Would you buy another?” only 68% of respondents said they would consider it, well below R&T’s survey averages. It was an ominous result. By 2000 it was well known Oldsmobile needed every single sale it could get, as it had become a “matter of life and death” in the words of R&T.
Death actually came while this R&T issue sold on newsstands that Dec. of 2000. On the 13th of that month, GM announced it was going to close Oldsmobile for good.
Further reading:
Curbside Classic: 1997 Oldsmobile Aurora – Waiting To Exhale
Curbside Classic: 2001 Oldsmobile Aurora – Dawn Turns To Dusk
Too little, too late. This should have been on GM’s radar screen in the late ’80s when Acura and Lexus were rolling out, and to make sure it was a stellar effort in every sense. But GM has never been, and will never be, capable of such. Cadillac has some strong product, but nothing so astounding as to make people switch from other luxury brands except if it’s a captive leasing scenario. With the rising popularity of Mercedes in the ’60s, GM then and there should have looked into the crystal ball and said “we can do better” by designating one of their best divisions (Cadillac, Olds, Buick?) as a true euro-fighter. Grosse Point myopia indeed.
Yes GM could have used one of their divisions as a euro-fighter, but the reason they didn’t do it was because there were perhaps 50 to 75K upper-class Euro sales annually in the US during the 60s and early 70s (i.e. Jaguar, Mercedes, Rolls, Porsche, Alfa), and Olds and Buick were each selling 500 to 750K of dressed up Chevrolets annually during that time and minting money for GM shareholders – no beancounter would have allowed such a strategy.
What GM management missed was how rapidly the sales of expensive European cars had been rising since the mid-1960s – even with exchange rate fluctuations that made them increasingly expensive in the U.S. market.
There was no indication that this segment was going to level out at 75,000 units, particularly with the Baby Boomers poised to hit their prime earning years.
GM should have allowed Oldsmobile and Cadillac to jointly develop a modern platform that could be shared between the two divisions, which would have increased total sales and made the platform more viable.
In the very early 1970s, Oldsmobile General Manager John Beltz did push for Oldsmobile to develop a BWM fighter, but he was shot down by top management on cost grounds.
“GM should have allowed Oldsmobile and Cadillac to jointly develop a modern platform that could be shared between the two divisions, which would have increased total sales and made the platform more viable.”
They thought they did…What’s more import-fighter than Olds Firenza and Cadillac Cimarron? 🙂
I feel like one of three things happened with the premium “import-fighting” J-bodies. Either
a) GM saw people buying these spartan, austere, undersize European premium cars (notably BMW, Saab and Volvo models) and figured it could make something similar…without understanding that part of the joy of such a car is it being on well-engineered or even pedigree bones, and *not* based on a soggy J-body platform,
b) The idea of a J-body-based import was proposed fairly early, and everyone just went with it because it promised very good profit margins and low investment expenses. But by the time the car neared end-of-development, it was clear the mission was doomed and that it could never win at its mission statement…but it was too late. The project had already been hyped to high hell and too much money had gone into it already, or…
c) As a sort of corollary to a), GM did what GM often did and developed a car on “spreadsheet specs.” The J-body Cimarron, in particular, might have met or exceeded all the measurable standards set by the contemporary small European cars, and that was good enough for GM to feel comfortable about making it. Never mind that the J-body was not enjoyable to drive or anything better than the sum of its parts.
Possibly a mixture of all three.
I think Kyree is right on all three points. The popularity of the original BMW 3-Series was not something GM was ever really going to understand, organizationally: By Detroit standards, the E21 and E30 were dinky, underpowered, rough-riding, and Spartan, commanding premium prices based on an elusive snob appeal no GM division was going to replicate. Also, the E21 and E30 were not all that technologically sophisticated — they had IRS, but by twitchy semi-trailing arms, nothing like the multilink suspension of the subsequent Mercedes W201 — so what made them appealing to drive was German chassis tuning, which is not something Detroit got its head around until much, much later.
The problem with the J-car, at least in North America, was not necessarily a lack of engineering sophistication, but that GM couldn’t not see it as a cheap economy car. Since by then even GM’s high-end cars were falling victim to relentless penny-pinching, the J-cars never had a chance.
I think you’re right. GM also could have focused on making models that sold fewer examples, for a lot more money (and profit margin), which is what the foreign competition did. But GM wasn’t set up for that. It was set up for volume, volume and more volume. It was also set up for squeezing out profit primarily by selling gussied-up cars that could share a lot of tooling and production lines with the more mainstream cars on which they were based, as you mention. Also, to Ole’s point, I think the GM board and shareholders would have found these ultra-high-end, niche models a risky proposition.
But a proper BMW fighter for Oldsmobile and Cadillac? I don’t know when that could realistically have happened. Not in the mid-late 70s when GM was reeling from the OPEC crisis and having to choke and downsize its cars to meet fuel economy ratings. Not in the 80s, when GM went through a second (far less successful) round of downsizing and made just about everything it sold transverse-FWD. And not in the 90s, when the firm was building particularly lackluster (and yet over-development-budget) cars in the name of cost savings.
The only thing I could have seen GM doing was literally bringing some better-cultured Opel product to the ‘States, as it sort of tried to do with the Diplomat, which would have become the eventual 1976 Seville. But it wouldn’t have been able to be built here in the States and would have been an import by any other name. It likely would have suffered from Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome and been sabotaged at every turn by both Cadillac and Oldsmobile…and it likely *still* would have still been inferior to the European competition, from both a badge-pedigree and a mechanical standpoint.
The last point is strongly evidenced by the fact that Opel’s attempts to do battle with BMW, Audi, Mercedes, and Volkswagen in the more prestigious segments were not very successful, and the downmarket push of the 3-Series and A-Class ended up basically killing the European “non-prestige” D-segment as well. Opel’s actual track record as a BMW fighter is not what you’d call compelling.
If GM was trying to break out of Your Father’s Olds, it didn’t work. The happy owners in the article are in the Retirement Belt.
The very slogan, “Not your father’s Oldsmobile” just reinforced the existing perception of Olds as an old man’s car, which was already implicit in the name itself, regardless of the marque’s history for engineering innovation that only old folks remembered by then anyway.
I suspect they were flirting with the idea of trying resolve that by changing Oldsmobile to Cutlass — which would explain why nearly every Olds model was a Cutlass Something-or-other for a while there — but IMO they got the ’80s-90s brand positioning of Olds and Buick exactly backwards.
In hindsight, the “Sloan ladder” upgrade path from Chevy should have been: Pontiac if you wanted more sporty performance (they got this one right), or Olds if you wanted more posh luxury, then Buick if you wanted both (which it eventually became by now anyway), and of course Cadillac as the final step further up from Buick.
And GM did a similar kind of marketing roughly 10 years ago on Buick. “That’s a Buick?”
Well, no. In the case of the Verano, Encore, Cascada and Regal…it was an Opel. But that’s neither here nor there.
The whole idea of not branding the new Oldsmobile as an Oldsmobile in an effort to revive Oldsmobile was just plain stupid. A college education was wasted on someone.
That’s a great assessment of this marketing flop. Though I suspect the person responsible for that was promoted.
I believe the idea at the time was to eventually rename the entire division Aurora as the traditional Olds buyer was dying off and nobody under 30 (or 40) was apparently remotely aspiring to own an Oldsmobile. So the Aurora Aurora would be the flagship and then there’d be the Aurora Intrigue, Aurora Alero, Aurora Bravada etc., the older models re-branded when they got re-styled/re-engineered. But there was a lot of waffling and no real commitment to it either, beyond an updated sort of planetary-orbiting-ish rocket logo.
Of course nobody under 30 could afford an Aurora anyway and while the styling was there to bring people into the showrooms, the ones that did generally looked at what else was sitting on the floor and hotfooted it out the door to Acura and Lexus. The look was certainly “fresh”, but the branding didn’t fool anyone that opened their mind of other options beyond Detroit’s.
Don’t forget there was a second-generation Aurora which watered down the distinctive styling a lot (as if the first generation’s was a mistake instead of doubling-down on it) and ended up as pretty much a fancier Impala or whatever.
The Oldsmobile Aurora was very much ahead of its time for a domestic car. Its streamlined design, superb structural rigidity, thorough modernism inside and out, and excellent ergonomics were all a blast of fresh turbulence entirely worthy of a brand with a rocket ship for its logo. Yet, it was still unapologetically and unabashedly American. Unfortunately, future Oldsmobiles would share virtually no similarities with this inspiring potential “halo” car. “Intrigue” anyone? Didn’t think so (unless you were Hertz or Budget). Were it not for China’s deep fascination with and fierce loyalty for the Buick brand, I don’t think Oldsmobile would have been the first major GM brand to bite the proverbial Detroit dust. The Aurora could have been the prologue of a triumphant American comeback. Instead, it became the epilogue of a tragic American death.
While the Northstar engine was much lauded when originally released, it proved to be one of the less reliable GM engines.
I found it interesting that the extended warranty documentation that was supplied with my company car (a 2022 Chrysler minivan) found it necessary to exclude the Northstar engine from coverage.
I wouldn’t think this would concern a Chrysler warranty plan. Evidently such is the reputation & history of these engines that even non-GM warranty plans find it necessary to prevent their dealers from covering the occasional rare trade-in at a Chrysler dealer.
I wasn’t familiar with the Tube Car. The Aurora certainly stayed true to the concept, but that’s not necessarily a good thing, as from some angles it looks awkward. The heavy horizontal emphasis at the lower doors visually fights with the curvaceous upper body. Some tension is okay; this is too much. And the tail treatment is particularly unpleasant.
But this sort of car should have come onstream years earlier, when sales of traditional Oldsmobiles first began to flag, not at the point when the brand was already in a death-struggle according to the media and people could tell it was going under. It makes you wonder what all those highly-salaried managers were doing, other than keeping out of each others’ way. They certainly were’s earning their keep, judging by the results. No wonder resale value was atrocious.
And the lack of quality that owners tell of is just head-shakingly amazing. Okay, you could blame the workers who assembled it, but someone in a managerial capacity let it out of the plant. Did GM higher-ups have no experience with Japanese imports? At a time when the assembly quality of Japanese cars was legendary, and had been for years, how did they think a luxury car with all those faults would be acceptable in the marketplace?
It makes you wonder whether they really did want to revitalize the division or not.
No wonder the ‘old GM’ died. It’s just a wonder it hadn’t happened earlier.
I wonder if “new GM” is really something different.
As I said elsewhere, it’s a shame the Aurora’s G-body sister, the 1995-1999 Buick Riviera, didn’t get even this same level of interior attention or tech. If they thought the Aurora had bad QC, the Riv was worse in just about every metric other than the latter’s use of the venerable 3800 engines.
As for the Aurora itself, it never occurred to me that it would *absolutely* have been an import-fighting entry-level-lux sedan, priced right on top of the Japanese competition: the Acura Vigor/3.2 TL, Lexus ES 300, Mazda Millenia S and Infiniti I30 (which did not arrive until later). What it lacked in those cars’ impeccable build quality and refinement, it made up for with a drastic, distinctive design and that torquey V8.
I can’t say I wouldn’t have bought a first-generation Aurora at any point that it was new, resale value be damned. In fact, I absolutely would have. I love a flawed car, as long as it excites me.
Back when the first series Aurora debuted I was in a rare situation, I was able to afford one of these rather expensive cars. I was a GM fan, and I was seriously considering a new Riviera, or Aurora, or a two year old Cadillac Seville or ElDorado. I was a fan of older Rivieras, and I was intrigued by the idea of buying a brand new one. The Aurora appealed to me, it certainly looked fantastic, and I could use a sedan with two kids. I knew that a coupe wouldn’t be the wisest choice.The Eldo was great looking also, and had a high quality interior, and the 4.6 NorthStar was fast. The STS combined all the best features of the other three cars. It had the best styling, the nicest interior, and the powerful engine. It was also a spacious sedan, and I’d kinda promised my Son that he would get his “own” door with our next car.
The Aurora was a strong runner up, and my Wife was fully behind any choice, but I couldn’t pass up the opportunity to buy the Cadillac. This was the most expensive car that I’ve ever bought, that includes a couple of “recent” new cars and some almost new ones.
I kept the STS for ten years and over 100,000 additional miles ( bought with 28,000 miles) and it didn’t have too many problems until it hit 80,000 miles.
The Aurora was a very nice car, but it wasn’t a Cadillac!
After this, my Wife realized that I would never be really satisfied with any car, and she will not go along with plans to buy another expensive car, which is why I have been buying Fords. But I have owned a lot of interesting older cars since then.
My dad wanted one of these badly. He brought one home for mom’s approval….he opened the passenger door for her….the inside door panel stayed inside while the door was open! He slammed the door and headed back to the dealer. He never considered a GM after that.
I got an off lease 99 Aurora sterling silver over charcoal with chrome wheels in 2000, it was with me for 2 years. I got the best wood dash kit on the market, installed HID headlights and driving lights, tinted (illegally) the windows as I lived in Michigan at the time, and I installed chrome exhaust covers. I only had 2 complaints well 3. The center console armrest was a semi-hard plastic. This was to be covered in leather. The drivers window would whistle at 70 mph no matter how many tines I took it to Bob Sak’s Oldsmobile. And the ride over some of Michigan’s roads would make the chassis shudder in a way that made you question the cost of the car. My now wife had a Toyota Corolla early 2002 model and it’s ride plus NVH would sometimes embarrass the Aurora. Any way GM offered to buy the car back with an offer for a Lacrosse and the car loss almost ten grand in value overnight once the announcement was made. The older Auroras were becoming affordable to the (Fellas) and my car was stunning. Someone towed it from in front of my now wife’s house in Detroit and striped to a complete shell not event the glass was left. An S Class and several Camrys later I drive a 2013 Avalon which is what an Aurora should have been.
I’ve always loved the styling of the 1995-99 Aurora. I’ll be damned if the one in the lead photo doesn’t look slightly awkward though… I’m still smitten. I barely remember the second generation, other than it was equipped with rear fog lights that every single driver in the US just switched on during their first night drive and never turned them off again.
I remember looking at and test driving a 1999 Aurora at an Oldsmobile dealer in early 2002. I really wanted one, but despite the reported low resale value, I couldn’t quite swing it. Looking at them now… as with the 1995 Firebird that I drove in this era, it’s *totally* a product of the 1990’s! And I still want one!
As a Northstar side note: A friend of mine owned a series of Northstar powered Cadillac Seville STS’s as late model used cars, and didn’t see a ton of problems with them. He had a 1993, a 1997, a 1998, and a 2003-ish; his last car was a (no longer a Seville) 2006 STS-V. I remember the 1997 consuming oil and leaking due to crankcase porosity, and the 1998 consuming oil, but no other engine woes. Perhaps that was the reason they had a 7-8 quart oil capacity? Hmm…